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Abstract 
What are the main macroeconomic factors that help understand economic growth in Brazil 
since 1870? Are institutions (and changes in institutions) a deep cause of economic growth in 
Brazil? Are these effects fundamentally and systematically different? Does the intensity and 
the direction (the sign) of these effects vary over time, in general and, in particular, do they 
vary with respect to short- versus long-run considerations? This thesis tries to answer these 
questions focusing on within country over long periods of time. It uses the power-ARCH 
(PARCH) econometric framework with annual time series from 1870 to 2003. The results 
suggest that financial development (domestic and international) exhibit the most robust 
first-order effects on growth and its volatility. Political instability, trade openness and public 
deficit play important yet secondary roles since the effects of the first two do not extent to 
the long-run (that is, they are restricted to the short-run) and those off the latter are sensitive 
to the measures of the variables used in our analysis. 
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Introduction 
This study examines how macroeconomic factors and political instability affected 
long-term economic growth in Brazil since 1870. The Brazilian case has its special interests. 
Ever since Brazilian independence, there is little disagreement among economists and 
economic historians that the period from 1870 to 1970 is a period of growth. The impact of 
coffee on Brazil’s economy drives the output growth for almost a century. However, in the 
wake of the economic crisis, Brazil’s economy performance entered a period of increase 
inflation and stagnation in 1980s. In trying to bring the inflation under control, Brazil had to 
undertake severe fiscal adjustment. Naturally, economic expansion required financial support 
and one of our focuses in this thesis is an understanding of the role of financial development. 
Thus, whether financial development together with other factors has affected Brazil's output 
growth is one central question of this thesis.  
From a political point of view, Brazil was rarely stable during the past one hundred years. 
Frequent political/institutional changes are associated with output growth. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to identify the causal effect of institutions on economic growth. Institutions do 
change much quicker in developing countries (rather than the developed countries) but the 
quality of the few existing data tends to be rather questionable, that is, when available. 
Therefore, this study explores a new dataset and within country variation over extremely 
long periods of time to assess the causal effects of various types of institutions in terms of 
the growth rate of per capita GDP. 
 
  This study tries to contribute to our understanding of the main causes of economic growth 
by using a power- ARCH (PARCH) frame work with following questions: What is the 
relationship between, on the one hand, financial development (domestic and international), 
political instability, public deficit, trade openness and, on the other hand, economic growth 
and (predicted) growth volatility? Are these effects fundamentally and systematically 
different? Does the intensity and the direction (the sign) of these effects vary over time, in 
general and, in particular, do they vary with respect to short- versus long-run considerations?  
We believe this further our understanding of economic growth because: (a) we study only 
one individual country over a very long period of time with annual frequency data. (b) we 
extensively use the economic history literature to guide our choice of potential important 
reasons behind the performance of the Brazilian economy over a very large time window, (c) 
we choose an econometric methodology that has been seldom used in the empirical growth 
literature despite the fact that it easily allow us to contrast the direct to the indirect (i.e., via 
the volatility channel) effects of each of our candidate reasons, sort out the short- from the 
long-run impacts, and distill the consequences of accounting for important structural breaks 
on the robustness of our key results. Another important, albeit more technical, benefit of our 
choice of econometric framework is that it helps shedding light on an important and resilient 
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puzzle on the relationship between output growth and its volatility. 
 From the univariate analysis, we find that (1) the main explanatory factors, solely in 
terms of their negative lagged direct/indirect effects on economic growth in Brazil, turn out 
to be financial development (domestic and international), political instabilities, trade 
openness and public deficit. From investigating whether dynamic considerations affect our 
conclusions, we find important differences in terms of short- and long-run behavior of our 
key variables, more specifically, while the effects of financial development (mainly M1 and 
commercial bank deposits) are negative in the short- and positive in the long-run, that of the 
US interest rate work in the opposite direction. (2) Further, as to the political instability 
indicators, while strong negative impacts can be observed in the short-run, the corresponding 
effects for the long-run are weaker. (3) Finally, public deficit has both a negative short and 
long-run impact. 
In the multivariate setting, the results show that (4) financial development (domestic and 
international) exhibit the most robust first-order effects on growth and its volatility. (5) 
Political Instabilities play important secondary roles since the effect of both formal and 
informal political instabilities do not extend to the long-run with the existence of all other 
explanatory variables. Further, (6) both trade openness and public deficit are important in 
explaining the output growth in Brazil. Interesting, the significance of the influences of 
public deficit on growth is sensitive to the choice of the political indicator. Similarly, trade 
openness has a significant negative direct impact on growth only when we include legislative 
effectiveness and revenues as a regressor. 
 
  The reminder of the thesis is organized as follows. Focus on the Brazilian case, Chapter 
one investigates the association between financial development and economic growth over 
the period of 1870 – 2003. Chapter two discusses the influences of institutional changes on 
output growth. Chapter three evaluates the relative merits of the factors behind these 
different explanations. Finally, the conclusions are summarized at the end. 
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Chapter One 
Financial Development and Economic Growth over the 
Very Long-Run: 
Non-Linear Time-Series Evidence for Brazil since 1870 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
The B in BRICs is for Brazil. In 2001, Goldman Sachs put out a report that popularized 
the term BRICs countries in economics (BRICs standing for Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
and, more importantly, marked the start of a shift in relative weights in the world economy 
towards the so-called emerging market countries. Many doubted whether Brazil should be 
included in such a distinguish group, but few questioned that among the four the country has 
undergone a most remarkable transformation in the last 100 years or so. From a poor, 
unsophisticated, primary exporter economy about one hundred years ago it became one of 
the largest and richest emerging markets of our day. Economists and economic historians 
have gone to great lengths to try to understand this important transformation. One class of 
potential explanations that has received considerable attention is macroeconomic factors. 
Various hypotheses have been put forward to explain this process of deep structural 
transformation but attention has focused on the roles of financial development, public 
finances and international financial integration. Few previous studies have evaluated these 
explanations jointly and this is the main contribution of this chapter. It uses the 
power-ARCH (PARCH) framework and annual time series data for Brazil covering the 
period from 1870 to 2003, to answer the following questions. What is the relationship 
between, on the one hand, financial development, public deficit, inflation, financial 
international and trade openness and, on the other, economic growth and its volatility? Are 
the effects of these variables direct or indirect that is, do they occur directly on economic 
growth or indirectly via the conditional growth volatility? Does the intensity and sign of 
these impacts vary over time? Do these effects vary over time, that is, with respect to short- 
versus long-run considerations? Is the intensity of these effects constant across the different 
eras or phases of Brazilian economic history? Are they independent from the main structural 
breaks we estimate? 
     
This chapter tries to contribute to our understanding of the main causes of economic 
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growth. Durlauf et al. (2005) and Acemoglu (2009) provide recent, authoritative surveys that 
support the view that there seems to be dissatisfaction with the empirical growth literature. 
This chapter tries to improve matters in this regard by focusing on a single country (as 
opposed to follow the common practice of trying to learn something about growth by 
focusing on the mean or median country). We believe this study can further our 
understanding about economic growth because: (a) we study only one individual country 
over a very long period of time with annual frequency data
1
, (b) we extensively use the 
economic history literature to guide our choice of potential important reasons, (c) we choose 
an econometric methodology that has been seldom used in the empirical growth literature 
despite the fact that it easily allow us to contrast the direct to the indirect (i.e., via the 
volatility channel) effects of each of our candidate reasons, sort out the short- from the 
long-run impacts, and distill the consequences of accounting for important structural breaks 
on the robustness of our key results. 
     
Another important benefit of our choice of econometric framework is that it helps 
shedding light on an important and resilient puzzle on the relationship between output 
growth and its volatility. While Ramey and Ramey (1995) show that growth rates are 
adversely affected by volatility, Grier and Tullock (1989) argue that larger standard 
deviations of growth rates are associated with larger mean rates. The majority of ARCH 
papers examining the growth-volatility link are restricted to these two key variables. That is, 
they seldom assess whether the effects of the presence of other variables affect the relation 
and, in the rare occasions that happens, they are usually inflation and its volatility that comes 
into play
2
. One contribution of this chapter is to study if and how the growth-volatility 
relationship changes in light of a much wider set of variables. Note also that the use of 
annual data allows us to perform a more appropriate test of the hypothesis that predicts a 
positive effect of output variability and uncertainty on the growth rate of output
3
. 
 
We estimate four main types of effects: (a) direct (on mean economic growth), (b) indirect 
(via volatility), (c) dynamic (short and long-run) and (d) structural break effects. In trying to 
satisfy both the time-series and economic growth literature traditions (the former mostly 
univariate and the latter multivariate), for each effect we report estimates for one variable at 
a time before discussing the full multivariate results. 
                                                    
1 Some studies access Brazil's performance for a cross-country perspective (Loayza and Rancière, 2006), 
while others are more focused on the period from the 1930's onwards-trying to explain the growth rate of 
Brazil in the period 1930-1997 (Abreu and Verner, 1997). 
2 For a comprehensive review of this literature see Fountas et al. (2007). In addition, Gillman and Kejak 
(2005) bring together for comparison several main approaches to modeling the inflation-growth effect by 
nesting them within a general monetary endogenous growth model with both human and physical capital.  
3 Black (1987) argues that investments in riskier technologies will be pursued only if the expected return on 
these investments (expressed as the average rate of output growth) is large enough to compensate for the 
extra risk. As real investment takes time to materialize, such an effect would be more likely to obtain in 
empirical studies utilizing low-frequency data. 
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The main results are as follows. Regarding the direct effect on economic growth, we find 
evidence for a negative influence from domestic financial development, trade openness as 
well as public deficit. Equally importantly, we find evidence of a positive effect of 
international financial integration (proxies by movements in the U.S. interest rate). In the 
multivariate setting, the lagged direct effect on growth of domestic financial development, 
trade openness as well as public deficit is again negative whereas those of international 
financial integration remain positive providing further confirmation of our main findings. 
Regarding the indirect effects (through the conditional growth volatility), the strongest 
indirect impacts are the volatility-decreasing effects of domestic financial development, trade 
openness and deficit as well as the growth volatility increasing effects of international 
financial integration (US interest rates.).Thirdly, regarding the likelihood of differential 
effects in terms of short- versus long-run behavior, we find that domestic financial 
development affects growth negatively in the short- but positively in the long-run, while the 
effects from international financial integration are opposite (proxies by US interest rate), the 
effects of public deficit are negative in both short- and long-run, while the effect of trade 
openness is restricted to the short-run. Fourth and finally, we subjected all these results to the 
presence of structural breaks. This is an important exercise given the very long-term nature 
of the data. We find that the basic results remain once structural breaks are taken into 
account. One noteworthy aspect of these findings is that effects of domestic financial 
development are larger before the breaks we estimate in the growth series (1962 and 1979.) 
In short, the main results from this analysis suggest that financial development (domestic and 
international) exhibit robust first-order effects on growth and its volatility. Trade openness 
and public deficit play important yet secondary roles. In our view, this is because the effects 
of trade openness do not extend to the long-run, while for public deficit the results depend on 
the variable we use to measure it in the multivariate setting. 
     
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 sets the historical context for the chapter 
by documenting the Brazilian puzzle. More importantly, this section briefly reviews the 
Brazilian historiography stressing the main reasons that have been offered to explain the 
economic performance of Brazil from 1870 to 2003. Section 1.3 reviews the historical 
researches of financial development, trade openness and public deficit separately. Section 1.4 
describes the data and Section 1.5 provides details and justification for our econometric 
methodology. Section 1.6 has our baseline econometric results. Section 1.6 concludes and 
suggests directions for future research. 
 
1.2 A General Overview of the Economic History of 
Brazil since 1870 
 15 
 
 
The objective of this section is to provide general background information about the main 
economic eras of Brazilian economic history. The reason for this is to help judge the range of 
variables we choose to focus on in the econometric analysis as well as to assess our main 
estimation results. The official historical cannon posits that Brazil was "discovered in April 
21st 1500" by Portuguese commander Pedro Alvares Cabral. Yet the Treaty of Tordesilhas of 
1494 divided the newly discovered American continent between Spain and Portugal and 
assigned to the latter a considerable part of modern Brazil (in 1494, still undiscovered). In 
any case, for the first 200 years since its "discovery," Brazil was clearly not the most 
important part of the Portuguese empire especially in economic terms. Nevertheless, the first 
200 years mark the expansion of the production of sugar for exports, based on extensive 
plantations of sugar cane and considerable slave trade. The so-called "sugarcane cycle" took 
place mainly in coastal areas of Pernambuco and Bahia, in the Brazilian Northeast. The 
discovery of gold and later of diamonds in the interior in an area that became known as 
Minas Gerais ("General Mines," which is still its name today) is an important turning point. 
A gold rush ensued and Brazil became a much more important "piece in the Portuguese 
crown." As a consequence, the Portuguese change the capital from Salvador (Bahia, which 
was close to the sugar cane plantations), to Rio de Janeiro, which was closer to the areas 
producing gold and diamonds and which had a port and a bay that were much easier to 
defend militarily (a crucial consideration in light of the much more valuable products being 
now exported.) A consequence of this was the possibility of a smooth change in domestic 
elites, from sugar- to gold-based, which was necessary given the enormous increase in 
migration from Portugal which came to Brazil in search of gold riches but also responding to 
a clear relative economic decline of the metropolis. It is also important to mention that 
minerals were discovered thanks to various searching expeditions organized both by the 
State ("entradas") and by the local elite or nascent private sector ("bandeiras.") Portugal's 
nineteenth-century economic decline (Summerhill, 2005) is somehow well illustrated by the 
disastrous reactions to the Napoleonic Wars, which forced the royal family to flee from 
Portugal to Brazil and hence to transfer the crown, the political and economic center of the 
Empire, from Lisbon to Rio de Janeiro. Brazil may have been the only colony in the world 
that was also one day the Imperial center, the metropolis. Gold and diamonds, Napoleon, the 
rushed escape of the crown to Rio, the emergence of a new domestic elite (built upon gold 
and diamonds), the 1808 forced opening of all the Brazilian ports to the "friendly nations" 
(that is, England), Portugal's clear nineteenth-century economic decline culminate with 
Brazilian independence in 1822. The half a century that follows is a period of enormous 
political and economic instability, in which the new nation tries to find its footing in a new 
world. It is crucial to keep in mind that elsewhere and very much over the same period there 
is a rather important event taking place: the take-off of the Industrial Revolution. 
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There is little disagreement among economists and economic historians that the period 
from 1870 to 1930 is a period of growth, though Brazil also went through difficulties caused 
in part by World War I and later by the Great Depression. The so-called Coffee Economic 
Cycle would then drive Brazil's economy for almost a century, and at least until year 1930. 
The impact of coffee on Brazilian economy was much stronger than that of sugar and gold 
since when the coffee surge began, Brazil was already freed from limitation of colonialism. 
Further, slavery was also finally abolished in 1888 which completed in a way an important 
shift towards wage labor. By the 1920s, Brazil was supplying about 80% of world's coffee. It 
is very important to point out here that, differently from Argentina for example, Brazilian 
international trade were strongly linked with the US, this country importing most of the very 
Brazilian coffee and consequently being an important source of foreign capital . Trade 
openness was 60% of GDP until 1900 while coffee exports accounted for 12.5 percent of 
GNP in 1920s. As Werner Baer (2001) among many other leading scholars’ notes, there is no 
doubt that coffee exports were the engine of growth throughout most of the nineteenth 
century. Naturally, such an economic expansion required financial support and one of our 
focuses in this chapter is an understanding of the role of financial development. Since the 
early nineteenth century, Brazil declared its independence and also built up its first modern 
style financial system
4
. The attention to the role of the financial system is not a hallmark of 
this literature and we intend to contribute to it by focusing more on it. Thus, whether 
financial development together with other factors has affected Brazil's output growth is one 
central question of this chapter. 
     
After a period of chaos, consolidation and war, Brazil entered the last two decades of the 
monarchic period from year 1870 to year 1889 (the so-called Second Empire). In 1864 -- 
1870 Brazil and its allies, Argentina and Uruguay, fought a war with Paraguay. The war 
ended with victory for Brazil and allies, but at a high price. As Skidmore states in "Brazil: 
Five Centuries of Change": victory over such a small, poor, and desolate country hardly 
qualified Brazil for the annals of glorious warfare but raised fundamental questions about 
whether their own ill-integrated society was ready to join the race to modernity. Although the 
decline of the empire can be attributed to various reasons, it can be roughly divided into 
three factors: economic, political factors and the army. First, the nascent bourgeoisie of Sao 
Paulo pushed for the end of the monarchy in an attempt to keep benefitting more fully from 
the coffee economy. Second, the empire had moved towards more political and 
administrative centralization. Regional oligarchies wanted to push for decentralization under 
a federal system to consolidate their positions. As a result, the empire was marked by 
considerable political instability in the 1880s. At last, the army came under influence of 
"positivism". They supported education, industrialization, abolition of slavery, regeneration 
                                                    
4 For example, Banco do Brasil was founded in 1808 and functioned both as bank of issue and a 
commercial bank until 1829. 
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of the nation, and guarding the fatherland: the "solider citizen" as agent of social change. All 
these reasons lead to the end of the Second Empire in year 1889. 
 
After the emperor was dethroned on November 15 of 1889, Brazil passed from a 
centralized empire to a federal republic by a bloodless coup led by the army. The period from 
1889 to 1930 is known as the Old Republic or the First Republic, and economically the 
period is marked by the politics of coffee-with-milk ("cafe com leite"), a combination of Sao 
Paulo (coffee) and Minas Gerais (milk) political elites. From a political point of view, Brazil 
was rarely stable during this period. The most sensitive feature of the oligarchic system of 
the First Republic was to adjust the political power between two groups -- the different 
regional oligarchies (states governor) and the armed forces. During the 1920s, the problems 
of the oligarchy system developed. Politically, the "tenent revolt" of 1922 and then again in 
1924, shaken the interior of Brazil without ever being fully defeated by the armed forces. In 
October 1929, with the Great Depression coffee exports stalled, and the Paulista oligarchy 
tried to stay in power ignoring the agreed-upon the alternation with the elites of Minas 
Gerais. This of course led to the end of the "politics of coffee with milk". In the year 1930, 
the situation reached a breaking point. At first, vice president Mello Vianna was shot three 
times in the neck and in the hand at Monte Claros (in the state of Minas Gerais). Later, in the 
Revolta da Princesa occurred in the Northeastern state of Paraiba. Soon after this event, Joao 
Pessoa, who was the governor of Paraiba, was murdered. After his death, more riots followed. 
And, at the end, on October 24th 1930, the "revolution of 1930" broke out. All those political 
crises together with the economic crisis led to the end of the Old Republic. 
 
The Revolution of 1930 in Brazil not only marked the end of the Old Republic but also the 
beginning of the Vargas Era. By leading the revolution, Provisional President Getulio 
Dornelles Vargas, ruled as dictator from 1930 to 1934, was elected as president from 1934 -- 
1937, and again governed as dictator from 1937 to 1945. Further, after 1945, Vargas still 
served as a senator until 1951 when after the general elections of 1950 once more Vargas 
returned to power as president (1951 - 1954). In other words, Getulio Vargas retained central 
political power in Brazil for nearly 24 years. Economic historians argue that Brazil during 
the Vargas Era and up until the late 1970s was as one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world (Maddison, 1995). As such, this era is also a turning point in the political history of 
Brazil. Under the Estado Novo (1937 - 1945), state autonomy ended, governors were 
replaced and all political parties were dissolved until 1944 (Hudson, 1997). 
     
As mentioned, from 1945 to the late 1970s Brazil is widely considered to be one of the 
fastest growing economies in the world (see among others Maddison, 1995). One of the most 
important contributions to the study of the long--term Brazilian economic growth is Abreu 
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and Verner (1997). They studied the contribution of various factors, with emphasis on the 
period 1930--1990, including financial development, degree of the trade openness, and 
education policies. They do not find evidence that financial development boosted growth. As 
they argued: "increased public sector savings proved (disappointingly) to have only a small 
impact on GDP", and "attempts to include monetary variables as explanations for either 
short-term or long-term economic growth in Brazil came to naught". It seems that in their 
view financial development fails to explain the economic growth in Brazil in this particular 
period. However, our results present a different story. By using a different econometric 
approach and longer term data, we find that financial development affects long-term growth 
positively and robustly. 
 
Although there is wide consensus that the 1980s was a "lost decade" in economic terms (on 
the other hand, in political terms, it saw re-democratization) the growth of Brazil since 1990 
is now a hotly debated issue. A lot of recent researches on either Latin America or Brazil 
covered this particular period and have paid attention to the study of financial development. 
Bittencourt (2010) finds that financial development played a significant role in generating 
growth in Latin America. Castelar et al. (2004) examined the relationships between financial 
development growth and equity. Also, Stefani (2007) investigated this relationship in Brazil 
between 1980 till 2006 by using cointegration methods. Further, some more papers shed 
some light on how relative factors like how interest rates and inflation affect Brazil's recent 
growth (Muinhos and Nakane 2006; Vale 2005). Most of these papers obtained a strong 
positive relationship between financial development and output growth in Brazil, yet they 
have not investigate this relationship over the long-term, and neither have assessed whether 
this a is a more or less important reason vis-a-vis the other important factors economic 
historians normally highlight (such as trade openness, public finances, and inflation or 
macroeconomic instability.) 
     
In sum, the period since 1870 is an important one in Brazil as it sees the country 
economical and politically take-off and becoming an emerging market, or a BRIC in other 
accounts. However, there is still debate about which factors better explain this remarkable 
transformation. Trade openness, macroeconomic stability, financial development, and 
international financial integration are the four main reasons often highlighted by economists 
and economic historians. One of the major objectives of this chapter is to evaluate the 
relative merits of the factors behind these different explanations. In this chapter, we cover the 
period from 1870 to 2003 and try to contribute by studying how financial development, trade 
openness, public deficit together with integration with of global financial markets played a 
role in the process of economic growth and transformation of Brazil. 
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1.3 Literature Review 
1.3.1 Financial Development 
The role of financial sector in economic growth is a long-debated issue. Robert Lucas 
(1988) and Nobel Laureate Merton Miller (1998) represent two different poles in the 
literature. While Robert Lucas dismisses finance as a “badly over-stressed” determinant of 
economic growth, Merton Miller argues that, “financial markets contributed to economic 
growth is a proposition too obvious for serious discussion”. 
Theoretically, as Merton and Bodie (1995) stated, in arising to ameliorate market frictions, 
financial system naturally influence the allocation of resources across space and time. 
Therefore, the development of the financial systems may impact the savings rates, 
investment decisions and technological innovations and hence the long-term growth rates.  
 
On the empirical side, the literature on finance and growth includes at least four aspects: 
(ⅰ) cross-country studies; (ⅱ) panel studies; (ⅲ) time-series analysis and (ⅳ) detailed 
country case-studies. 
 
Cross-country studies 
The pioneering study to assess whether finance exerts a causal influence on growth is 
given by Goldsmith (1969). By using the data compiled on 35 countries over the period from 
1860 to1963 (when available) on the value of financial intermediary assets as a proportion of 
GNP, Goldsmith’s paper was the first to show the existence of a positive relationship 
between financial development and economy development. However, Levine (2005) pointed 
out several problems of Goldsmith’s work. For example, first of all, only 35 countries are 
involved in the investigation. Secondly, it doesn’t systematically control for other factors 
influencing economic growth. The third, close association dose not identify the direction of 
causality and further, the measure of the financial development used may not accurately 
proxy for the functioning of financial system. 
Building on Goldsmith’s work, King and Levine (1993a) investigated 77 countries and 
covered the period of 1960 – 1989. Beyond the monetary indicators, King and Levine also 
construct additional measures of the level of financial development – measures of both the 
size and relative importance of banking institutions. Systematically control for other factors 
affecting the growth, their study shows that financial development is robustly and positively 
associated with their three growth indicators
5
. Additionally, to examine the predictability of 
the financial indicators, King and Levine study whether the value of financial development 
                                                    
5 By using different econometric methods and robustness check, King and Levine (1993b, 1993c) confirm 
these findings. 
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in 1960 predicts the growth indicators over the next 30 years. Their empirical results show 
that financial depth in 1960 is a good predictor of subsequent rates of economic growth, 
capital accumulation and productivity growth. 
 
Unlike the earlier researches focus only on one segment of the financial system – banks, 
the following studies also examine the role of stock markets on development. Building on 
the work by Atje and Jovanovic (1993), Levine and Zervos (1998) conclude that there is a 
significant relationship between the stock market and growth, however, when the banking 
depth indicators are included in the regressions, the impact of stock market on growth turn 
out to be insignificant. 
 
Panel  
Differ from the previous studies that are based on cross-section data, this subsection 
discusses the panel approaches. According to Levine (2005), the panel approaches benefit 
the investigations in three aspects. The first benefit from moving a panel is the ability to 
exploit both the time-series and cross-sectional variation in the data. Secondly, the panel 
approach avoids biases associated with cross-country regressions. And at last, it also permits 
the use of instrumental variables for all regressors. 
By using the panel data of 74 developed and less developed countries over the period 
1960 - 1995, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) find a strong positive relationship between 
financial development and output growth. Moreover, Loayza and Ranciere (2006) extend 
this line of empirical research. Using a sample of 75 countries with annual data during the 
period 1960 -2000, they provide evidence that financial liberalization can generate both 
short-run instability and long-run growth. In other words, the positive long-run relationship 
between financial development and growth co-exists with a negative short-run effect. 
 
Time-series analysis and detailed country case-studies 
Two classic studies on country case-studies are given by Cameron et al. (1967) and 
McKinnon (1973). Cameron et al. (1967) studies the historical relationships between 
banking development and early stages of industrialization for seven countries (Note: 
England (1750-1844), Scotland (1750-1845), France (1800-1870), Belgium (1800-1875), 
Germany (1815-1870), Russia (1860-1914), Japan (1868-1914)), while McKinnon studies 
the relationship between financial system and economic development in Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Germany, Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan. Although these researches do not use the 
formal statistical analysis, mass of evidence emerging from these country studies which 
suggest that better functioning financial systems support faster economic growth. 
Some more recent researches examine the impact of finance on economic growth for the 
United States. Focusing on the early decades after U.S. independence, Wright (2002) 
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examines how the U.S. financial system drove America’s transformation after 1780. 
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) and Dehejia and Lleras Muney (2003) both examine the 
growth experiences of states across the U.S. these two papers find that financial development 
boost economic growth rates. Further, the latter one extends the findings by examining the 
impact of deposit insurance. 
 
In terms of the Brazil, one of the important historical researches is given by Haber (1991, 
1997). Using firm-level data from 1830 – 1930, Haber suggests that when Brazil overthrew 
the monarchy in 1889, it also dramatically liberalized restrictions on financial markets. 
Financial development gave more firms easier access to the external finance and therefore, 
industrial concentration fell and production boomed. In other words, Haber concludes that 
international differences in financial development will significantly affect the rate of 
industrial expansion and hence the output growth. Another impressive work on Brazil is 
given by Abreu and Verner (1997). The study argues that since the mid-1990s, investment is 
the major factor that drives the GDP growth. However, it seems that financial development 
fails to explain the economic growth in Brazil in this particular period, as Abreu and Verner 
(1997) argued: "increased public sector savings proved (disappointingly) to have only a 
small impact on GDP", and "attempts to include monetary variables as explanations for 
either short-term or long-term economic growth in Brazil came to naught". 
Later from 1990 till early 21st century, the growth of Brazil becomes a hot debated issue. 
Recent researches mainly focus on the role of financial development on either Latin 
American or Brazil. Bittencourt (2010) found that financial development played a significant 
role in generating growth in Latin America. Castelar et al. (2004) examined the relationship 
between financial development growth and equity. Also, Stefani (2007) investigated this 
relationship in Brazil between 1980 till 2006 by using a cointegration methodology. 
Moreover, some papers shed some light on the relative fields like how interest rates and 
inflation affect Brazil's recent growth (Muinhos and Nakane 2006; Vale 2005). In line with 
the theory we discussed above, most of the papers obtained a strong positive relationship 
between financial development and output growth in Brazil. 
 
1.3.2 Trade Openness 
Similar to the financial development, the relationship between trade openness and 
economic growth is also a long controversy issue in the literature. Ideally, countries that are 
more open have a greater ability to catch up to leading technologies of the world. In other 
words, as Chang, Kaltani, Loayza (2009) argued, openness promotes the efficient allocation 
of resources through comparative advantage, allows the dissemination of knowledge and 
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technological progress, and encourages competition in domestic and international markets 
and hence output growth. In a line with the theory, several studies in this field, conclude that 
trade openness is a significant explanatory variable for the economic growth (see Dollar 
(1992), Harrison (1996), Sala-i-Martin (1997), Easterly and Levine (2001) and Dollar and 
Kray (2002)). However, there is always a position at the opposite side. For instance, 
Krugman (1994) and Rodrik and Rodríguez (2001) argue that the effect of openness on 
growth is doubtful. Further, a few more recent studies suggested that not all the counties 
share the equally gains from the trade openness. Saches and Warner (1997) find that 
specialization in exporting primary products is bad for the economy growth. Ahmad and 
Kwan (1991) investigate 47 African countries and find no causality between exports and 
growth. 
 
Concerning case studies, Muendler (2002) and Lopez-Cordova and Moreira (2003) cover 
the case of Brazil and show that productivity growth resumed during the period of 1986 – 
2000. Both Muendler, and Lopes-Cordova and Moreira suggested a powerful import 
discipline effect. In addition, Muendler also find a positive association between imported 
input and turnover effects. Marie Daumal and Selin Ozyurt (2011) cover 26 Brazilian states 
over the period of 1989 – 2002 and find that openness is more beneficial to states with high 
level of initial per capita income.  
 
As regard of exports/imports, there are only few historical studies that focus on the 
influence of exports/imports on Brazil separately. The only detailed historical quantitative 
study on the export of coffee is given by Delfim Netto (1959). Nevertheless, in the paper, 
Delfim Netto doesn’t provide a general econometric model to measure the relative 
importance of the factors that shaped coffee export cycles and his findings are only 
concerned with proving the harmful effects of the coffee valorization policies upon Brazil’s 
competitiveness in the world coffee market. Another historical research in this field is given 
by Luis Catao (1992), who argues that due to the compensatory exchange rate depreciation 
in the particular period of falling world coffee prices, the insufficient expansion of the 
domestic transportation and the extreme dependence of both investment and government 
finance on foreign investment, the exports failed to promote generalized economic 
development in Brazil in the certain period (1870-1930). 
 
However, it is worthwhile to note that the theoretical literature has given more attention to 
the relationship between trade policies and growth rather than the association between trade 
volumes and growth (Note: Trade openness has two concepts – volumes and policies. 
Although these two concepts are closely related, their relationship with growth may differ 
from each other.). Therefore, in this chapter, we have three measures of trade openness, 
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namely exports, imports and the summation of exports and imports, to explore the impact of 
Brazil’s trade openness (volumes) on the economic growth. 
1.3.3 Public Deficit 
Theoretically, the measurement of public deficit, budget deficit or budget balance itself is 
compounded by the lack of uniformity in different countries. For instance, the definition of 
conventional budget deficit can measured in two means. Firstly, the deficit equals to the 
difference between total cash flow expenditure and fiscal revenue. Secondly, the deficit 
reflects accrued income and spending flow (regardless of whether they are involved cash 
payments or not). As Agénor and Montiel (1999) stated, the difference between these two 
measurements is that accumulation of arrears on payments or revenue is reflected by higher 
deficit when measured on an accrual basis compared with a cash-based measure. According 
to Blejer and Cheasty (1991), one of the most commonly accepted measure of public deficit 
is the difference between current revenues and current expenditures of government
6
. Further, 
in terms of the association between growth and public deficit, the historical researches 
suggest three kinds of thought which are the Ricardian School, the Keynesian view and the 
neo-classical view. While the neo-classical and Ricardian schools concentrate on the long 
run, the Keynesian view emphasizes the short run effect.  
 
In the standard Keynesian view, assume that an increase in government expenditures, 
financed by borrowing may cause output growth to expand through a multiplier process. 
Keynesians argue that because of the employment of unutilized resources, public deficit may 
stimulate savings and investment and hence economic growth. However, in the traditional 
Keynesian view, there is no clear budget constraint in the analysis, and thus it doesn’t 
distinguish the usage of public deficit between government consumption and investment 
expenditures. 
 
Opposite to the Keynesian view, neo-classical view suggests that public deficit may be 
detrimental to investment and growth. In the neo-classical perspective, the component of the 
revenue deficit in public deficit implies a reduction in government savings or an increase in 
government dis-savings. And, if the reduction in government saving is not fully offset by a 
rise in private savings, the overall saving rate will fall and hence output growth declines.  
 
The third perspective of the Ricardian view claims that public deficit has no impact on the 
growth. According to Ricardian view, the government spending must be paid for, whether 
now or later. And, the present value of the government spending must be equal to the present 
value of tax and non-tax revenues. Therefore, public deficit doesn’t have any impact on 
                                                    
6 This is the measurement which we are using in this chapter 
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aggregate demand if individuals concern about the current value of their incomes and the 
present value of their future tax liabilities. In other words, the decrease of current 
government savings which is implied by public deficit may be offset by an increase in 
private savings. Consequently, the total investment remains unchanged and hence output 
growth is unchanged. However, one important assumption of the Ricardian view is that the 
individuals are foresighted, they have discount rates that are equals to government’s discount 
rate on spending and they also have long time horizon for evaluating the present value of the 
future taxes. 
 
Empirically, there is no general agreement among economists that the influence of public 
deficit on growth is either good or bad. While Bose, Haque and Osborn (2007) argues that 
there is a positive relationship between public deficit and economic growth, Ball and 
Mankiw (1995) argues the relationship may be negative. Yaya Keho (2010) investigates the 
relationship between public deficit and economic growth for seven countries over the period 
of 1980 – 2005. The empirical results show mixed results, that is in three countries there is 
no causality between public deficit and growth while in the remaining four countries, deficit 
had negative effect on growth. Consistent with Ricardian equivalence hypothesis, Gadong T. 
Dalyop (2010) examines the influence of public deficit on real GDP growth in Nigeria and 
finds that public deficit had little effect on the output economic growth. 
 
In case of Brazil, public deficit is often linked with fiscal policies, interest rate and 
inflation. Abreu and Verner (1997) have an entire chapter to review the historical record of 
Brazil’s fiscal deficit from 1930. Eliana Cardoso and Albert Fishlow (1990) analyze the 
relations between the public deficit, interest rate, domestic and foreign debt, and inflation in 
the 1980s. And Mario Falcao Pessoa (2004) discusses the fiscal deficit and corresponded 
fiscal policies in Brazil since 1997. Indeed, public deficit itself is an important fiscal 
indicator which will affect the design and execution of fiscal policies. However, not many 
papers directly answer the question of what is the influence of public deficit on output 
growth for Brazil. Therefore, in this chapter, we adopted three measures of public deficit 
which are revenues (over GDP), expenditures (over GDP) and the differences between 
revenues and expenditures (over GDP) in examining the relationship between public deficit 
and output growth in Brazil. 
1.4 Data 
 
The data set we put together for this chapter reflects the main factors identified by 
economic historians discussed above. The factors often associated with the economic 
performance of Brazil are the following: financial development, macroeconomic volatility, 
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trade openness, public deficit, and international financial integration. 
Theoretically, as Merton and Bodie (1995) stated, in arising to ameliorate market frictions, 
financial system naturally influence the allocation of resources across space and time. 
Therefore, the financial development may impact the savings rates, investment decisions and 
technological innovations and hence the long-term growth rates. In this chapter, our two 
main measures of financial development try to capture the efficiency of the financial sector, 
not its relative size. The first is the commercial bank deposits over GDP. Our basic data 
source is "International Historical Statistics: The Americas: 1750 -- 2000" (Mitchell. B. R., 
2003). However, due to the missing figures, we follow a more practicable method of Peláez 
and Suzigan (1976) to regenerate the series, which is the total deposits in commercial banks 
are defined as the summation of time deposits in commercial banks and deposits at the end 
of the period in commercial banks. Thus, our commercial bank deposits are quoted from 
IBGE
7
 from 1870 – 1985 and since the year of 1985 our adopted data sets can be found 
IBGE
8
. 
The second measure of our financial development is the deposits at Banco do Brasil over 
GDP. Although Mitchell B.R. (2003) recorded the annual data for Brazil since 1870, the 
money standards of the data changed from time to time and figures are often incomplete for 
a given sub-period. In order to find relatively complete series to avoid bias as much as 
possible, we also generated the deposits at Banco do Brasil by the method of Peláez and 
Suzigan (1976), which is the deposit measured by the added value of time deposits and 
deposits at the end of the period in the central bank. Therefore, our serial of deposits at 
Banco do Brasil is mainly cited from IBGE
9
 for the period of 1870-1985 and from the year 
of 1985 to the end of our examining period, our data are quoted from IBGE website
10
. 
Further, given more restrictive nature of deposits at Banco do Brasil, we use this variable 
mostly for robustness check thereby attaching greater weight to commercial bank deposits 
(see Figure 1)
11
. 
Additionally, we use the ratio of M1 to GDP as the proxy of the financial depth so as to 
further robustness check. Similar to our two main financial development indicators, multiple 
resources have been adopted to construct the serial of M1. As Mitchell.B.R (2003) only 
recorded the data from the year of 1948 – 1989 and from year of 1993 – 1999, we cited our 
M1 from IBGE for the period of 1870 – 1948. Moreover, to filling the gap between 1989 and 
                                                    
7 IBGE, 1990. Estatísticas históricas do Brasil : séries econômicas, demográficas e sociais de 1550 a 1988. 
Rio de Janeiro, pp 534-550.  
8 IBGE, 2007. Estatísticas Econômicas, Table MC-30, Depósitos a prazo 1901-1997.  
Available at: ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/  
9 IBGE, 1990. Estatísticas históricas do Brasil : séries econômicas, demográficas e sociais de 1550 a 1988. 
Rio de Janeiro, pp 534-550. 
10 IBGE, 2007. Estatísticas Econômicas, Table MC-30, Depósitos a prazo 1901-1997.  
Available at: ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/  
11 For robustness we also use two measures of financial development that reflect depth. The first indicator 
we use is the ratio of M2 to GDP (results are not reported). The main reason for considering this measure is 
that it has been used extensively in the finance-growth literature (see Campos et al. 2011). The second 
indicator is the M1over GDP. 
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1993, our data are quoted from the Banco Central do Brasil from this particular period. 
 
Figure 1 Economic Growth Rate of Brazil and Financial Development 
Our next economic performance indicator of the Brazil is trade openness. As Chang, 
Kaltani, Loayza (2009) argued, openness promotes the efficient allocation of resources 
through comparative advantage, allows the dissemination of knowledge and technological 
progress, and encourages competition in domestic and international markets and hence 
economy growth. However, it is worthwhile to note that the theoretical literature has given 
more attention to the relationship between trade policies and growth rather than the 
association between trade volumes and growth
12
. Therefore, our three measures of trade 
openness are namely exports (over GDP), imports (over GDP) and imports plus exports 
(over GDP). Mitchell. B. R. (2003) recorded the three measures of trade openness yearly for 
both periods of 1870 – 1948 and 1981 – 2003. Nevertheless, the data sets that Mitchell 
provided since 1949 are recorded in millions of US dollars. In order to use the same 
monetary standard, we adopted the data quoted from IBGE
13
 in the period of 1949 – 1980 
(see Figure 2). 
                                                    
12 Trade openness has two concepts – volumes and policies. Although these two concepts are closely related, 
their relationship with growth may differ from each other. 
13 IBGE, 1990. Estatísticas históricas do Brasil : séries econômicas, demográficas e sociais de1550 a 1988. 
Rio de Janeiro, p 570-571 
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Figure 2 Three measures of Trade Openness 
 
  The next control variables in our data sets are public deficit which are proxies as the ratio 
of total public deficit to GDP. According to Blejer and Cheasty (1991), one of the most 
commonly accepted definition of public deficit is the difference between current revenues 
and current expenditures of government. Therefore, in this chapter, we have three measures 
of public deficit: revenues (over GDP), expenditures (over GDP) and revenues minus 
expenditures (over GDP). Due to the missing figures of Mitchell (2003), our major source of 
the public deficit are Estatísticas históricas do Brasil: séries econômicas, demográficas e 
sociais de 1550 a 1988
14
 and IBGE
15
. 
                                                    
14 IBGE, 1990. Estatísticas históricas do Brasil : séries econômicas, demográficas e sociais de 1550 a 1988. 
Rio de Janeiro, p 616 - 617.  
15 IBGE, 2007. Estatísticas Econômicas, Table FP01_Receita e despesa da União 1901-2000. 
  Available at: ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/ 
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Figure 3 Three measures of Public Deficit 
  Finally, international financial sector developments should also have an impact on Brazil's 
economic growth although for most of the period since 1930 Brazil remained a closed 
economy. Marcelo Abreu (1997) states that from 1930-1980 Brazil had a "cross-eyed" 
foreign economic orientation with bold export promotion polices and a rather closed 
domestic market. But Brazil, as the largest economy in Latin America, and ninth largest in 
the world, cannot be isolated to the world economy environment. However, it is still hard to 
measure the world economy environment itself, especially when we take both the depression 
and World War periods into account. Thus, in standard fashion in this type of study, we use 
the level of interest rate in US as our proxy of the global financial market. US interest rates 
are mainly quoted from Milton Fridman (1982)
16
 (see Figure 4). 
                                                    
16 Friedman, Milton and Schawartz, Anna J., 1982. Monetary Trends in the United States and United 
Kingdom: Their Relation to Income, Prices, and Interest Rates, 1867-1975" University of Chicago Press. 
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Figure 4 International Financial Development 
1.5 General Econometric Framework 
 
The PARCH model was introduced by Ding, Granger and Engle (1993) and quickly 
gained currency in the finance literature
17
. Let growth yt follow a white noise process 
augmented by a risk premium defined in terms of volatility: 
                     𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 +  klog(ℎ𝑡) + 𝜆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜀𝑡    ,                    (1)
18
 
with  
𝜀𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑡
1
2 
where 𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙  is either the financial development variable or one of the other explanatory 
variables
19
 and 𝑙 is the order of the lag.    
In addition, {𝑒𝑡} are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables 
with E(𝑒𝑡) =  E(𝑒𝑡
2 − 1) = 0, while (ℎ𝑡)is positive with probability one and is a measurable 
function of the sigma-algebra Σ𝑡−𝑙, which is generated by {𝑦𝑡−1,𝑦𝑡−2 , … }. 
In other words, ℎ𝑡  denotes the conditional variance of growth. In particular, ℎ𝑡  is 
specified as an asymmetric PARCH(1,1) process with lagged growth included in the variance 
equation: 
                ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 𝑓(𝑒𝑡−1) + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝜑𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛 ,             (2) 
With 
𝑓(𝑒𝑡−1) = [|𝑒𝑡−1| − 𝜍𝑒𝑡−1]
𝛿 , 
Where δ (with δ>0) is the heteroscedasticity parameter, α and β are the ARCH and GARCH 
coefficients respectively, ς with |ς| < 1 is the leverage term and γ is the level term for the 
                                                    
17 See, for example, Karanasos and Kim (2006). Karanasos and Schurer, (2005, 2008) use this process to 
model output growth and inflation respectively. 
18 As a robustness check we estimate model 1 using √ℎ𝑡  for the in-mean effect. The baseline results (see 
Appendix E) are very much similar to the results we report in the paper. 
19 Because the original deposits at Banco do Brasil and the US interest rate variables, are I(1), they enter our 
models in first differences. 
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𝑛th lag of growth20. In order to distinguish the general PARCH model from a version in 
which δ is fixed (but not necessarily equal to two) we refer to the latter as (P)ARCH. 
We present our main reasons in three interdependent blocs: the direct, indirect and 
dynamic (short and long-run) effects. We proceed with the estimation of the PARCH(1,1) 
model in equations (1) and (2) in order to take into account the serial correlation observed in 
the levels and power transformations of our time series data. The Tables below report the 
estimated parameters of interest for the period 1870-2003. These were obtained by 
quasi-maximum likelihood estimation (QMLE) as implemented in EVIEWS. The best fitting 
specification is chosen according to the Likelihood Ratio (LR) results and the minimum 
value of the Information Criteria (IC) (not reported). Once heteroscedasticity has been 
accounted for, our specifications appear to capture the serial correlation in the power 
transformed growth series. 
Our set of variables tries to reflect the different explanations for the Brazilian puzzle 
previously put forward by economic historians. This set comprises domestic and 
international financial developments, the degree of openness to international trade and public 
deficit. In order to study the direct effects of our set of explanatory variables, we specify 
model 1 with φ = 0 in equation (2), while model 2 with λ = 0 in equation (1) allows us to 
investigate their indirect impacts on growth. 
 
1.6 Empirical Results 
 
Our results are presented following specific types of effects. That is, we discuss direct (on 
mean economic growth), indirect (via volatility), dynamic (short and long-run) and structural 
break effects. Moreover, in trying to satisfy both the time-series and economic growth 
literature traditions (the former mostly univariate and the latter multivariate), for each effect 
we report estimates for one variable at a time before discussing the full multivariate results.  
 
1.6.1 Direct Growth Effects 
   
Table 1 reports the results from our estimation of the (P) ARCH (1, 1) model for each one 
of the elements in our set of explanatory variables. The parameter we are most interested in 
is λ (in the second column.) The results reveal that the lagged direct effects of domestic 
financial development (any of the three measures), trade openness and public deficit (or their 
elements) on per capita economic growth rates are negative and statistically significant, 
                                                    
20 The model imposes a Box-Cox power transformation of the conditional standard deviation process and 
the asymmetric absolute residuals. 
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whereas those of international financial development (US interest rate) are positive and 
statistically significant as well
21
. As we will see below the lagged direct effect on growth is 
equivalent to the short-run impact. 
As for the in-mean parameter (k), notice that in all cases the estimates are statistically 
significant and positive which is in line with the theoretical argument of Black (1987). Also 
the power term coefficients δ are rather stable, with the Akaike IC (AIC) criteria choosing a 
(P)ARCH specification with power term in most of the cases equal to 1.00 (e.g., deposits at 
Banco do Brasil, trade openness, public deficit and US interest rate). 
How robust are these baseline individual results? One robustness test would be to 
investigate whether or not such powerful and precise effects obtain in the presence of the 
other explanatory variables. In other words, we want to be sure that they remain if we add to 
the baseline specification any of our three additional variables
22
. Therefore, the estimated 
regression is as follows: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + klog(ℎ𝑡) + 𝜆𝑓𝑑𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑥𝑡𝑜,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜆𝑝𝑑𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜆𝑢𝑠𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜀𝑡    ,    (3) 
With 
                                               ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛 ,            (4) 
Where 𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙  is a financial development indicator, 𝑥𝑡𝑜,𝑡−𝑙  is trade openness (or one of 
its elements), 𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−𝑙  is public deficit (any of the tree measures) and 𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−𝑙 is US interest 
rate. Further, while 𝑙 is the order of the lag of the explanatory variables that maximum to 
eighth, 𝑛 measures the lag of the growth (from 1 to 8). 
Tables 1.1-1.3 present the results when we add all four regressors. That is, domestic 
financial development, trade openness, public deficit and US interest rate. The first three 
variables show the expected negative and statistically significant lagged direct impact (see 
the λ𝑓𝑑, λ𝑡𝑜, and λ𝑝𝑑 columns)
23
. As for the effect of US interest rate, it is positive and 
statistically significant (see the λ𝑢𝑠 columns in Tables 1.1-1.3). As we will see below the 
lagged direct effect on growth is equivalent to the short-run impact. 
In summary, we find that the main explanatory factors, solely in terms of their direct 
effects on economic growth in Brazil, turn out to be domestic (mainly M1 and commercial 
bank deposits) and international (US interest rate) financial development. Interestingly, the 
effects of the later are working in the opposite direction from those of the former. Public 
                                                    
21 We also estimate bivariate regressions (results not reported) to examine the joint effects of domestic and 
international financial development on growth. Moreover, our trivariate analysis (see Appendix A) 
reinforces the conclusion of the univariate one. 
22 Our trivariate analysis (see Appendix A) reinforces the conclusion of the univariate one. 
23 It is worth noting that deposits at Banco do Brasil affect growth negatively in only two out of the nine 
cases (see the  λ𝑓𝑑  column in Table 1.3). That is, when we include as a regressor trade openness (or its 
elements) together with either public deficit or revenues the lagged direct impact of deposits (Banco do 
Brasil) disappears. Similarly, the influence of the trade openness on growth is qualitatively altered by the 
presence of domestic financial development and public deficit. In particular, the significance of its influence 
is altered by changes in the choice of these two variables. More specifically, the negative impact of trade 
openness on growth disappears when we include commercial bank deposits and public deficit (see the λ𝑡𝑜  
column in Table 1.2). 
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deficit and trade openness also seems to play an important role. Interestingly, we find that 
the direct effect of the latter (or its elements) is sensitive to the measures of the variables 
used in our analysis. We now turn to the investigation of the indirect effects. 
 
1.6.2 Indirect Effects (Via Growth Volatility) 
 
One of the main advantages of the (P)ARCH framework is that it allow us to study not 
only the direct growth effects from the full set of explanatory variables described above, but 
also their indirect effects on economic growth through the predicted component of growth 
volatility (conditional on its past values). As we can see from Tables 1 and 1.1-1.3 above and 
from Tables 2 and 2.1-2.3 in this section, the effect of conditional or predicted volatility on 
growth is in all cases positive (k > 0) and statistically significant at conventional levels. In 
the current section, we present our results for such indirect impacts in two parts and follow 
the same format as before: we first discuss the indirect effects of each one of our explanatory 
variables and then we present results for our complete set (that is, including all the four 
explanatory variables).  
Table 2 reports the estimation results for each one of the elements in our data set for what 
we call the indirect impact, which is the effect on growth via the volatility channel
24
. The 
parameter we are most interested in is φ (in the fourth column.) Our results show that the 
effects of domestic financial development, trade openness and public deficit on the 
conditional volatility of per capita economic growth rates are negative and statistically 
significant whereas those of US interest rate are positive and significant. 
Thus we find that exogenous increases in domestic financial development, public deficit 
and trade openness have a negative and significant indirect impact on growth (recall that the 
lagged direct effect is also negative). The result for the latter reflects one of the costs many 
economists associate with trade liberalization efforts: in the short-run, changes in the share 
of trade in GDP decrease the conditional or expected share of growth volatility (or, 
equivalently, increase the amount of growth volatility that economic agents are not able to 
anticipate.) Therefore such a decrease in conditional volatility driven by trade openness 
translates into lower rates of economic growth (because k > 0). 
On the other hand, higher US interest rates are associated with a larger fraction of growth 
volatility that is anticipated by the relevant economic agents. And the larger the share of the 
total growth volatility that is anticipated, the higher the per capita growth rates we observe. 
Therefore, international financial integration register a positive lagged direct effect on 
growth and a positive and substantial impact on the expected or conditional share of growth 
                                                    
24 In the expressions for the conditional variances reported in Table 2, various lags of growth (from 1 to 8) 
were considered with the best model (l = 8) chosen on the basis of the minimum value of the AIC. 
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volatility (see Tables 1, 1.1-1.3, and 2). 
It is also worth noting that since the estimates for the in-mean parameter (k) and the level 
coefficient (γ) in Table 2 are statistically significant and positive they offer strong strong 
evidence for a positive bidirectional feedback relationship between growth and its volatility, 
which seems robust to the presence of various finance and economic variables. 
We now proceed by investigating the robustness of these results. Specifically, and for 
comparability purposes, we ask how the results from the various aspects of domestic 
financial development, trade openness and public deficit change if we add to the baseline 
model the complete set of explanatory variables (as opposed to assess their effects one by 
one). Similar to the direct effects, our multivariate specification for the indirect effects is 
given by: 
                      𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 +  klog(ℎ𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡    ,                            (5) 
With  
 ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝜑𝑓𝑑𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑𝑡𝑜𝑥𝑡𝑜,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑𝑝𝑑𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑𝑢𝑠𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−𝑙 +
𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛 ,                                                                  (6) 
Where 𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙  is a financial development indicator, 𝑥𝑡𝑜,𝑡−𝑙 is trade openness (or one of its 
elements), 𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 is public deficit (any of the tree measures) and 𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−𝑙  is US interest rate. 
Further, L and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively 
(from 1 to 8). 
Tables 2.1-2.3 show that after adding this full set of controls, the indirect negative effects 
of trade openness and public deficit remain statistically significant. Focusing our attention on 
the φ𝑓𝑑 and k parameters, note that two forms of financial development (in this case, M1 
and deposits at Banco do Brasil) are found to affect conditional volatility negatively 
(φ𝑓𝑑 < 0 in Tables 2.1 and 2.3). Since k > 0, domestic financial development affects 
growth negatively as well. In other words, the negative indirect impact of commercial bank 
deposits on growth disappears in the multivariate analysis. 
There is another additional important result from Tables 2.1-2.3. In terms of the effects of 
financial globalization (or, more specifically, of the international dimensions of financial 
development), we find that they tend to be positive and significant (φ𝑢𝑠 > 0) on anticipated 
growth volatility when proxies by the interest rate in the US. This is intuitive as reductions in 
the US interest rate translate into the reduction of the price of money internationally with the 
latter pricing accounting for risk. 
In summary, we find strong evidence that domestic financial development, trade openness 
and public deficit have a negative indirect (via volatility) impact on growth whereas US 
interest rate affects it positively. 
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1.6.3 Dynamic Aspects 
 
In this section we investigate how short- and long-run considerations help us refine our 
baseline results. Another potential benefit from this exercise is that the required use of lags 
may help ameliorate any lingering concerns about endogeneity. In order to estimate short- 
and long- run relationships we employ the following error correction (P)ARCH form 
               ∆𝑦𝑡 = μ + θ∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑐 − 𝜁𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡 ,                 (7) 
where θ and ζ capture the short and long-run effects respectively, and ϕ is the speed of 
adjustment to the long-run relationship. This is accomplished by embedding a long-run 
growth regression into an ARDL model. In other words, the term in parenthesis contains the 
long-run growth regression, which acts as a forcing equilibrium condition 
                         y𝑡 = c + 𝜁𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡  ,                               (8) 
where ut is I(0). The lag of the first difference of either the financial development variable 
(domestic or international) or trade openness or public deficit (∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙) characterizes the 
short-run effect. The condition for the existence of a long-run relationship (dynamic stability) 
requires that the coefficient on the error-correction term be negative and not lower than -2 
(that is, −2 < ϕ < 0 ). We also take into account the PARCH effects by specifying the 
error term u𝑡 as follows 
                                    𝜀𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑡
1
2 ,                           (9) 
  Where 
                        ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛              (10) 
 
Table 3 presents the results on the estimation of short- and long-run parameters linking the 
four explanatory variables with growth. In all cases, the estimated coefficient on the error 
correction term (ϕ) lies within the dynamically stable range (-2, 0). From investigating 
whether dynamic considerations affect our conclusions, we find important differences in 
terms of short and long-run behavior of our explanatory variables, more specifically, while 
the negative effects of public deficit are similar in the long- and short-run, that of domestic 
financial development are negative in the short- but positive in the long-run (see the θ and ζ 
columns). Those for US interest rate are positive in the short- but negative in the long-run. 
Finally, the negative short-run effects of trade openness disappear in the long-run. 
For the sake of space, we do not report the results for the intermediate steps
25
. Table 3.1 
presents the results for the four regressors with the estimated model defined as follows 
∆𝑦𝑡 = μ + θ𝑓𝑑∆𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + θ𝑡𝑜∆𝑥𝑡𝑜,𝑡−𝑙 + θ𝑝𝑑∆𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + θ𝑢𝑠∆𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑐 −
𝜁𝑓𝑑𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−1 − 𝜁𝑝𝑑 𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−1 − 𝜁𝑢𝑠𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡 ,                                   (11) 
                                                    
25 See trivariate results in Appendix A. 
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With  
                                               ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛 ,            (12) 
Where 𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙  is a financial development indicator, 𝑥𝑡𝑜,𝑡−𝑙 is trade openness (or one of its 
elements), 𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 is public deficit (any of the tree measures) and 𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−𝑙  is US interest rate.  
  The estimates of ϕ lie within the range -1.00 to -0.74. Regarding the short and long-run 
estimates, θ𝑖  and ζ𝑖, we focus our analysis first on those obtained from the US interest rate. 
All estimates of the short-run coefficients (see the θ𝑢𝑠 column) are highly significant and 
positive whereas the corresponding values for the long-run coefficients are negative (see the 
ζ𝑢𝑠 column). 
Next we discuss the results regarding the domestic financial development and trade 
openness variables. In the long-run, we find that financial development (in this case, M1 and 
commercial bank deposits) affects growth positively (see the ζ𝑓𝑑 column in Table 3.1). 
Interestingly, the short-run coefficients tell a very differently story: we find that the short-run 
impact of financial development (any of the three measures) on growth is negative and 
significant (see the θ𝑓𝑑  column). Thus our results square well with recent findings by 
Loayza and Rancière (2006), among others, in that the sign of the relationship between 
economic growth and financial development depends on whether the movements are 
temporary or permanent (the effect being negative in the former and positive in the latter). 
Finally, the negative short-run impact of trade openness (any of the three forms) disappears 
in the long-run (thus it is not included in the regression)
26
. Interestingly, the negative 
long-run impact of public deficit (but not of its elements) disappears as well.  
In summary, in the short-run three variables have a negative effect on growth whereas that 
of the US interest rate is positive. In the long-run domestic financial development affects 
growth positively whereas the impact of US interest rate turns to negative and that of trade 
openness (any three aspects) disappears. 
 
1.6.4 Structural Breaks 
 
One final important robustness test regards the role of structural breaks. We use the 
methodology developed by Bai and Perron (2003) to examine whether there are any 
structural breaks in growth, its volatility, the three financial development variables, the 
various aspects of trade openness and the three forms of public deficit. Bai and Perron (2003) 
address the problem of testing for multiple structural changes under very general conditions 
on the data and the errors. In addition to testing for the existence of breaks, these statistics 
                                                    
26 These results are in line with the ones from the bivariate/trivariate analysis (not reported). Thus our 
multivariate analysis shows that the short- and long-run effects of domestic and international financial 
development are not affected by the addition of two other explanatory variables to the model.  
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identify the number and location of multiple breaks. 
In the case of the economic growth series the Bai-Perron methodology supports one 
structural break point which occurs for year 1918
27
. For US interest rate and, interestingly, 
also for growth volatility we find no structural breaks. However, our Bai-Perron results 
support that two measures of domestic financial development, M1 and commercial bank 
deposits, have two structural breaks, which are dated for years 1889 and 1930, and 1914 and 
1962, respectively. In addition, we also find two structural breaks in expenditures and 
revenues (they are dated 1890 and 1980).  Further, we also find one structural break in trade 
openness and public deficit (it is dated 1899 and 1965, respectively). 
In what follows, we incorporate dummy variables in the equations (1), (2), (7) and (10), 
thus taking into account breaks in growth, domestic financial development, trade openness 
and public deficit. First, we introduce the following notation. D1t, is an (intercept) dummy 
defined as D1t = 1 in the periods 1918-2003 and D1t = 0 otherwise. Similarly, D𝑖𝑡 is a (slope) 
dummy indicating the period which starts from the year of the break in either the financial 
development or trade openness or public deficit variable ( x𝑖𝑡 ). For example for the latter Dit 
= 1 in the period from 1965 to 2003 whereas for the revenues/expenditures D𝑖𝑡  = 1 during 
the period from 1980 until the end of the sample, and D𝑖𝑡= 0 otherwise. 
The augmented model is given by 
 
              𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑘 log(ℎ𝑡) + 𝜆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜆𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑙𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜖𝑡,                 (13) 
And 
     ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + 𝜔1𝐷1𝑡 + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 𝑓(𝑒𝑡−1) + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝜑𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑙𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛 ,   (14) 
Recall that the coefficients φ and λ capture the impacts of the variable (either financial 
development or trade openness or public deficit) on growth and its volatility respectively. 
Similarly, φ𝑑 and λ𝑑 correspond to the two effects from the year of the break onwards. 
Thus the two effects are captured by φ and λ in the period up to the year of the structural 
break, and by φ + φ𝑑  and λ + λ𝑑 during the period from the year of the break until the 
end of the sample. As above in order to study the direct effects of financial development we 
specify model 1 with φ = φ𝑑 = 0, while model 2 with λ = λ𝑑 = 0, allows us to investigate 
indirect impact on growth. 
We also incorporate intercept dummies and level effects in the error correction equation (7) 
and conditional variance equation (10), as follows 
 
      ∆𝑦𝑡 = μ + θ∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + θ𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑙∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑐 − 𝜁𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡,          (15) 
             ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + ω1𝐷1𝑡 + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛 ,               (16) 
Overall, we find our results to be quite robust to the inclusion of the structural break 
                                                    
27 As a measure of volatility we use the power transformed absolute growth |𝑦𝑡|
𝑑 . 
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dummies. That is, domestic financial development has negative short-run effects on growth 
whereas its long-run impact is positive. The short- and long-run impacts of US interest rate 
are opposite from those of domestic financial development. Public deficit affects growth 
negatively both in the short and the long-run. Trade openness has a negative short-run impact 
but the effect disappears in the long-run. For all four variables both lagged indirect and direct 
effects have the same sign, that is, positive for the US interest rate and negative for the other 
three. It is also noteworthy that the lagged direct effects on growth of commercial bank 
deposits and revenues/expenditures are stronger before 1914 and after 1980, respectively. 
The indirect effects of the public deficit are weaker after 1965. 
 
1.6.5 Summary Results 
 
This section summarizes our main results. The long-run impact of domestic financial 
development on growth is positive whereas its short-run effect is negative (see the first row 
of Table 7). Similarly to domestic financial development, for trade openness both the lagged 
direct/ short-run and indirect effects on growth are negative. However, in the long-run the 
impact disappears. The effects of the US interest rate on growth are exactly the opposite 
from those of domestic financial development. That is, its long-run impact is negative 
whereas the short-run/lagged direct as well as the indirect effects are positive (see the third 
row of Table 7). Finally, all four influences of public deficit (direct, indirect, short and 
long-run) are negative. 
 
Table 7 Summary of Results 
   For all four variables both lagged direct and indirect effects on growth work in the same 
direction and the former is equivalent to the short-run impact (see the first three columns of 
Table 7). 
In sum, our main results suggest that financial development (domestic and international) 
Table 7: Summary of Results: Direct, Indirect, Short and Long-run Effects.
D IND SR LR D IND SR LR
Financial Development -1 -2 - 3 Trade Openness -4 - -5 0
US Interest Rate   - Public Deficit - - -6 -7
Notes: D denotes the direct effect. IND is the indirect effect. LR and SR denote the long and short-
run impacts, respectively. 1For deposits (Banco do Brasil) the effect is insignificant (see the fd
column in Table 1.3). 2The effect disappears when commercial bank deposits are used (see the fd
column in Table 2.2). 3The impact is insignificant when deposits at Banco do Brasil are used (see the
fd column in Table 3.1). 4The effect disappears when commercial bank deposits and public deficit
are used (see the to column in Table 1.2). 5The impact is insignificant when deposits (Banco do
Brasil) are used. 6The effect disappears when commercial bank deposits and either expenditures or
revenues are used. 7The impact disappears when either M1 and expenditures or public deficit are
used (see the pd column in Table 3.1).
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exhibit the most robust first-order effects on growth and its volatility. We also find that trade 
openness and public deficit play important yet secondary roles because the effects of the 
former do not extent to the long-run (that is, they are restricted to the short-run) and those of 
the latter are sensitive to the measures of the variables used in our analysis. 
Thus the most robust results obtained for domestic and international financial 
development. Interestingly, the effects for the later are working in the opposite direction 
from those of the former. 
 
1.7 Conclusions and Future Research 
 
Using a PARCH framework and data for Brazil from approximately 1890 to 2003 we ask 
the following questions: What is the relationship between, on the one hand, financial 
development (domestic and international), public deficit, trade openness and, on the other 
hand, economic growth and (predicted) growth volatility? Are these effects fundamentally 
and systematically different? Does the intensity and the direction (the sign) of these effects 
vary over time, in general and, in particular, do they vary with respect to short- versus 
long-run considerations? We find that the main explanatory factors, solely in terms of their 
negative lagged direct/indirect effects on economic growth in Brazil, turn out to be domestic 
financial development, trade openness and public deficit. Further, we find robust evidence 
that the US interest rate affect growth positively both directly (lagged effect) and indirectly 
via its volatility. 
From investigating whether dynamic considerations affect our conclusions, we find 
important differences in terms of short- and long-run behavior of our key variables, more 
specifically, while the effects of financial development (mainly M1 and commercial bank 
deposits) are negative in the short- and positive in the long-run, that of the US interest rate 
work in the opposite direction. Finally, public deficit has both a negative short and long-run 
impact. 
These findings are interest in themselves but they also matter because they raise a number 
of new questions that we believe may be useful in motivating future research. Here we 
highlight two suggestions. Regarding the role of finance in the process of economic 
development, our finding reinforces a large body of previous research in that we also show a 
strong, positive impact of financial development on growth in the long-run. We cannot forget 
however that Brazil is unique. Put it differently, Brazil is an outlier and further research 
could try to replicate our analysis using the historical experience of other countries (ideally 
in a panel setting). That is, to study the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth in a panel of developing countries would strengthen what we know. Yet, 
the data requirements are very heavy indeed, with most developing countries lacking 
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historical data even on key figures, such as per capita GDP, going back to the beginning or 
middle of the XIXth century. This, of course, does not make this task less important. 
The second suggestion refers to a possible methodological improvement, namely the 
application of the bivariate GARCH model to the problem at hand (albeit the relatively small 
number of observations). The joint estimation of the political instability-financial 
development-growth system in a panel of countries would clearly represent progress and is 
something we feel future research should try to address. 
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Chapter Two 
Institutional Change and Economic Growth in Brazil 
from 1870 to 2003 
2.1 Introduction 
    It is difficult to identify the causal effect of institutions on economic growth. In 
developed countries, institutions do change but they do so extremely slowly and the relevant 
starting point to evaluate their effect is arguably well beyond available data (e.g., early 1800s 
may be ideal). On the other hand, institutions do change much quicker in developing 
countries but the quality of the few existing data tends to be rather questionable, that is, 
when available. This chapter explores a new dataset and within country variation over 
extremely long periods of time to assess the causal effects of various types of institutions in 
terms of the growth rate of per capita GDP. 
     
    In terms of the definition of the political instability, Campos and Karanasos (2008) 
closely follow North distinction between formal and informal institutions to focus on the role 
of political instability. Institutional change can hence occur through changes in formal or 
through changes in informal political institutions. The latter includes events of political 
unrest like assassinations, revolutions and riots, and the former includes events such as 
government terminations and electoral surprises. In other words, the latter ones (termed 
formal political instability) are the result of the competing between different political 
institutions or factions while the former ones (termed informal instability) have no 
appropriate representation within institutional channels. 
     
    Of course there has been a lot of interest and a burgeoning literature on the relationship 
between political instability and economic growth. In a seminal paper, using a cross section 
framework, Barro (1991) finds that assassinations, number of coups and revolutions have a 
negative effect on growth. Campos and Nugent (2002) confirm this result by using panel 
data analysis. Interestingly, Campos and Nugent find that the political instabilities causes a 
negative impact (on growth) in Saharan African countries but have a positive effect in a 
sample of Middle East countries. Yet, other researches claim that there is no significant 
relationship between political instability and output growth. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) 
suggested, assassinations and war casualties have no significant effect on growth. 
Benhabib-Spiegel (1997) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) also support this argument by using 
different data and methodologies. 
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    Within a power-ARCH (PARCH) framework and using annual time series data for 
Brazil covering the period from 1870 to 2003, the aim of this chapter is to put forward 
answers to the following questions. What is the relationship between instability of a 
country's key political institutions, economic growth and volatility? Are the effects of these 
variables direct (on economic growth) or indirect (via the conditional growth volatility)? 
Does the intensity and sign of these impacts vary over time? Does the intensity of these 
effects vary with respect to short- versus long-run considerations? Is the intensity of these 
effects constant across the different eras or phases of Brazilian economic history (in other 
words, are they independent from the main structural breaks we estimate)? 
     
This chapter tries to contribute to our understanding of whether instability of a country's 
key political institutions affects output growth. We believe this further our understanding of 
economic growth because: (a) we study only one individual country over a very long period 
of time with annual frequency data. Most of the researches assess political instability from a 
cross-country perspective (Barro, 1991; Levine and Renelt,1992; Fosu, 2001 etc.) while 
others are more focused on the shorter periods trying to explain the growth rate of Brazil and 
Argentina (Campante et al., 2009), (b) we extensively use the economic history literature to 
guide our choice of potential important reasons behind the performance of the Brazilian 
economy over a very large time window, (c) we choose an econometric methodology that 
has been seldom used in the empirical growth literature despite the fact that it easily allow us 
to contrast the direct to the indirect (i.e., via the volatility channel) effects of each of our 
candidate reasons, sort out the short- from the long-run impacts, and distill the consequences 
of accounting for important structural breaks on the robustness of our key results. Another 
important, albeit more technical, benefit of our choice of econometric framework is that it 
helps shedding light on an important and resilient puzzle on the relationship between output 
growth and its volatility. While Ramey and Ramey (1995) show that growth rates are 
adversely affected by volatility, Grier and Tullock (1989) argue that larger standard 
deviations of growth rates are associated with larger mean rates. The majority of ARCH 
papers examining the growth-volatility link are restricted to these two key variables. That is, 
they seldom assess whether the effects of the presence of other variables affect the relation 
and, in the rare occasions that happens, they are usually inflation and its volatility that comes 
into play
28
. 
Our results are presented following specific types of effects. That is, we discuss direct 
(on mean economic growth), indirect (via volatility), dynamic (short and long-run) and 
structural break effects. As for the direct effects on economic growth, we find evidence for 
negative direct influences on real GDP growth from both the informal political instabilities 
                                                    
28 For a comprehensive review of this literature see Fountas et al. (2007). In addition, Gillman and Kejak 
(2005) bring together for comparison several main approaches to modeling the inflation-growth effect by 
nesting them within a general monetary endogenous growth model with both human and physical capital.  
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(i.e, assassinations, coups and revolutions) and formal political instabilities (i.e, legislative 
effectiveness and number of cabinet changes). Equally importantly, we find that almost all of 
our political instability indicators have strong negative impacts on the output growth in the 
short-run. How does this set of variables affect predicted growth volatility? Or in other 
words, how do they affect growth indirectly through their impact on growth volatility? We 
find strong volatility-decreasing effects form both formal and informal political instabilities. 
Our investigation of the dynamic effects shows important differences in terms of the short 
and long-run behavior of our key variables: almost all political factors affect growth 
negatively in the short-run but the evidence in the long-run is weaker. Importantly, however, 
the negative impact of assassinations, coups, revolutions together with legislative 
effectiveness and cabinet changes remain strong in the long-run. Finally, we subjected all 
these results to the presence of structural breaks. This is a crucial exercise given the very 
long-term nature of our data. We find that our basic results remain once we take structural 
breaks into account. It is also noteworthy that the contemporaneous direct effects on growth 
of our explanatory variables (i.e, anti-government demonstrations and assassinations) are 
stronger before the structural breaks, whereas the indirect effects are weaker after the breaks. 
     
In sum, our main results suggest that the instability of political institutions (four measures 
of political indicators from both formal and informal political variables) exhibit the most 
robust first-order effects on growth and its volatility. We also find that other political factors 
play important yet secondary roles because the long-run effects disappeared (that is, they are 
restricted to the short-run). Hence in summary the most robust results (negative 
direct/indirect, short and long-run impact on economic growth) are those obtained for 
assassinations, number of coups, legislative effectiveness and cabinet changes. 
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the historical researches of 
political instability. Section 2.3 sets the construction of our new data set for the chapter by 
documenting the Brazilian political history events from 1870 to 1930. Section 2.4 provides 
justification for our econometric methodology. Section 2.5 has our baseline econometric 
results. Section 2.6 summarizes the conclusion. 
 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Economic growth and political instabilities are closely interconnected. Theoretically, as 
Drazen (2000) states there are two main reasons for why political instability may affect 
economic outcomes. Firstly, political instability creates uncertainty with respect to future 
institutions and policymakers, which alters the behavior of private agents and firms with 
respect to accumulation of capital. Secondly, because political instability can disrupt market 
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functioning and economic relations, it has a direct effect on productivity and hence output 
economic growth. However, whereas economic growth is well-defined concept, political 
instability is not. Since the political instability itself cannot be measured directly, empirical 
studies often rely on indicators like the number of the revolutions (Barro, 1991) or the 
number of the assassinations (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). Nevertheless, political instability 
is a multi-dimensional concept which cannot be captured by one or two variables. Therefore, 
in this chapter, we follow North distinction between formal and informal institutions to focus 
on the role of political instability. Institutional change can hence occur through changes in 
formal or through changes in informal political institutions. The latter includes events of 
political unrest like assassinations, and number of the coups and the former includes events 
such as government terminations and electoral surprises. In other words, the latter ones 
(termed formal political instability) are the result of the competing between different 
political institutions or factions while the former ones (termed informal instability) have no 
appropriate representation within institutional channels. 
 
On the empirical side, historical researches on the association between political instability 
and output growth suggest at least three kinds of possibilities. The first aspect in the 
literature suggests that political instability has a significant effect on economic growth. For 
instance, Alesina et.al. (1996), using a sample of 113 countries from 1950 to 1982, finds that 
instability has a negative and significant effect on per capita GDP growth. Campos and 
Nugent (2002) confirm this result by using panel data analysis. Interestingly, Campos and 
Nugent find that the political instabilities causes a negative impact (on growth) in Saharan 
African countries but have a positive effect in a sample of Middle East countries. The second 
aspect in the literature argues that economic growth causes political stability (Zablotsky, 
1996), while Kirmanoglu (2003) investigates the relationship between per capita GDP and 
political instability for 19 countries and gives a third suggestion that the causality runs both 
ways. Moreover, some researches claim that there is no significant relationship between 
political instabilities and output growth. As Easterly and Rebelo (1993) suggested, 
assassinations and war casualties have no significant effect on growth. Few years later, 
Benhabib-Spiegel (1997) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) also support this argument by using 
different political indicators and methodologies. 
 
Focusing on our case study of Brazil, although Brazil is marked by extremely social unrest 
in the particular periods (e.g. 1920s and 1980s), there is little historical research that covers 
the case of Brazil. Luisa Blanco and Robin Grier (2009) investigate the underlying causes of 
political instability in a panel of 18 Latin American countries from 1971 – 2000 and find that 
the openness to trade has a significant negative effect on instability. Bildirici Melike (2004) 
investigates the link between political instability financial depth and economic growth in the 
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emerging countries (including Brazil) for 1985 – 2004 and suggests a short-run causality.  
 
In sum, similar to Melike’s work, we ask the questions of what is the relationship between 
financial development, political instability, public deficit, trade openness and output growth. 
Are these effects fundamentally and systematically different? Do the intensity and the 
direction (the sign) of these effects vary over time, in general and, in particular, do they vary 
with respect to short- versus long-run considerations. In the section below, we will discuss 
our measures of all those explanatory variables.  
 
 
2.3 Construction of our New Data Set on Changes of 
Political Institutions in Brazil since 1870 
This section presents the data used in our analysis. Our political instability variables can 
be divided into two categories, formal political instabilities and informal ones. Both formal 
and informal political indicators are recorded yearly for Brazil from the year of 1919 to the 
year of 2003 with the exclusion of the World War II period (1940-1945). However, in order 
to track our political instability variables back to the year of 1870, we constructed our own 
informal political instability series from the year of 1870 to the year of 1919. 
To achieve this goal, firstly, according to the definitions of the political instability 
variables, we collect the related political events from 1870 -- 1930. Then, by comparing the 
data we constructed to the existing ones from 1919 to 1930, we can evaluate the accuracy of 
the series we generated. Therefore, in the following subsections, we describe in detail the 
construction of the political instability indicators from 1870 to 1930. We will also discuss 
how those political events we generated match our existing data set. 
 
2.3.1 Informal Political Instabilities: 
Our informal political instability variables include (see figure 5) seven indicators.  
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Figure 5 Informal Political Instabilities 
First of all, we identify the events that related to the anti-government demonstrations. As 
anti-government demonstrations is defined as peaceful government gatherings of at least 100 
people, we find only one related political event occurred in the year of 1904. With the 
approval of law of Mandatory Vaccine, an uprising against government's decisions broke out. 
The event began on 10th November, with a group of student demonstration (Boris Fausto, 
1986)
29
. Although the movement quickly turned to riot at the end, it was a peaceful 
demonstration in the first few days. In the following 26 years, until the year of 1930, we 
cannot observe any other information about anti-government demonstrations either from the 
political history resources or our existing data set. 
                                                    
29 Boris Fausto (1986). Brazil: the social and political structure of the First Republic, 1889-1930. Volume 5 
of Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University Press. pp812. 
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Next, assassinations are defined as any political motivated murder or attempted murder 
of a high government official or politician. The only related piece of event we found during 
the period of 1870 -- 1919 is that Jose Gomes Pinheiro Machado, who was a Brazilian 
republican politician, was murdered in the year of 1915 (Boris Fausto, 1986)
30
. Further, to 
comparing to our existing data, we also find two other assassinations in the year 1930. 
Earlier in February, Vice president Mello Vianna was shot three times in the neck and in the 
hand at Monte Claros in the states of Minas Geraes
31
. After a few months, Joao Pessoa 
Cavalcanti de Albuquerqu, who was the governor of the Paraiba, was murdered in July 
(Boris Fausto, 1986)
32
.  
In the case of general strikes, the identification is clear before the year of 1888 since 
Brazil was still under slavery. According to the definition of the general strikes( a general 
strike involved with at least 1000 workers and aimed at government policies), we found that 
the first major strike in Brazil occurred in Rio de Janeiro in 1903
33
 when workers at the 
Aliaca Textile Mill walked off the job. This strike paralyzed Rio de Janeiro for twenty days 
when over 40,000 workers from all the city's textile mills went on strike demanding better 
conditions and pay (Michael M. Hall and Hobart A. Spalding, 1988)
34
. The next short and 
unsuccessful strike to shake Brazil was a general strike in the textile industry of Sao Paulo in 
1907 (Michael M. Hall and Hobart A. Spalding, 1988). Six years later, the strike led by cities 
Federacao Operaria Syndical occurred in Rio Grande do Sal (Michael M. Hall and Hobart A. 
Spalding, 1988)
35
. In the year of 1917, one of the most violent general strikes
36
 broke out in 
Sao Paulo in July. According to Michael M. Hall and Hobart A. Spalding, records show that 
about 50,000 people joined the movement. From the year of 1919 to 1930, our existing data 
set shows that one strike happened in the year of 1920 which is recorded by Steven (2011). 
However, this general strike
37
 was called in 1920 for factory workers in Rio de Janeiro. 
It is, sometimes, hard to distinguish the guerrilla warfare to the revolutions. In this 
chapter, we defined our guerrilla warfare as armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on 
                                                    
30 Boris Fausto (1986). Brazil: the social and political structure of the First Republic, 1889-1930. Volume 5 
of Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University Press. pp817. 
31 Found the event in newspaper. Available at: http://trove.nla.gov.au/ndp/del/article/83815336. 
32 Boris Fausto. (1986). Brazil: the social and political structure of the First Republic, 1889-1930. Volume 5 
of Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University Press. pp827. 
33 Michael M. Hall and Hobart A. Spalding (1988). The urban working class an dearly Latin American 
Labour movements, 1880-1930. Volume 4 of Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University 
Press. pp348. 
34 Michael M. Hall and Hobart A. Spalding (1988). The urban working class an dearly Latin American 
Labour movements, 1880-1930. Volume 4 of Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University 
Press. pp348. 
35 Michael M. Hall and Hobart A. Spalding (1988). The urban working class an dearly Latin American 
Labour movements, 1880-1930. Volume 4 of Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University 
Press. pp348. 
36 Michael M. Hall and Hobart A. Spalding (1988). The urban working class an dearly Latin American 
Labour movements, 1880-1930. Volume 4 of Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University 
Press. pp332. 
37 Steven (2011). Organized Labor in Brazil 1900-1937: From Anarchist Origins to Government Control - 
Colin Everett. Available at: 
http://libcom.org/history/organized-labor-brazil-1900-1937-anarchist-origins-government-control-colin-ever
ett 
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by independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the overthrow of the 
present regime. According to this definition we found the Contestado War (Guerra do 
Contestado)
38
 is a typical guerrilla war occurred in 1912 (Vinhas de Queiroz, 1966). Clashes 
between settlers and landowners lasted for four years. During that time, with the support by 
the Brazilian states' police and military forces, around 9,000 houses were burned and 20,000 
people were killed. At the end, the guerrilla war was finally ended with the capture of 
Adeodato -- the last leader of the Contestado, in August of 1916. Further, by comparing the 
series we quoted from 1919 -- 1930, we found two more guerrilla wars. The first one is 
called revolution of 1923
39
 while the second one is the movements lead by Luis Carlos 
Prestes in the year of 1924 (Boris Fausto, 1986)
40
.  
The fifth measure of our informal political instability variable is the number of the 
coups, which is defined as the number of extra constitutional or forced changes in the top 
government elites. It is very clear that in our examined period of 1870 -- 1930, only two 
bloodless coups occurred, in the year of 1889 and 1930 respectively. As Riordan Roett (1999) 
stated, the traditional resources of support for the monarchy were seriously weakened at the 
end of the Second Empire. Firstly, on November 15 of 1899, the Emperor was dethroned and 
Brazil passed from centralized Empire to federal republic by bloodless coup ever since 
(Boris Fausto, 1986)
41
. Secondly, in the year of 1930, after Vargas took the power, he issued 
a decree law which granted virtually dictatorial power to the government and dissolved the 
congress. This is so called a coup as Leslie Bethell (2008) mentioned in Politics in Brazil 
under Vargas, 1930-1945. 
The definition of our sixth informal political indicator –revolutions, is as follows: 
illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any attempt at such a change, or any 
successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose aim is independence from the central 
government. During the six years from 1864 to 1870, Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay fought 
a bloody war with Paraguay. The war ended with the victory of Brazil and its allies but at a 
terrible price. Nevertheless, in Brazil, the war contributed to the growth of manufacturing 
and to increased power of the central government. Thus, there was almost no revolutionary 
revolt against the government during the last two decades of the Second Empire. However, 
due to the competition between the President Deodora da Fonseca and the vice President 
Floriano Peixoto, soon after the formation of the First Republic, the first revolt of the Naval 
(Revolta da Armada) broke out in 1891. The President dissolved the congress provoking 
                                                    
38 Vinhas de Queiroz, Mauricio (1966). Messianismo e conflito social: a guerra sertaneja do Contestado 
(1912-1916). Rio de Janeiro: Oxford University Press. 
39 This event has no English sources. 
  Flores, Moacyr (1993). História do Rio Grande do Sul. Porto Alegre: Nova Dimensão, 
  Also see: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolu%C3%A7%C3%A3o_de_1923 
40 Boris Fausto (1986). Brazil: the social and political structure of the First Republic, 1889-1930. Volume 5 
of Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University Press. pp820. 
41 Riordan Roett, 1999. Brazil: Politics in a Patrimonial Society. pp7. 
  Also see, Boris Fausto. 1986. Brazil: the social and political structure of the First Republic, 1889-1930. 
Volume 5 of Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University Press.  
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rebellions in the navy and in Rio Grande do Sul (June E. Hahner, 1969)
42
. One year later, a 
document sent by 13 generals to the president of the Republic manifesto called for new 
elections. President Floriano who took office since the first revolt of the Naval, suppressed 
the movement, and ordered the arrest of its leaders. Therefore, in the September of 1893, the 
second Revolta da Armada broke out at Rio de Janeiro (June E. Hahner, 1969). While the 
naval insurgents still threaten the capital, the Federalists rapidly approach the southern 
borders of Sao Paulo. The Federalist Revolution
43
 which lasted two years from 1893 - 1895 
was defeated in the Battle of the Pulador (June E. Hahner, 1969). Moreover, in the same year 
of 1893, a more bloody conflict between the state of Brazil and a group of settlers who 
founded their own community, named Canudos, began. The Canudos war
44
 had a brutal end 
in the October 1897, almost all the inhabitants were killed by a large Brazilian army force 
(Colin M. MacLachlan, 2003). Few years later, The Revolt of the Lash (Revolta da 
Chibata)
45
, occurred on November 1910. There were about 2400 sailors involved in this so 
called sailors' revolt. The rebel had been planned for about two years and triggered by severe 
punishment applied to the sailor Marcelino Rodriguez Menezes. The movements last from 
22nd to 27th, the crews, most of them were black, deposed their white officers and 
threatened to bomb the city, however the mutiny was resolved within a week (Schneider Ann, 
2009). Further, for the comparison reasons we mentioned above, we also investigated the 
revolutionary events of Brazil during the period of 1919 -- 1930. As Boris Fausto (1986) 
stated, the period between 1922 and 1924 was marked by many conflicts and riots. Tenente 
Revolts
46
 occurred in 1922 and once again in 1924 which contribute significantly to the 
weakening of the political power of the Sao Paulo oligarchy. Few months after Tenente 
revolt, other revolts
47
 without names broke out in various cities in Rio Grande do Sul 
against the government (Boris Fausto, 1986). In the year of 1928, a revolt
48
 has been 
recorded in a newspaper without many details. "A revolutionary outbreak was reported from 
Mattogresso with no details." was the only piece of news can be found. Two years later, the 
Revolution of 1930
49
 overthrew President Washington Luis and installed Getulio Vargas as 
Provisional President (Leslie Bethell, 2008). Few months later in 1930, Revolta de Princesa 
-- Paraíba occurred. 
                                                    
42 June E. Hahner, 1969. Civilian -- Military Relations in Brazil 1889-1898. University of South Carolina 
Press. P133 
   Also see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolta_da_Armada 
43 June E. Hahner, 1969. Civilian -- Military Relations in Brazil 1889-1898. University of South Carolina 
Press. pp 143. 
44 Colin M. MacLachlan (2003). History of Modern Brazil: the past against future Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers. pp50. 
45 Schneider Ann, 2009. The 1910 Sailors' Revolt Against the Lash. University of Chicago Press.  
46 Alain Rouquie and Stephen Suffern (1995). The military in Latin American politics since1930.. Volume 6 
of Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University Press. pp240. 
47 Boris Fausto (1986). Brazil: the social and political structure of the First Republic, 1889-1930. Volume 5 
of Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University Press. pp820. 
48 Asuncion (1928, Aug. 10). Revolt in Brazil. The Straits Times. 
Available at: http://newspapers.nl.sg/Digitised/Page/straitstimes19280811.1.10.aspx 
49 Leslie Bethell (2008). Politics in Brazil under Vargas, 1930-1945. Volume 9 of Cambridge History of 
Latin American. Cambridge University Press. 
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The last measure of our informal political instability variable is the riots, which defined as 
the violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving. The Riots before the 
First Republic have been documented in several books (Bethell, Leslie, 1985, Maecdo, M. K, 
1998 and Carneiro David, 1960). From 1873 to 1874 in the southern Brazil, a clash which is 
called Revolt of the Muckers (Revolta dos Muckers)
50
 between two groups in one German 
community arisen. From the end of 1874 to the middle of 1875, in the northeast of Brazil, a 
revolt which called Quebra -- Quilos revolt (Revolta do Quebra-Quilos)
51
 against a new 
system of measures and weights broke out. In the year of 1875, about 300 women went 
through the streets (armed with stones and sticks) in order to protest against the compulsory 
military draft on August 30th (Guerra das Mulheres)
52
. During the last decade of the Empire, 
Revolt of the penny (Revolta do Vintem)
53
 took place from December 28 1879 to January 4 
of 1880 on the street of Rio de Janeiro. And once again, the revolt occurred between March 
27 and March 30 in the city of Curitiba in 1883. Although the statistics of injuries and death 
is inaccurate, the sure thing is shoots are fired from both sides, several injured on both sides, 
and numerous arrested. Ten years after the first civilian president of republic assumed power, 
in 1904, an uprising to against government decision broke out. On the 13th November, the 
center of Rio de Janeiro became battlefield (Boris Fausto, 1986)
54
. In the year of 1914, with 
the policy of bailouts, President's attempted to intervene the northeast region, neutralized the 
political power of the oligarchy in state of Ceara. However, the attempt of replacing states 
governor quickly triggered the clash called Sedicao de Juazeiro
55
 (Boris Fausto, 1986). 
From the year of 1919 till the year of 1930, our existing data set shows three riots. First one 
occurred in the year of 1920. Boris Fausto (1986) recorded a revolt without many details in 
the "Brazil: the social and political structure of the First Republic, 1889-1930". Another two 
riots took place in the year of 1930. Stated by Boris Fausto (1986), Revolta de Princesa -- 
Paraiba occurred. Soon after this event, Joao Pessoa, who was the governor of Paraiba, was 
murdered in July. After his death, there were more riots. 
2.3.2 Formal Political Instabilities: 
Our formal political instability variables include eight measures (see figure 6): Changes in 
                                                    
50 Bethell, Leslie, ed.(1985) Brazil: Empire and Republic 1822-1930. Volume 5 of Cambridge History of 
Latin America. Cambridge University Press. PP.170-171. Also see: 
http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolta_dos_Muckers 
51 Maecdo, M. K. de (1998). Revoltas populares na Provincia do Rio Grande: o "Quebra-Quilos" e o 
"Motim das Mulheres". Historia do RN. Available from : www.seol.com.br/rnnaweb/ridiculo de mais 
52 Geraldo Maia (2003). O motim das mulheres  
Available at: http://www2.uol.com.br/omossoroense/120904/nhistoria.htm 
53 Carneiro David (1960). Historia do periodo provincial do Parana galeria de presidentes, 1853-1889. 
Curitiba: Tipografia Max Roesner Press. 
  Also see: http://pt.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolta_do_Vint%C3%A9m_(Rio_de_Janeiro) 
54 It is recorded as a demonstration in the book, however, the movement turned to riot at the end. Boris 
Fausto (1986). Brazil: the social and political structure of the First Republic, 1889-1930. Volume 5 of 
Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University Press. pp812. 
55 Boris Fausto. 1986. Brazil: the social and political structure of the First Republic, 1889-1930. Volume 5 
of Cambridge History of Latin American. Cambridge University Press. pp816-817. 
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effective executive (the number of times in a year that effective control of the executive 
power changes hands. Such a change requires that the new executive be independent of his 
predecessor), government crisis (any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the 
downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of revolt aimed at such overthrow), 
legislative effectiveness (the definition is as follows: (0) None. No legislature exists. (1) 
Ineffective. There are three possible bases for this coding: first, legislative activity may be 
essentially of a "rubber stamp" character; second, domestic turmoil may make the 
implementation of legislation impossible; third, the effective executive may prevent the 
legislature from meeting, or otherwise substantially impede the exercise of its functions. (2) 
Partially Effective. A situation in which the effective executives power substantially 
outweighs, but does not completely dominate, that of the legislature. (3) Effective. The 
possession of significant governmental autonomy by the legislature, including substantial 
authority in regard to taxation and disbursement, and the power to override executive vetoes 
of legislation.), legislative selection (which is defined as follows: (0) None. No legislature 
exists. (1) Nonelective. Examples would be the selection of legislators by the effective 
executive, or by means of heredity or ascription. (2) Elective. Legislators (or members of the 
lower house in a bicameral system) are selected by means of either direct or indirect popular 
election.), major constitutional changes
56
 (the number of basic alterations in a state's 
constitutional structure), number of cabinet changes (the number of times in a year that a 
new premier is named and/or 50% of the cabinet posts are occupied by new ministers), 
purges, and size of cabinet (which refers to the number of ministers of "cabinet rank", 
excluding undersecretaries, parliamentary secretaries, ministerial alternates, etc. Include 
president and vice-president under a presidential system, but not under a parliamentary 
system. Chiefs of state excluded, except under presidential system.). 
                                                    
56 There were no major constitutional changes between the year of 1891 and the Vargas Era.  
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Figure 6 Formal Political Instabilities 
With the exception of the government crisis and the purges, all other formal political events 
are recorded since the year of 1870
57
. Therefore, we will discuss in detail the construction of 
the purges and government crisis respectively. 
Given the definition of the purges - any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of 
                                                    
57 There were no major changes for legislative effectiveness, legislative selection and number of cabinet 
changes during the First World War Period. 
   According to the definition, the changes in effective executive are equal to the changes of the presidents.  
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political opposition within the ranks of the regime or the opposition we find that during the 
last decade of the Second Empire, the empire was marked by considerable political 
instability in the 1880s. In the year of 1884, records show that, out of a peacetime army of 
13,500 men, more than 7526 had been jailed for insubordination (Lima Oliveira, 1986)
58
. 
Later, from the year of 1891 to the year of 1892, along with the rebellions and the change of 
the president, there were also purges and counter purges which mentioned in two books
59
. As 
our existing data recorded another purge activity in the year of 1930, we found the 
corresponded political history event in Cambridge History of Latin American (Vol.9). As 
pointed out by Leslie Bethell (2008)
60
, soon after the 1930 revolution, a quick change among 
the armed forces had been adopted. The senior ranks were eliminated by a massive purge. By 
the end of 1930, nine of eleven major generals and eleven of twenty -- four brigadier 
generals retired. 
Although there is a clear definition of the government crisis, it is still hard to define which 
events or situations are rapidly developing states that threaten to bring the downfall of the 
present regime. For instance, consider the Paraguay War (1864 -- 1870). While the bloody 
war lasted for six years, produced nearly 50,000 deaths and caused a ruinous increase of the 
public debt, Paraguay war, somehow, still has some positive effects to Brazil. The war 
centralized the government power, thus, there was almost no revolutionary revolt against the 
government during the 1860s. Taken all those factors in to account, we believe that in the 
year of 1870, Brazil was not in a situation for a government crisis. However, in the year of 
1889, as Frank Colson (1981)
61
 stated, the crisis of 1889 has long been seen as a turning 
point in Brazilian history. First of all, Paraguay War raised massive public debts that 
seriously reduced the growth of the country. Then, the abolition of slavery without 
compensation gradually weakened the firm foundation of the monarchy -- it had lost the 
support of vital groups like the landowners (June E. Hahner, 1969)
62
. More importantly, the 
war with Paraguay greatly increased the political power of the Brazilian army. Eventually, 
with the allowance of a discontented republican minority to grow more audacious 
(Republicanism), a group of army officers led by Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca launch a coup 
to proclaim the Republic on November 15, 1889. All in all, we believe the first government 
crisis in Brazil, during the time period between 1870 and 1930, occurred in the year of 1889. 
Another government crisis which recorded in our existing data set can be observed in the 
                                                    
58 Lima Oliveira, 1986. Imperio Brasileiro, O. Editora Universidade de Brasilia Press. 
59 There is no description of the event but a list of people who involved in. 
   James Woodard, 2009. A Place in Politics: Sao Paulo, Brazil, from Seigneurial Republicanism to 
Regionalist Revolt. Duke University Press. P254 Note 1 
   Joseph L. Love, 1980. Sao Paulo in the Brazilian Federation, 1889-1937. Stanford University Press. 
60 Leslie Bethell (2008). Politics in Brazil under Vargas, 1930-1945. Volume 9 of Cambridge History of 
Latin American. Cambridge University Press. pp24. 
61 Frank Colson (1981). On Expectation. Perspectives on the Crisis of 1889 in Brazil. Journal of Latin 
American Studies Vol.13, No.2, pp.265-292. 
62 June E. Hahner, 1969. Civilian -- Military Relations in Brazil 1889-1898. University of South Carolina 
Press. pp 2-4. 
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year of 1930. Similar to the crisis in 1889, the government crisis in the 1930 resulted from a 
joint effect of multiple factors. Politically, the tenente revolt occurred in 1922 and then in 
1924 had shaken the interior of Brazil without ever being defeated by the army. Then, the old 
republic suffered a big hit with the economic crisis. It was in October 1929 that Great 
Depression began. Although there was little immediate outcome at the beginning, the 
problem of overproduction became serious within 4 to 5 years. Brazilian Exports fell about 
two thirds within 7 years' time -- from 1929 to 1935. Losing profit on the coffee exports, the 
Paulista oligarchy tried to stay in power of the republic without respecting the alternation 
with Minas Gerais. This led to the end of the "politics of coffee with milk". Those political 
crises together with the economic crisis led to the end of the Old Republic on October 24th 
1930. 
To sum up, in order to generate our own political instability series, we track all the 
political events yearly from 1870 to 1930. Next, we classified each event to its own category 
according to the definition which has been mentioned above. Finally, by comparing the data 
we generate to the existing ones from 1919 to 1930, we found that the series we generated 
from these events are basically correct. 
2.4 Econometric Framework 
Our general econometric framework has been discussed in the chapter 1.5. In this chapter, 
our set of variables comprises seven measures of informal political instabilities and eight 
forms of formal political factors. In order to study the direct effects of our set of explanatory 
variables, we specify model 1 with φ = 0 in equation (2), while model 2 λ = 0  in 
equation (1) allows us to investigate their indirect impacts on growth. 
2.5 Empirical Results 
In this section, our results are presented following specific type of effects. That is, we 
discuss direct (on mean economic growth), indirect (via volatility), dynamic (short and 
long-run) and structural break effects respectively. 
2.5.1 Direct Impact on Growth 
Tables 8.a and Table 8.b report the results from our estimation of the (P)ARCH(1,1) model 
for each one of the elements in our set of explanatory variables. The estimated regression is 
defined as follows: 
                 𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 +  klog(ℎ𝑡) + 𝜆𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜀𝑡    ,                       (17) 
With  
                                 ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛,                    (18) 
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Where 𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 is a political instability variable. Additionally, we estimate models with 
lagged values
63
 of our explanatory variables as regressors. As we will see below the lagged 
direct effect on growth is equivalent to the short-run impact. 
The parameter we are most interested in is λ𝑝𝑖 (in the second column). The results reveal 
that the direct effects of informal political instabilities on economic growth rate are mostly 
negative and statistically significant (five out of seven), while the effects of formal political 
instability variables are negative and significant as well (six out of eight). As for the in mean 
parameter (k), notice that in all cases the estimates are highly significant and positive, which 
is in line with the theoretical argument of Black (1987). Also the power term coefficients δ 
are rather stable, with the Akaike IC (AIC) criteria choosing a (P)ARCH specification with 
power terms in most of the cases equal to 1.00 (e.g., anti-government demonstrations, 
general strikes, riots and the size of cabinet). 
How robust are these baseline results? It seems that both formal and informal political 
instability variables are dominant influences. One robustness test would be to investigate 
whether or not such powerful effects obtain in the presence of indirect (via volatility) effects. 
In other words, we want to be sure that direct effects remain if we allow our control variables 
to enter both the mean and variance equations simultaneously. 
Tables 10.a and Table 10.b present the results when we include our political instability 
indicators in both the mean and variance equations. Informal political variables show the 
expected negative and statistically significant lagged direct impacts (see the λ𝑝𝑖 column in 
Table 10.a). However, the negative direct effect of formal political instability on growth is 
significant in only four out of the eight cases. That is, when we consider both effects jointly, 
the negative direct impact of formal political instability on growth becomes weaker but it 
does not disappear entirely (it disappears only for legislative selection and size of the cabinet, 
see Table 10.b). 
In summary, we find that our two main explanatory factors, formal and informal political 
instabilities, affect Brazil's economic growth negatively. Interestingly, four measures of 
informal political instability (anti-government demonstrations, assassinations, general strikes 
and number of coups d'etat) and three measures of formal political factors (changes in 
effective executive, legislative effectiveness and number of cabinet changes) seem to play 
important roles in determine growth. In particular, we find that not only they have strong 
direct effects but also indirect effects as well. We now turn to the investigation of these 
indirect effects. 
 
2.5.2 Indirect Effects (Via Growth Volatility) 
                                                    
63 L and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively (from 1 to 8). 
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One of the main advantages of the (P)ARCH framework is that it allows us to study not 
only the direct growth effects from the full set of explanatory variables that described above, 
but also their indirect effects on economic growth through the predicted component of 
growth volatility (conditional on its past values). Therefore, our estimated model for indirect 
effects is given by: 
                       𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + klog(ℎ𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡    ,                        (19) 
With  
                   ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝜑𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛,           (20) 
 
Where 𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 is a political instability variable, l and n are the order of the lags of 
political instability variables and growth respectively (from 1 to 8). As we can see from 
Tables 8.a and 8.b above and from Tables 9.a and 9.b in this section, the effect of conditional 
or predicted volatility on growth is positive (k > 0) and statistically significant in all cases at 
conventional levels. In the current section, we present our results for such indirect impacts in 
two parts and follow the same format as before. 
Table 9.a and Table 9.b report the estimation results for each one of the elements in our 
data set for what we call the indirect impact, which is the effect on growth via the volatility 
channel. The parameter we are most interested in is φ𝑝𝑖  (in the fourth column). Our results 
show that the effects of both formal and informal political instabilities are mostly negative 
and significant (with the exceptions of revolutions and major constitutional changes). 
We find that exogenous increases in political instability have a negative and significant 
indirect impact on growth. That is, less political instability is associated with a larger fraction 
of growth volatility that is anticipated by the relevant economic agents. And the larger the 
share of the growth volatility that is anticipated, the higher growth rates we observe. 
Therefore, political instability registers a negative lagged direct effect on growth but also a 
substantial impact on the expected or conditional share of growth volatility and thus a 
negative indirect effect as well (see Tables 9.a and Table 9.b). 
We now proceed by investigating the robustness of these results. Specifically, we ask how 
the results for the political instabilities change if we examine jointly the indirect and direct 
effects. 
There are a number of additional important results from Tables 10.a and 10.b apart from 
the ones that were discussed in the previous section. Focusing our attention first on the φ and 
κ parameters, all measures of informal political instabilities (except the revolutions) are 
found to affect the conditional variance of growth negatively. Since k > 0, informal political 
factors affect growth negatively as well. Similarly, the volatility of growth is also dependent 
on changes in the formal political factors, since the parameter φ𝑝𝑖  is negative and 
statistically significant in seven out of the eight cases. 
To sum up, we find strong evidence that both formal and informal political instabilities 
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have a negative indirect (via volatility) impact on growth. 
 
2.5.3 Dynamic Aspects 
In this section we investigate how short- and long-run considerations help us refine our 
baseline results. Another potential benefit from this exercise is that the required use of lags 
may help ameliorate any lingering concerns about endogeneity. In order to estimate short- 
and long- run relationships we employ the following error correction (P)ARCH form 
             ∆𝑦𝑡 = μ + θ∆𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑐 − 𝜁𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡 ,                (21) 
where θ𝑝𝑖  and ζ𝑝𝑖  capture the short and long-run effects of political instability variables 
respectively, and ϕ is the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship. This is 
accomplished by embedding a long-run growth regression into an ARDL model. In other 
words, the term in parenthesis contains the long-run growth regression, which acts as a 
forcing equilibrium condition 
                       y𝑡 = c + 𝜁𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 ,                               (22) 
where ut is I(0). The lag of the first difference of either formal or informal political instability 
variables (∆𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙) characterizes the short-run effect. The condition for the existence of a 
long-run relationship (dynamic stability) requires that the coefficient on the error-correction 
term be negative and not lower than -2 (that is, −2 < ϕ < 0). We also take into account the 
PARCH effects by specifying the error term ut as follows 
                               𝜀𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑡
1
2 ,                               (23) 
  Where 
                   ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛 ,                 (24) 
Tables 11.a and 11.b report the results on estimations of short and long-run parameters 
linking the explanatory variables with growth. In all cases, the estimated coefficients of error 
correction term (ϕ) lie within the dynamically stable range (-2,0). Generally speaking, from 
investigating whether dynamic considerations affect our conclusions, we find major 
differences in terms of short and long-run effects. To be more specifically, we find that, in 
total, fourteen out of the fifteen political instabilities have strong short-run effects while only 
five out of the fifteen explanatory variables have long-run effects. 
Next we discuss the results regarding the informal political factors and formal ones 
separately. We first focus our analysis on those obtained from the informal political 
instabilities. Table 11.a presents the results. The estimated ϕ lies within the range -0.55 to 
-0.32, while θ𝑝𝑖  and ζ𝑝𝑖  capture the short and long-run effects respectively. With the 
exception of the guerrilla warfare, all other estimates of the short-run coefficients (see the 
θ𝑝𝑖  column) are highly significant and negative. However, the corresponding values for the 
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long-run coefficients tell a very different story, which is the negative short-run effects of 
anti-government demonstrations, general strikes and riots disappear in the long-run (see the 
ζ𝑝𝑖  column in Table 11.a). 
Similarly, we find strong evidence that formal political factors affect economic growth 
negatively (estimates of the short-run coefficients are highly significant and negative), while 
only two out of the eight formal political indicators observed long-run effects, namely: 
legislative effectiveness and number of the cabinet changes. 
In summary, in the short-run, fourteen political instabilities have a negative effect on 
Brazil's growth whereas in the long-run, only five political instabilities (three informal and 
two formal ones) seems to affect growth negatively 
 
2.5.4 Structural Breaks 
Considering the role of structural breaks, we adopt our final important robustness test. We 
use the methodology developed by Bai and Perron (2003) to observe whether or not there are 
any structural breaks in growth, informal political instabilities and formal ones. Under very 
general conditions on the data and the errors, Bai and Perron address the problem of testing 
for multiple structural changes. In addition to testing for the existence of breaks, these 
statistics identify the number and location of multiple breaks. 
In the case of the economic growth series the Bai-Perron methodology supports three 
structural break points which occur for year 1938 and 1979 respectively. 
For three measures of informal political instability (guerrilla warfare, number of Coups 
d'etat and revolution) and six measures of formal political indicators (changes in effective 
executive, government crisis, legislative effectiveness, major constitutional changes, purges 
and size of the cabinet), we find no structural breaks. However, our Bai-Perron results 
support one structural break in anti-government demonstrations (it is dated 1964), 
assassinations (it is dated 1978), and general strikes (it is dated 1902). Additionally, we also 
find two structural breaks in riots which are dated 1929 and 1964. Further, we observe one 
structural break for either legislative selection or number of cabinet changes, which occur in 
1939 and in 1889, correspondingly. 
In what follows, we incorporate dummy variables in the equations (1), (2), (21) and (24), 
thus taking into account breaks in growth, informal and formal political instabilities. 𝐷1𝑡 
and 𝐷2𝑡 are (intercept) dummies defined as: 𝐷1𝑡= 1 in the period 1938-2003, 𝐷2𝑡= 1 in the 
period 1979-2003, and 𝐷1𝑡= 0 and  𝐷2𝑡= 0 otherwise. Similarly, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is a (slope) dummy 
indicating the period which starts from the year of the break in either the informal political 
factor or formal political variable(𝑥𝑖𝑡). For example for the assassinations 𝐷1𝑡= 1 in the 
period from 1978 to 2003 and for the anti-government demonstrations 𝐷1𝑡= 1 during the 
period from 1964 until the end of the sample. 
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The augmented model is given by 
             𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑘 log(ℎ𝑡) + 𝜆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜆𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑙𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜖𝑡,                  (25) 
And 
ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + 𝜔1𝐷1𝑡 + 𝜔2𝐷2𝑡 + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 𝑓(𝑒𝑡−1) + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝜑𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑙𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛 .(26) 
Recall that the coefficients φ and λ capture the impacts of the variable on growth and its 
volatility respectively. Similarly, 𝜆𝑑 and 𝜑𝑑 correspond to the two effects from the year of 
the break onwards. Thus the two effects are captured by λ and φ in the period up to the year 
of the structural break, and by λ + λ𝑑 and φ + φ𝑑  during the period from the year of the 
break until the end of the sample. As above in order to study the direct effects of political 
instability we specify model 1 with φ =  𝜑𝑑 = 0, while model 2 with λ =  𝜆𝑑 = 0, allows 
us to investigate their indirect impacts on growth. 
We also incorporate intercept dummies and level effects in the error correction equation 
(21) and conditional variance equation (24), as follows 
 
      ∆𝑦𝑡 = μ + θ∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + θ𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑙∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑐 − 𝜁𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡,          (27) 
               ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛 ,                     (28) 
We find our results to be quite robust to the inclusion of the structural break dummies. 
That is, both informal and formal political instabilities have strong negative effects on the 
growth and its volatility (see Tables 12 and 13). As to the dynamic aspects, for three 
measures of informal political instability, we find strong evidence of a negative impact in 
both short and long-run, whereas three out of the four other measures affect growth only in 
the short-run (see Table 14.a). Similarly, with the exceptions of legislative effectiveness and 
number of cabinet changes, all other formal political instabilities have only a short-run 
negative effect (see Table 14.b). 
Interestingly, the causal direct, indirect and short-run impacts from anti-government 
demonstrations and assassinations become weaker after we account for structural breaks in 
1964 and 1978, respectively (see the λ𝑑 columns in Tables 12.a, and the θ𝑑  column in 
Table 14.a). Similarly, the direct effect of legislative selection is stronger before 1939 (see 
the λ𝑑 column in Tables 12.b). 
 
2.6 Conclusions  
Using a PARCH framework and data for Brazil from approximately from 1870 to 2003 we 
ask the following questions: What is the relationship between, political instability, economic 
growth and (predicted) growth volatility? Are these effects fundamentally and systematically 
different? Does the intensity and the direction of these effects vary over time, in general and 
in particular, do they vary with respect to short- versus long-run considerations? Our main 
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results can be summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 15 Summary of Results 
To be more specifically, our empirical results show that the majority of the formal and 
informal political instabilities have strong negative direct and indirect effects on economic 
growth in Brazil. 
From investigating whether dynamic considerations affect our conclusions, we find 
important differences in terms of the short and long-run behavior of our key variables, more 
specifically, while strong negative impacts can be observed in the short-run (fourteen out of 
fifteen), the corresponding effects for the long-run are weaker (five out of fifteen). 
In sum, for two informal political instabilities (assassinations and number of coups) and 
two formal ones (legislative effectiveness and number of cabinet changes) all four influences 
(direct/indirect, short and long-run) are highly significant. These findings are interest in 
themselves but they also matter because they raise a number of new questions that we 
believe may be useful in motivating future research. 
Table 15: Summary of Results: Direct, Indirect, Short and Long-run Effects.
D IND SR LR D IND SR LR
Informal PI -1 -2 -3 -4 Formal PI -5 -6 - -7
Notes: D denotes the direct effect. IND is the indirect effect. LR and SR denote the long
and short-run impacts, respectively. 1For riots and guerrilla warfare effects are insignificant
(see the pi column in Table 8.a and 10.a). 2The effect disappears when revolutions are
used (see the pi column in Table 9.a and 10.a).3The impact is insignificant when guerrilla
warfare is used (see the pi column in Table 11.a).4The impact disappears when
anti-government demonstrations, guerrilla warfare, general strikes and riots are used
(see the pi column in Table 11.a). 5The impact is insignificant when government crisis
and purges are used (see pi column in Table 8.b). 6The effect disappears when major
constitutional changes are used (see pi column in Table 9.b and 10.b). 7only two out of
the eight formal political indicators observed negative long-run effects, namely:
legislative effectiveness and number of the cabinet changes (see pi column in Table 11.a).
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Chapter Three 
Finance, Political Instability and Growth:  
Non-Linear Time-Series Evidence for Brazil since 1870 
3.1 Introduction 
During the past century, Brazil with its particular tendency of growth rate draws 
economists’ attentions. Various hypotheses have been put forward to explain Brazil growth 
record in either past few decades or from a long-term horizon. In order to explain the 
Brazil’s output growth, we have discussed the influences of macro economy indicators and 
political instabilities separately in the last two chapters. we note, on the one hand, both 
domestic and international financial development exhibit the most robust first-order effects 
on growth and its volatility, on the other hand, majority of political instabilities have strong 
negative direct and indirect effects on economic growth in Brazil.  
In trying to pursue our understandings of Brazil’s growth process, in this chapter, we focus 
on the joint determination of the financial development and political instabilities to evaluate 
the relative merits of the factors behind key explanatory variables with a power-ARCH 
(PARCH) framework and annual time series data for Brazil covering the period 
approximately from 1870 to 2003.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to put forward answers to the following questions. What is the 
relationship between, on the one hand, financial development (domestic and international), 
political instability, public deficit, trade openness and, on the other hand, economic growth 
and (predicted) growth volatility? Are these effects fundamentally and systematically 
different? Does the intensity and the direction (the sign) of these effects vary over time, in 
general and, in particular, do they vary with respect to short- versus long-run considerations? 
 
The results show that our main explanatory factors, solely in terms of their negative 
lagged direct/indirect effects and short and long-run impacts on economic growth in Brazil, 
turn out to be domestic financial development (mainly commercial bank deposits) and 
international financial development (the US interest rate). In particular, two out of the three 
domestic financial development indicators, that is M1 and commercial bank deposits, have 
negative short-run/lagged direct effects on growth whereas their long-run impacts are 
positive. The short and long-run impacts of US interest rate are opposite from those of 
domestic financial development. Interestingly, deposits at Banco do Brasil and the US 
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interest rate have a strong negative indirect effect on growth. We also find that political 
Instabilities play important secondary roles since the effect of both formal and informal 
political instabilities do not extend to the long-run with the existence of all other explanatory 
variables. For the informal political proxy, assassinations, the estimates of the short-run 
coefficients are highly significant and negative whereas the corresponding values for the 
long-run coefficients become insignificant. As to the formal political indicator, which is 
legislative effectiveness, our multivariate analysis shows that its short-run negative effect is 
not affected by the addition of other explanatory variables to the model, however, in the 
long-run the impact disappears when we use revenues as a regressor. 
  
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and Section 3.3 
provides justification for our econometric methodology. Section 3.4 has our baseline 
econometric results. Finally, summary and conclusions are provided in Section 3.5. 
 
3.2 Data 
The data set we put together for this chapter covers the period between 1870 and 2003, 
excluding the Second World War period that is from 1939 to 1945. The factors that 
associated with the economic performance of Brazil are the following: domestic and 
international financial development, trade openness and public deficit. Besides, we also use 
four selected political indicators as a proxy of the political instability. 
Our basic data source is "International Historical Statistics: The Americas: 1750 -- 2000" 
(B. Mitchell, 2003). Data were recorded yearly for Brazil including: Gross Domestic Product, 
deposits at Banco do Brasil, deposits in commercial banks and M1. However, for the 
informal political instability variables (see below for the distinction between informal and 
formal political instability), data are missing from the year of 1870 to the year of 1918 
(formal ones are missing records from 1914 to 1918 as well). In order to find relatively 
complete series and to avoid bias as much as possible, other resources are included. 
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Figure 7 Growth Rate of Brazil and Financial Development (with the exclusion of World War 
Period) 
Two of our main measures of financial development try to capture the efficiency of the 
financial sector, not its relative size. The first is the commercial bank deposits over GDP. 
Deposits in commercial banks are quoted by B. Mitchell (2003). However, due to the 
missing figures, we follow a more practicable way of Peláez and Suzigan (1976) to 
regenerate the series
64
. Our second measure is the deposits at Banco do Brasil over GDP. It is 
measured by the added value of time deposits and deposits at the end of the period in the 
central bank. Given its more restrictive nature we use this variable mostly for robustness 
check, thereby attaching greater weight to commercial bank deposits (see Figure 7)
65
. Further, 
our measures of trade openness and public deficit are both quoted from Mitchell (2007) and 
IBGE
66
. Trade openness is measured as the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, while 
public deficit is the ratio of total public deficit to GDP (see Figures 8 and 9). 
                                                    
64 Total deposits in commercial canks are defined as the summation of time deposits in commercial banks 
and deposits at the end of the period in commercial banks. 
65 For robustness we also use another measure that is M1 over GDP, to further check for the robustness of 
our results (Results are presented in Appendix C). 
66 Actually, Mitchell (2007) provided data from 1870 until 2004. However, data are in millions of US 
dollars since 1949. Further, as our GDP series that we collected is in national currency, we adopted IBGE's 
figures from 1949 to 1980. 
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Figure 8 Three measures of Trade Openness (with the exclusion of World War Period) 
 
Figure 9 Three measures of Public Deficit (with the exclusion of World War Period) 
As we have mentioned in the first chapter, International financial development should also 
have an impact on Brazil's economic growth, although for most of the period since 1930 
Brazil remained a closed economy. Marcelo Abreu states that from 1930-1980 Brazil had a 
"cross-eyed" foreign economic orientation, with bold export promotion policies and a rather 
 64 
 
closed domestic market. But Brazil, as the largest economy in Latin America, and ninth 
largest in the world, cannot be isolated to the world economic environment. However, it is 
still hard to measure the world economic environment itself, especially when we take both 
the depression and the First World War periods into account. Thus, in standard fashion in this 
type of study, we use the level of interest rate in US as our proxy of the global financial 
market. US interest rates are quoted from Milton Fridman (1982) (see Figure 10). 
 
Figure 10 International Financial Development (with the exclusion of World War period) 
Based on the distinction between formal and informal political events, we divide our 
political instability variables into two categories (see Figure 11). Our informal political 
instability variables include: assassinations and number of coups
67
. Our formal political 
instability variables are as follows: number of the cabinet changes and legislative 
effectiveness
68
. 
                                                    
67 See Chapter 2 – 2.3.1 for the definitions of assassinations and number of coups. 
68 See Chapter 2 – 2.3.2 for the definitions of cabinet changes and legislative effectiveness. 
. 
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Figure 11 Selected Political Instability Indicators 
3.3 Econometric Framework 
The general econometric framework has been discussed in the chapter 1.5. In this chapter, 
our set of variables
69
 comprises domestic and international financial developments, four 
political instability variables, the degree of openness to international trade and public deficit. 
In order to study the direct effects of our set of explanatory variables, we specify model 1 
with φ = 0 in equation (2), while model 2 with λ = 0 in equation (1) allows us to investigate 
their indirect impacts on growth. 
3.4 Empirical Results 
In this section, we present following specific types of effects. That is, we discuss direct 
(on mean economic growth), indirect (via volatility), dynamic (short and long-run) and 
structural break effects respectively. Particularly, in trying to study the roles of both domestic 
financial development and political instability we include both variables as regressors. 
Further, in this chapter, we run regressions with all five lagged explanatory variables. 
 
3.4.1 Direct Effects 
                                                    
69 Because almost all the explanatory variables are I(1), they all enter our models in first difference, with the 
exception of political instability variables. 
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In order to estimate direct effects for the joint effects of domestic financial development 
and political instability, we employ the following error correction (P)ARCH form: 
            𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + klog(ℎ𝑡) + 𝜆𝑓𝑑𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜆𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜀𝑡    ,               (29) 
with  
                                 ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛,                   (30) 
where 𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙  indicates a financial development variable and 𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙  is a political 
instability variable. L and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth 
respectively (from 1 to 8). Table 16 reports the results. The parameters we are most 
interested in are λ𝑓𝑑  and λ𝑝𝑖 . The results reveal that in the presence of the political 
instability variables, the lagged direct effect of domestic financial development (any of the 
three measures) on economic growth rate is negative and statistically significant, and vice 
versa, in the presence of financial development variables the impact of political instability 
(mainly assassinations and legislative effectiveness) on growth is negative and significant as 
well
70
. 
As for the in-mean parameter (k), notice that in all cases the estimates are statistically 
significant and positive which is in line with the theoretical argument of Black (1987). Also 
the power term coefficients δ are rather stable, with the Akaike IC (AIC) criteria choosing a 
(P)ARCH specification with power term in most of the cases equal to 1.00. 
It seems that both domestic financial development and political instability are dominant 
influences. In testing the robustness of these baseline results, one robustness test would be to 
investigate whether or not such powerful effects obtain in the presence of the other 
explanatory variables. In other words, we want to be sure that the strong direct effects remain 
if we add to the baseline specification any of our three additional variables. Therefore, the 
estimated model is given by: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + klog(ℎ𝑡) + 𝜆𝑓𝑑𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜆𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜆𝑡𝑜𝑥𝑡𝑜,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜆𝑝𝑑𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜆𝑢𝑠𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜀𝑡,        
(31) 
with  
                                 ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛.                   (32) 
Tables 16.1 and 16.2 present selected results with all five control variables. That is, 
commercial bank deposits, political instability (either assassinations or legislative 
effectiveness), trade openness, public deficit and US interest rate
71
. Similarly to the results 
revealed in Table 16, both commercial bank deposits and political instability variables show 
the expected negative impact (see the λ𝑓𝑑 and λ𝑝𝑖  columns). As for the effect of US 
interest rate, it is positive and statistically significant (see the λ𝑢𝑠 columns in Tables 
                                                    
70 We also estimate trivariate regressions (see Appendix B) to examine the joint effects of political 
instability, domestic and international financial development on growth. 
71 For the results of number of the coups/number of the cabinet changes, see Appendix C. 
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16.1-16.2). Interestingly, when we include all five regressors, the significance of the 
influences of public deficit on growth is sensitive to the choice of the political indicator. 
Specifically, the negative impact of public deficit on growth disappears when we use 
assassinations as a regressor (in six out of the nine cases). Similarly, trade openness has a 
significant negative impact on growth only when we include legislative effectiveness and 
revenues as a regressor. 
To sum up, most of our independent variables play an important role in explaining output 
growth of Brazil. Financial development (commercial bank deposits), US interest rate, and 
either informal (assassinations) or formal political instability (legislative effectiveness) are 
the dominant effects. Interestingly, the effect of the domestic financial development works in 
the opposite direction from that of the international financial development. The effects of 
trade openness and public deficit seem to be sensitive to the measure of the variables used in 
our analysis. We now turn to the investigation of the indirect effects. 
3.4.2 Indirect Effects (Via Growth Volatility) 
One of the main advantages of the (P)ARCH framework is that it allows us to study not 
only the direct growth effects from the full set of explanatory variables described above, but 
also their indirect effects on economic growth through the predicted component of growth 
volatility (conditional on its past values). As we can see from Table 16 above and from Table 
17 in this section, the effect of conditional or predicted volatility on growth is, in all cases, 
positive (k > 0) and statistically significant at conventional levels. In the current section, 
we present our results for such indirect impacts in two parts and follow the same format as 
before: we first discuss the indirect bivariate effect and then we present selected results for 
our complete set (that is, including all the five explanatory variables). 
Our bivariate estimated regression is as follows:  
                       𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + klog(ℎ𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡    ,                        (33) 
with  
           ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝜑𝑓𝑑𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛,        (34) 
where 𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙  and 𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙  indicate a financial development variable and a political 
instability variable respectively
72
. Table 17 reports the estimation results for the joint effects 
for what we call the indirect impact, which is the effect on growth via the volatility channel. 
The parameters we are most interested in are φ𝑓𝑑 and φ𝑝𝑖 . The results show that the 
effects of both financial development (any of the three measures) and political instability 
indicators are mainly negative and statistically significant, with the exception of the number 
of coups. That is, less financial development and political instability are associated with a 
larger fraction of growth volatility, and the larger share of the growth volatility is anticipated, 
                                                    
72 L and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively (from 1 to 8). 
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the higher growth rates we observed (since k > 0). Therefore, both financial development 
and political instability register negative lagged direct effects on growth and also a negative 
and substantial indirect impact via the expected or conditional share of growth volatility. 
We now proceed by investigating the robustness of these results. Specifically, and for 
comparability purposes, we ask how the results from the various aspects of domestic 
financial development and political instability change if we add to the baseline model the 
complete set of explanatory variables. Similar to the bivariate model, the estimated 
regression is defined as follows: 
                       𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + klog(ℎ𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡    ,                        (35) 
with 
ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝜑𝑓𝑑𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑𝑡𝑜𝑥𝑡𝑜,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑𝑝𝑑𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 +
𝜑𝑢𝑠𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛,                                                       (36) 
where 𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙  indicates a financial development variable, 𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 is a political instability 
variable, 𝑥𝑡𝑜,𝑡−𝑙  is trade openness (or one of its elements), 𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 is public deficit (any of 
the three measures) and 𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−𝑙 is US interest rate. Further, L and n are the order of the lags 
of explanatory variables and growth respectively (from 1 to 8). 
Tables 17.1 and Table 17.2 show the selected results after adding the full set of control 
variables. The indirect negative effects of both domestic financial development (deposits at 
Banco do Brasil) and political instability (mainly assassinations and legislative effectiveness) 
remain highly significant whereas the international dimension of financial development 
proxy (US interest rate) tend to affect anticipated growth volatility positively (φ𝑢𝑠 > 0). 
Moreover, both trade openness and public deficit appear to have negative indirect impacts on 
output growth (see columns φ𝑡𝑜  and φ𝑝𝑑). 
In summary, we find strong evidence that domestic financial development, political 
instability, trade openness and public deficit have a negative indirect impact on growth 
whereas US interest rate affects it positively. 
3.4.3 Dynamic Aspects 
In this section we investigate how short- and long-run considerations help us refine our 
baseline results. Another potential benefit from this exercise is that the required use of lags 
may help ameliorate any lingering concerns about endogeneity. In order to estimate short- 
and long- run relationships we employ the following error correction (P)ARCH form 
                 ∆𝑦𝑡 = μ + θ∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑐 − 𝜁𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡 ,              (37) 
where θ and ζ capture the short and long-run effects respectively, and ϕ is the speed of 
adjustment to the long-run relationship. This is accomplished by embedding a long-run 
growth regression into an ARDL model. In other words, the term in parenthesis contains the 
long-run growth regression, which acts as a forcing equilibrium condition 
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                          y𝑡 = c + 𝜁𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡 ,                             (38) 
where u𝑡 is I(0). The lag of the first difference of either the financial development variable 
(domestic or international) or political instability (formal or informal) or trade openness or 
public deficit (or its two components) (∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙) characterizes the short-run effect. The 
condition for the existence of a long-run relationship (dynamic stability) requires that the 
coefficient on the error-correction term be negative and not lower than -2 (that is, -2 < ϕ < 0). 
We also take into account the PARCH effects by specifying the error term u𝑡 as follows 
                               𝜀𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡ℎ𝑡
1
2 ,                               (39) 
  Where 
                   ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛 ,                 (40) 
 
Table 18 presents the bivariate results of short and long-run estimations linking the 
financial development and political instability with growth. In all cases, the estimated 
coefficient on the error correction term (ϕ) lies within the dynamically stable range (-2, 0). 
From investigating whether dynamic considerations affect our conclusions, we find major 
differences in terms of short and long-run behavior of our explanatory variables. First, we 
focus our attention on the parameters for the political instability variables (see the θ𝑝𝑖  and 
ζ𝑝𝑖  columns). The negative effects of political instability (either formal or informal) are 
stronger and bigger in the short than in the long-run. The long-run impact disappears in five 
out of the twelve cases. Next, we discuss the results regarding the domestic financial 
development variables. Two measures of financial development, which is M1 and 
commercial bank deposits, affect growth negatively in the short-run whereas the effect turns 
to positive in the long-run. Growth is not affected by deposits at the Banco do Brasil in the 
long-run. These results are in line with the ones from the univariate analysis which are 
reported in our previous chapters. 
For the sake of space, we do not discuss the results for the intermediate steps (that is the 
results for by three variables). Table 18.1 presents the results for the five regressors with the 
estimated model defined as follows: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = μ + θ𝑓𝑑∆𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + θ𝑝𝑖∆𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + θ𝑡𝑜∆𝑥𝑡𝑜,𝑡−𝑙 + θ𝑝𝑑∆𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−𝑙 + θ𝑢𝑠∆𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−𝑙 +
𝜑(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑐 − 𝜁𝑓𝑑𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−1 − 𝜁𝑝𝑖𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝜁𝑝𝑑𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−1 − 𝜁𝑢𝑠𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡 ,            (41)   
with  
                                               ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛 ,            (42) 
 
That is, commercial bank deposits (𝑥𝑓𝑑,𝑡−𝑙), US interest rate (𝑥𝑢𝑠,𝑡−1), political instability 
(𝑥𝑝𝑖,𝑡−𝑙  indicates either assassinations or legislative effectiveness), public deficit (𝑥𝑝𝑑,𝑡−𝑙) 
and trade openness (𝑥𝑡𝑜,𝑡−𝑙). 
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The estimates of ϕ lie within the range -0.71 to -0.52. Regarding the short and long-run 
estimates, θ𝑖  and  ζ𝑖 we focus our analysis first on those obtained from the US interest rate. 
All estimates of the short-run coefficients (see the θ𝑢𝑠 column) are highly significant and 
positive whereas the corresponding values for the long-run coefficients are negative (see the 
ζ𝑢𝑠  column). Interestingly, the estimations for our measure of domestic financial 
development, that is commercial bank deposits, tell a very different story: we find that the 
effects of domestic financial development work in the opposite direction from those of the 
US interest rate, which is the impact turns from negative in the short-run to positive in the 
long-run. These impacts depend on whether the movements are temporary or permanent, the 
effect being negative in the former and positive in the latter, which is in line with recent 
findings by Loayza and Rancière (2006). Similarly to the US interest rate, we obtain strong 
negative long-run effects from revenues/expenditures, however, only a very weak evidence 
of a short-run effect (in one out of the four cases) can be observed from Table 18.1. In sharp 
contrast, trade openness has only a negative short-run effect on growth. 
Next we discuss the results regarding the political factors. For the informal political proxy, 
that is assassinations, the estimates of the short-run coefficients (see the θ𝑝𝑖  column) are 
highly significant and negative whereas the corresponding values for the long-run 
coefficients become insignificant. As to the formal political indicator, that is legislative 
effectiveness. Our multivariate analysis shows that its short-run negative effect is not 
affected by the addition of other explanatory variables to the model, however, in the long-run 
the impact disappears when we use revenues as a regressor (see the ζ𝑝𝑖  column). 
To sum up, in the short-run, four explanatory variables have a negative effect on growth 
whereas that of the US interest rate is positive. In the long-run domestic financial 
development affects growth positively whereas the impacts of public deficit and the US 
interest rate are negative. 
3.4.4 Structural Breaks 
One final important robustness test regards the role of structural breaks. We use the 
methodology developed by Bai and Perron (2003) to examine whether there are any 
structural breaks in growth, its volatility, the four financial development variables (three 
domestic and one international), the various aspects of political instability and the three 
forms of trade openness and public deficit. Bai and Perron (2003) address the problem of 
testing for multiple structural changes under very general conditions on the data and the 
errors. In addition to testing for the existence of breaks, these statistics identify the number 
and location of multiple breaks. 
In the case of the economic growth series the Bai-Perron methodology supports one 
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structural break point which occurs for year 1938
73
. Similarly, our Bai-Perron results support 
that assassinations and the number of cabinet changes have one break, which is dated for 
year 1978 and year 1889, respectively.  
In what follows, we incorporate dummy variables in the equations (1), (2), (37) and (40), 
thus taking into account breaks in growth and the political factors. First, we introduce the 
following notation. 𝐷𝑡 is an (intercept) dummies defined as: 𝐷𝑡= 1 in the period 1938-2003, 
𝐷𝑡= 0 otherwise. Similarly, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 is a (slope) dummy indicating the period which starts from 
the year of the break in the political instability variable (𝑥𝑖𝑡) . For example for the 
assassinations 𝐷𝑖𝑡= 0 in the period from 1870 to 1978 and 𝐷𝑖𝑡= 1 during the period from 
1979 until the end of the sample. 
The augmented model is given by 
          𝑦𝑡 = 𝑐 + 𝑐1𝐷𝑡 + 𝑘 log(ℎ𝑡) + 𝜆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜆𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑙𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜖𝑡,               (43) 
And 
        ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 𝑓(𝑒𝑡−1) + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝜑𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑙𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛.       (44) 
Recall that the coefficients λ and φ capture the impacts of the control variables on growth 
and its volatility respectively. Similarly, λ𝑑 and φ𝑑 correspond to the two effects from the 
year of the break onwards. Thus the two effects are captured by λ and φ in the period up to 
the year of the structural break, and by λ + λ𝑑 and φ + φ𝑑  during the period from the year 
of the break until the end of the sample. As above in order to study the direct effects of 
political instability and financial development we specify model 1 with φ = φ𝑑 = 0, while 
model 2 with λ = λ𝑑 = 0 allows us to investigate the indirect impacts on growth. 
We also incorporate intercept dummies and level effects in the error correction equation 
(37) and conditional variance equation (40), as follows 
 ∆𝑦𝑡 = μ + 𝜇1𝐷𝑡 + θ∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + θ𝑑𝐷𝑖,𝑡−𝑙∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡−𝑙 + 𝜑(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝑐 − 𝜁𝑥𝑖,𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡 ,     (45) 
 
                 ℎ𝑡
𝛿
2 = ω + αℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 |𝑒𝑡−1|
𝛿 + 𝛽ℎ𝑡−1
𝛿
2 + 𝛾𝑦𝑡−𝑛 .                   (46) 
Overall, we find our results to be quite robust to the inclusion of the structural break 
dummies (see Table 19 - 21). That is, two out of the three domestic financial development 
indicators, that is M1 and commercial bank deposits, have negative short-run/lagged direct 
effects on growth whereas their long-run impacts are positive. The short and long-run 
impacts of US interest rate are opposite from those of domestic financial development. 
Public deficit affects growth negatively in both the short and long-run. 
Political instability and trade openness play a less important role. Both formal and 
                                                    
73 The two measures of financial development, that is M1 and commercial bank deposits, have two 
structural breaks, which are dated for years 1889 and 1930, and 1915 and 1962, respectively. In addition, we 
also find two structural breaks in expenditures and revenues (they are dated 1892 and 1982). Further, we 
also find one structural break in trade openness (or any of its two components) and public deficit (it is dated 
1901 and 1967, respectively). For US interest rate and, interestingly, also for growth volatility we find no 
structural breaks. As a measure of volatility we use the power transformed absolute growth |𝑦𝑡|
𝑑 
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informal political variables have only short-run effects. Similarly, the negative short-run 
impact of trade openness disappears in the long run. Interestingly, the causal direct, indirect 
and short-run impacts from assassinations become weaker after we account for the structural 
break in 1978, respectively (see the λ𝑝𝑖𝑑 , φ𝑝𝑖𝑑  and θ𝑝𝑖𝑑  columns in Tables 18-20, 
respectively). 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
Using a PARCH framework and data for Brazil from approximately 1870 to 2003 we ask 
the following questions: What is the relationship between, on the one hand, financial 
development (domestic and international), political instability, public deficit, trade openness 
and, on the other hand, economic growth and (predicted) growth volatility? Are these effects 
fundamentally and systematically different? Does the intensity and the direction (the sign) of 
these effects vary over time, in general and, in particular, do they vary with respect to short- 
versus long-run considerations? Our main results can be summarized in the following table: 
 
Table 22 Summary of Results 
To sum up, we find that the main explanatory factors, solely in terms of their negative 
lagged direct/indirect effects and short and long-run impacts on economic growth in Brazil, 
turn out to be domestic financial development (mainly commercial bank deposits) and 
international financial development (the US interest rate). In particular, two out of the three 
domestic financial development indicators, that is M1 and commercial bank deposits, have 
negative short-run/lagged direct effects on growth whereas their long-run impacts are 
positive. The short and long-run impacts of US interest rate are opposite from those of 
domestic financial development. Interestingly, deposits at Banco do Brasil and the US 
interest rate have a strong indirect effect on growth. Therefore our main results suggest that 
Table 22: Summary of Results: Direct, Indirect, Short and Long-run Effects.
D IND SR LR D IND SR LR
Financial Development -1 - - 2 Trade Openness -3 - -4 0
US Interest Rate   - Public Deficit -5 - -6 -
Political Instability Variables7
Assassinations - - - 0 Legislative Effectiveness - - - 0
Notes: D denotes the direct effect. IND is the indirect effect. LR and SR denote the long and short-
run impacts, respectively. 1For deposits (Banco do Brasil) the effect is less significant. In the meanwhile, M1
and commercial bank deposits have strong negative impacts. 2The impact is insignificant when deposits
at Banco do Brasil are used (see fd column in Table 18). 3Effects of trade openness seems to
be sensitive to the measure of the variables. 4The effect disappears when it combines with M1 (see the to
column in Table 18.5.a, 18.5.c, 18.5.d). 5The impact is insignificant when assassinations and commercial bank
deposits are used (see pd column in Table 16.1 ). 6The effects of public deficit seems to be very sensitive
to the measure of the variables. 7 The effects of PI are restricted to the short-run. (see Table 16, 17, 18
and Appendix B ). Further, the effects of Number of Coups and Number of Cabinet Changes are very sensitive
to the measure of the variables used in the analysis (see Appendix C and D).
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financial development (domestic and international) exhibit the most robust first-order effects 
on growth and its volatility. We also find that political instability, trade openness and public 
deficit play important yet secondary roles because the effects of the first two do not extent to 
the long-run (that is, they are restricted to the short-run) and those off the latter are sensitive 
to the measures of the variables used in our analysis
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Conclusions 
Brazil is unique, not only because of its particular tendency of growth rate, but also due to 
the frequent political/institutional changes. This study examines how macroeconomic factors 
and political instability affected long-term economic growth in Brazil since 1870. Using a 
PARCH framework and data for Brazil from approximately 1870 to 2003 we ask the 
following questions: What is the relationship between, on the one hand, financial 
development (domestic and international), political instability, public deficit, trade openness 
and, on the other hand, economic growth and (predicted) growth volatility? Are these effects 
fundamentally and systematically different? Does the intensity and the direction (the sign) of 
these effects vary over time, in general and, in particular, do they vary with respect to short- 
versus long-run considerations?  
 
We find that the main explanatory factors, solely in terms of their negative lagged 
direct/indirect effects on economic growth in Brazil, turn out to be financial development 
(domestic and international), political instabilities, trade openness and public deficit. From 
investigating whether dynamic considerations affect our conclusions, we find important 
differences in terms of short- and long-run behavior of our key variables, more specifically, 
while the effects of financial development (mainly M1 and commercial bank deposits) are 
negative in the short- and positive in the long-run, that of the US interest rate work in the 
opposite direction. Further, as to the political instability indicators, while strong negative 
impacts can be observed in the short-run, the corresponding effects for the long-run are 
weaker. Importantly, however, the negative impact of assassinations, coups, revolutions 
together with legislative effectiveness and cabinet changes remain strong in the long-run. 
Finally, public deficit has both a negative short and long-run impact. 
 
These findings are interest in themselves but they also matter because they raise a new 
question, how to evaluate the relative merits of the factors behind these key explanatory 
variables, that we believe may extend our understanding of Brazil’s economic performance. 
To achieve this goal, in chapter three, we focus on the joint determination of the financial 
development and political instabilities and find that financial development (domestic and 
international) exhibit the most robust first-order effects on growth and its volatility. To be 
more specific, two out of the three domestic financial development indicators, that is M1 and 
commercial bank deposits, have negative short-run/lagged direct effects on growth whereas 
their long-run impacts are positive. The short and long-run impacts of US interest rate are 
opposite from those of domestic financial development. Interestingly, deposits at Banco do 
Brasil and the US interest rate have a strong negative indirect effect on growth.  
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Political Instabilities play important secondary roles since the effect of both formal and 
informal political instabilities do not extend to the long-run with the existence of all other 
explanatory variables. For the informal political proxy, assassinations, the estimates of the 
short-run coefficients are highly significant and negative whereas the corresponding values 
for the long-run coefficients become insignificant. As to the formal political indicator, which 
is legislative effectiveness, our multivariate analysis shows that its short-run negative effect 
is not affected by the addition of other explanatory variables to the model, however, in the 
long-run the impact disappears when we use revenues as a regressor. 
Further, both trade openness and public deficit are important in explaining the output 
growth in Brazil. Interesting, the significance of the influences of public deficit on growth is 
sensitive to the choice of the political indicator. Specifically, the negative direct impact of 
public deficit on growth disappears when we use assassinations as a regressor. Similarly, 
trade openness has a significant negative direct impact on growth only when we include 
legislative effectiveness and revenues as a regressor. 
Last but not least, we subjected all these results to the presence of structural breaks. We 
find that the basic results remain once structural breaks are taken into account. That is, two 
out of the three domestic financial development indicators have negative short-run/lagged 
direct effects on growth whereas their long-run impacts are positive. The short and long-run 
impacts of US interest rate are opposite from those of domestic financial development. 
Public deficit affects growth negatively in both the short and long-run. Political instability 
and trade openness play a less important role. Both formal and informal political variables 
have only short-run effects. Similarly, the negative short-run impact of trade openness 
disappears in the long run. 
 
  To sum up, in examining how macroeconomic factors and political instability affected 
long-term economic growth in Brazil since 1870, we find financial development exhibits the 
most robust first-order effects on growth and its volatility. Political instability, trade 
openness and public deficit play important yet secondary roles since the effects of the first 
two do not extent to the long-run (that is, they are restricted to the short-run) and those off 
the latter are sensitive to the measures of the variables used in our analysis. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Direct Effect of Economic Growth (Univariate) 
Table 1 Direct Effect on Economic Growth
x it  k     
Panel A: Financial Development
M1
17.05
0. 011

l6
1.78
0. 396
3.75
0. 61
3.23
0. 39
n8
4.73
0. 120

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
4.83
0. 006

l2
0.30
0. 016
3.54
0. 59
3.93
0. 49
n4
0.67
0. 048

0. 80
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
6.90
0. 010

l3
4.41
0. 069
5.09
0. 72
3.48
0. 32
n8
7.37
0. 148

1. 00
Panel B: Trade Openness
Exports
7.90
0. 010

l3
2.02
0. 041
5.52
0. 74
3.41
0. 30
n8
7.48
0. 194

0. 90
Imports
6.22
0. 010

l2
2.63
0. 109
4.52
0. 59
4.07
0. 38
n8
6.04
0. 177

0. 90
Trade Openness
6.17
0. 010

l5
1.98
0. 038
5.62
0. 69
3.67
0. 34
n8
7.41
0. 150

1. 00
Panel C: Public Deficit
Expenditures
4.81
0. 005

l1
1.82
0. 023
3.45
0. 61
4.61
0. 52
n2
0.76
0. 057

1. 00
Revenues
6.70
0. 010

l6
3.70
0. 040
3.84
0. 67
2.81
0. 35
n8
3.12
0. 110

1. 00
Public Deficit
5.69
0. 009

l6
4.49
0. 220
3.82
0. 65
3.31
0. 36
n8
4.86
0. 111

1. 00
Panel D: International Financial Development
US Interest Rate
4.93
0. 009

l1
2.38
0. 010
5.70
0. 60
4.21
0. 41
n8
2.43
0. 124

1. 00
Table 1 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c k logh tx i,tl t , h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 y tn.
x i,tl can be either financial development or trade openness or public deficit or US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 1.1 Direct Effect of M1, Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on 
Economic Growth 
 
Table 1.1 Direct Effect of M1, Trade Openness, Public Deficit
and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k fd to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
2.66
3. 60
l4
1.71
0. 024
l5
2.07
0. 073
l4
2.19
0. 002
l3
2.29
0. 001
3.02
0. 47
2.50
0. 44
n2
0.67
0. 09

0. 80
Revenues
1.94
4. 00
l5
2.15
0. 028
l4
2.08
0. 062
l3
3.31
0. 004
l5
9.14
0. 002
2.42
0. 43
2.04
0. 42
n4
0.56
0. 03

0. 80
Public Deficit
2.61
3. 13
l4
1.29
0. 038
l8
3.25
0. 070
l6
2.01
0. 002
l6
7.50
0. 003
4.13
0. 62
1.66
0. 26
n5
2.45
0. 17

0. 80
Imports
Expenditures
1.97
4. 58
l4
4.10
0. 037
l5
2.92
0. 047
l4
2.61
0. 003
l4
2.53
0. 001
3.08
0. 46
1.66
0. 29
n1
0.54
0. 08

0. 80
Revenues
1.91
5. 83
l5
1.96
0. 020
l4
3.31
0. 071
l4
3.10
0. 003
l5
9.70
0. 002
1.96
0. 37
1.70
0. 37
n2
0.16
0. 04

1. 00
Public Deficit
3.04
2. 64
l4
4.61
0. 030
l8
5.72
0. 098
l6
3.48
0. 003
l6
6.87
0. 003
4.11
0. 62
2.07
0. 29
n5
3.03
0. 18

0. 80
Trade Openness
Expenditures
2.48
3. 06
l4
6.71
0. 035
l8
3.00
0. 025
l4
5.03
0. 003
l6
9.38
0. 002
3.73
0. 58
2.04
0. 33
n5
1.89
0. 11

0. 80
Revenues
2.13
1. 84
l4
6.75
0. 034
l8
1.89
0. 002
l4
3.46
0. 002
l6
7.77
0. 002
3.75
0. 57
3.03
0. 43
n3
0.31
0. 03

0. 80
Public Deficit
2.42
2. 65
l5
1.69
0. 015
l8
3.67
0. 033
l4
2.75
0. 004
l6
7.46
0. 003
4.12
0. 62
2.22
0. 31
n5
2.48
0. 14

0. 80
Table 1.1 reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
y t  c k logh tfdx fd,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 y tn ,
x fd,tl is M1, x to,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures), and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are absolute t statistics.
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Table 1.2 Direct Effect of Commercial Bank Deposits, Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US 
Interest Rate on Economic Growth 
 
Table 1.2 Direct Effect of Commercial Bank Deposit, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k fd to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
2.51
2. 93
l4
2.60
0. 029
l5
2.36
0. 053
l4
4.17
0. 003
l6
4.76
0. 002
3.44
0. 53
2.11
0. 37
n3
0.42
0. 04

0. 80
Revenues
3.00
3. 00
l4
1.60
0. 030
l5
3.06
0. 057
l4
3.34
0. 003
l6
9.27
0. 002
3.66
0. 60
3.28
0. 38
n8
5.09
0. 13

1. 00
Public Deficit
1.60
1. 68
l3
7.16
0. 058
l3
0.07
0. 001
l6
2.62
0. 003
l6
7.78
0. 002
4.09
0. 59
2.86
0. 37
n5
1.83
0. 10

0. 80
Imports
Expenditures
1.83
2. 22
l4
4.69
0. 041
l5
1.97
0. 026
l4
2.46
0. 002
l6
11.04
0. 002
3.26
0. 50
2.94
0. 44
n2
0.24
0. 04

0. 80
Revenues
2.89
2. 61
l4
4.91
0. 047
l8
1.90
0. 037
l4
5.88
0. 002
l6
8.27
0. 002
3.88
0. 59
2.97
0. 37
n8
2.89
0. 14

0. 90
Public Deficit
2.22
2. 17
l4
6.73
0. 057
l6
0.25
0. 003
l6
2.44
0. 003
l6
8.10
0. 002
4.03
0. 62
2.47
0. 35
n5
2.24
0. 14

0. 80
Trade Openness
Expenditures
2.32
2. 61
l4
3.09
0. 038
l5
2.90
0. 019
l4
2.96
0. 002
l6
9.25
0. 002
3.09
0. 53
3.03
0. 44
n8
2.93
0. 12

0. 90
Revenues
1.64
2. 18
l4
5.22
0. 043
l8
2.04
0. 026
l4
5.19
0. 002
l6
6.58
0. 002
3.71
0. 53
3.04
0. 39
n7
0.59
0. 04

0. 80
Public Deficit
2.14
2. 27
l4
4.31
0. 052
l3
0.31
0. 005
l6
1.74
0. 002
l6
7.08
0. 002
3.79
0. 60
3.07
0. 37
n8
2.67
0. 08

1. 00
Table 1.2 reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
y t  c k logh tfdx fd,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 y tn ,
x fd,tl is commercial bank deposits,
x to,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures), and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 1.3 Direct Effect of Deposits at Banco do Brasil, Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US 
Interest Rate on Economic Growth 
Table 1.3 Direct Effect of Deposits at Banco do Brasil, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k fd to pd us    
Imports
Expenditures
3.00
2. 96
l8
2.28
0. 017
l8
2.49
0. 054
l4
4.23
0. 002
l6
7.36
0. 002
3.71
0. 56
2.41
0. 34
n8
2.43
0. 13

0. 80
Revenues
2.37
2. 25
l5
1.33
0. 008
l8
3.35
0. 059
l4
4.12
0. 003
l6
6.57
0. 002
3.81
0. 58
3.22
0. 40
n8
2.16
0. 12

0. 80
Public Deficit
3.67
3. 39
l5
0.66
0. 006
l8
3.34
0. 070
l4
2.06
0. 004
l6
8.76
0. 002
4.90
0. 56
3.02
0. 38
n8
3.08
0. 16

0. 80
Exports
Expenditures
2.05
1. 70
l4
2.59
0. 017
l8
3.21
0. 053
l4
4.43
0. 002
l6
8.41
0. 003
4.10
0. 59
3.99
0. 45
n8
1.98
0. 10

0. 80
Revenues
1.99
1. 63
l5
1.18
0. 008
l8
2.92
0. 047
l4
3.98
0. 004
l6
6.79
0. 002
4.15
0. 67
3.08
0. 39
n5
1.88
0. 07

1. 00
Public Deficit
3.07
3. 52
l5
0.06
0. 001
l8
4.39
0. 091
l6
2.76
0. 003
l6
8.79
0. 002
3.64
0. 59
2.58
0. 36
n8
4.00
0. 22

0. 80
Trade Openness
Expenditures
2.90
2. 72
l5
1.23
0. 009
l8
3.42
0. 025
l4
4.13
0. 003
l6
10.69
0. 002
3.71
0. 59
2.73
0. 38
n8
2.56
0. 15

0. 80
Revenues
3.00
2. 85
l5
1.11
0. 009
l8
2.32
0. 021
l4
3.73
0. 004
l6
7.47
0. 002
3.30
0. 62
2.96
0. 40
n8
3.42
0. 12

1. 00
Public Deficit
3.22
3. 77
l5
1.18
0. 009
l4
3.93
0. 057
l4
2.27
0. 003
l6
7.74
0. 002
3.58
0. 58
2.70
0. 36
n8
4.43
0. 18

0. 90
Table 1.3 reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
y t  c k logh tfdx fd,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 y tn ,
x fd,tl is deposits at Banco do Brasil,
x to,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures), and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 2 Indirect Effect on Economic Growth (Univariate) 
 
Table 2 Indirect Effect on Economic Growth
x it  k     
Panel A: Financial Development
M1
6.16
0. 010
3.66
0. 62
2.98
0. 38

l6
1.76
0. 349
n8
4.22
0. 157

0. 90
Commercial Bank Deposits
5.97
0. 010
3.97
0. 66
3.28
0. 38

l8
0.53
0. 007
n8
5.31
0. 140

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
4.57
0. 010
3.26
0. 53
3.03
0. 40

l3
2.88
0. 121
n8
3.82
0. 128

1. 00
Panel B: Trade Openness
Exports
4.12
0. 012
3.75
0. 47
2.53
0. 36

l8
3.95
0. 134
n8
4.75
0. 117

1. 00
Imports
12.22
0. 010
4.72
0. 72
3.44
0. 33

l4
1.73
0. 033
n8
7.73
0. 142

1. 00
Trade Openness
3.82
0. 012
3.82
0. 50
2.19
0. 33

l8
2.54
0. 143
n8
4.78
0. 170

0. 90
Panel C: Public Deficit
Expenditures
4.04
0. 010
3.35
0. 51
3.46
0. 42

l2
2.69
0. 044
n8
3.59
0. 107

1. 00
Revenues
5.18
0. 007
3.21
0. 59
3.21
0. 43

l8
6.41
0. 099
n8
3.20
0. 113

1. 00
Public Deficit
5.80
0. 010
3.78
0. 58
3.08
0. 38

l3
2.86
0. 098
n8
4.31
0. 195

0. 80
Panel D: International Financial Development
US Interest Rate
4.90
0. 010
4.46
0. 57
3.06
0. 33

l2
10.26
0. 011
n8
2.91
0. 080

1. 00
Table 2 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c k logh tt , h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 x i,tl y tn.
x i,tl can be either financial development or trade openness or public deficit or US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 2.1 Indirect Effect of M1, Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on 
Economic Growth 
 
Table 2.1 Indirect Effect of M1, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k   fd to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
4.11
0. 0087
2.82
0. 41
2.59
0. 45
l6
2.23
0. 347
l8
2.18
0. 124
l2
2.87
0. 040
l8
2.00
0. 006
n8
3.51
0. 094

1. 00
Revenues
5.97
0. 0092
3.56
0. 51
2.46
0. 35
l6
2.94
0. 432
l8
4.91
0. 164
l8
4.11
0. 029
l8
2.40
0. 008
n8
4.07
0. 108

1. 00
Public Deficit
5.84
0. 0083
4.07
0. 39
4.82
0. 46
l6
1.70
0. 229
l8
5.08
0. 194
l3
3.25
0. 136
l1
7.87
0. 013
n8
3.83
0. 097

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
5.48
0. 0102
4.49
0. 56
4.48
0. 38
l6
2.72
0. 342
l8
1.69
0. 082
l2
2.35
0. 021
l1
6.11
0. 014
n8
4.05
0. 100

1. 00
Revenues
6.64
0. 0070
3.58
0. 62
3.32
0. 39
l6
2.07
0. 333
l4
2.28
0. 046
l3
3.31
0. 024
l8
2.62
0. 008
n8
4.07
0. 093

1. 00
Public Deficit
6.26
0. 0108
3.90
0. 52
3.52
0. 37
l6
2.88
0. 457
l8
2.13
0. 146
l1
1.67
0. 086
l1
6.31
0. 016
n8
4.08
0. 142

0. 90
Trade Openness
Expenditures
6.66
0. 0077
4.23
0. 49
2.68
0. 31
l6
1.93
0. 304
l8
2.27
0. 134
l5
3.64
0. 031
l1
2.05
0. 006
n8
3.45
0. 100

1. 00
Revenues
7.55
0. 0067
3.85
0. 49
2.84
0. 38
l6
2.28
0. 383
l8
2.02
0. 127
l5
4.25
0. 038
l1
2.34
0. 008
n8
3.41
0. 102

1. 00
Public Deficit
5.03
0. 0098
4.15
0. 44
3.92
0. 39
l6
1.71
0. 196
l8
3.38
0. 140
l3
2.98
0. 098
l1
6.36
0. 013
n8
5.91
0. 125

1. 00
Table 2.1 reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: y t  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 fdx fd,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl y tn,
where x fd,tl is M1, x to,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements),
xpd,tl is public deficit (or one of its parts) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 2.2 Indirect Effect of Commercial Bank Deposits, Trade Openness, Public Deficit and 
US Interest Rate on Economic Growth 
 
Table 2.2 Indirect Effect of Commercial Bank Deposits, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k   fd to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
8.37
0. 0092
4.31
0. 40
3.61
0. 34
l8
0.51
0. 007
l8
1.75
0. 130
l2
2.01
0. 022
l6
4.38
0. 014
n8
5.28
0. 094

1. 00
Revenues
6.56
0. 0055
2.63
0. 51
2.24
0. 39
l8
0.62
0. 011
l8
2.57
0. 196
l8
3.60
0. 036
l8
1.84
0. 008
n8
3.03
0. 114

1. 00
Public Deficit
5.27
0. 0084
3.91
0. 49
2.92
0. 35
l8
1.03
0. 012
l8
3.66
0. 163
l3
3.41
0. 127
l8
2.72
0. 007
n8
4.69
0. 114

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
8.69
0. 0093
4.40
0. 63
2.94
0. 33
l6
0.86
0. 013
l8
1.61
0. 110
l2
2.55
0. 033
l8
1.84
0. 005
n8
4.52
0. 122

1. 00
Revenues
16.49
0. 0073
3.63
0. 49
5.15
0. 48
l8
0.34
0. 006
l6
1.63
0. 164
l3
2.85
0. 022
l1
1.79
0. 006
n8
2.98
0. 076

1. 00
Public Deficit
6.09
0. 0097
5.60
0. 57
5.53
0. 36
l8
0.19
0. 003
l6
2.17
0. 202
l3
2.92
0. 117
l1
2.03
0. 009
n8
6.55
0. 175

0. 90
Trade Openness
Expenditures
7.40
0. 0080
4.49
0. 58
2.32
0. 29
l8
1.45
0. 019
l8
3.73
0. 137
l5
3.52
0. 027
l1
2.34
0. 007
n8
3.65
0. 110

1. 00
Revenues
5.66
0. 0120
3.35
0. 43
2.51
0. 37
l8
0.95
0. 014
l8
2.17
0. 112
l5
4.07
0. 025
l1
2.45
0. 007
n8
3.74
0. 098

1. 00
Public Deficit
5.02
0. 0100
4.73
0. 50
3.67
0. 36
l8
0.57
0. 006
l8
4.13
0. 122
l3
2.76
0. 069
l8
5.77
0. 013
n8
6.76
0. 127

1. 00
Table 2.2 reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: y t  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 fdx fd,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl y tn,
where x fd,tl is commercial bank deposits, x to,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements),
xpd,tl is public deficits (or one of its parts) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 2.3 Indirect Effect of Deposits at Banco do Brasil, Trade Openness, Public Deficit and 
US Interest Rate on Economic Growth 
 
Table 2.3 Indirect Effect of Deposits at Banco do Brasil,, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k   fd to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
5.41
0. 0098
4.17
0. 44
2.99
0. 37
l8
4.04
0. 299
l8
3.36
0. 123
l2
3.70
0. 058
l8
2.28
0. 007
n8
3.89
0. 122

0. 90
Revenues
5.67
0. 0105
4.50
0. 43
3.89
0. 37
l8
2.92
0. 201
l8
3.29
0. 100
l2
4.63
0. 053
l1
6.19
0. 012
n8
2.89
0. 093

1. 00
Public Deficit
8.72
0. 0060
3.53
0. 48
3.52
0. 41
l8
3.44
0. 275
l8
2.69
0. 137
l3
4.29
0. 177
l1
2.33
0. 009
n8
1.94
0. 067

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
8.49
0. 0061
6.07
0. 64
4.13
0. 32
l8
5.76
0. 248
l8
2.72
0. 113
l2
5.94
0. 054
l8
2.72
0. 007
n8
7.89
0. 139

1. 00
Revenues
6.19
0. 0081
5.83
0. 45
4.48
0. 38
l8
7.79
0. 390
l8
1.79
0. 058
l2
9.20
0. 142
l6
1.85
0. 005
n8
4.87
0. 132

1. 00
Public Deficit
9.98
0. 0057
4.21
0. 50
6.11
0. 44
l5
5.96
0. 403
l8
3.79
0. 080
l3
3.63
0. 040
l6
4.00
0. 006
n8
4.18
0. 091

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
8.72
0. 0060
3.53
0. 48
3.52
0. 41
l8
3.44
0. 275
l8
2.69
0. 137
l3
4.29
0. 177
l1
2.33
0. 009
n8
1.94
0. 067

1. 00
Revenues
7.85
0. 0096
4.65
0. 55
2.28
0. 27
l8
2.66
0. 248
l8
2.62
0. 124
l5
5.06
0. 042
l1
2.13
0. 009
n8
3.74
0. 146

0. 90
Public Deficit
6.03
0. 0078
4.84
0. 35
5.16
0. 37
l5
3.89
0. 350
l8
2.91
0. 134
l3
4.24
0. 156
l6
6.89
0. 018
n8
5.83
0. 145

0. 90
Table 2.3 reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: y t  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 fdx fd,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl y tn,
where x fd,tl is deposits at Banco do Brasil, x to,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements),
xpd,tl is public deficit (or one of its elements) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
 84 
 
 
Table 3 The Short- and Long-run Effects on Growth (Univariate) 
 
Table 3 The Short and Long-run Effects on Growth
x it        
Panel A: Financial Development
M1
l6
3.47
0. 779
6.76
0. 391
6.18
0. 997
2.88
0. 48
3.18
0. 51
n8
0.41
0. 019

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
l3
2.96
0. 385
1.77
0. 018
6.11
0. 907
2.25
0. 30
4.71
0. 60
n8
0.64
0. 028

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
l4
2.00
0. 218
1.30
0. 135
7.74
0. 625
3.36
0. 50
3.99
0. 47
n8
0.34
0. 024

0. 90
Panel C: Public Deficit
Revenues
l4
1.88
0. 086
5.77
0. 142
8.79
0. 703
2.90
0. 56
3.69
0. 54
n8
1.33
0. 056

0. 90
Expenditures
l6
2.34
0. 049
10.69
0. 143
9.31
0. 567
8.20
0. 96
5.06
0. 26
n5
2.82
0. 148

1. 00
Public Deficit
l8
2.70
0. 246
0.70
0. 028
7.29
0. 528
5.70
0. 72
3.32
0. 26
n5
3.03
0. 116

1. 00
Panel D: International Financial Development
US Interest Rate
l4
3.19
0. 012
3.57
0. 002
8.50
0. 612
2.83
0. 52
3.85
0. 53
n5
1.39
0. 044

1. 00
Table 3 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t   x i,tl y t1 c x i,t1t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 y tn.
 and capture the short and long-run effects respectively.
indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
x i,tl can be either financial development or trade openness or public deficit or US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
The long-run impact of trade openness is insignificant (results not reported).
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Table 3.1 The Short- and Long-run Effects of Financial Development, Public Deficit, Export 
and US Interest Rate on Growth 
Table 3.1 The Short- and Long-run Effects of Financial Development, Public Deficit,
Exports (Trade Openness) and US Interest Rate on Growth
x it  fd to pd us fd pd us     
Expenditures
M1
l3
2.77
1. 055
l8
1.63
0. 168
l5
1.76
0. 051
l6
2.49
0. 011
7.15
0. 591
0.709
0. 0086
1.63
0. 0006
12.61
0. 81
4.7
0. 55
3.50
0. 37
n8
1.41
0. 059

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
l3
2.21
0. 110
l8
0.37
0. 027
l5
1.65
0. 057
l5
8.75
0. 018
1.80
0. 045
5.93
0. 0967
4.70
0. 0029
13.95
0. 72
5.10
0. 61
4.66
0. 46
n8
0.14
0. 009

0. 80
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
l3
1.76
0. 063
l8
0.73
0. 043
l5
1.00
0. 027
l5
5.07
0. 012
1.50
0. 128
4.21
0. 1025
2.06
0. 0018
10.32
0. 61
5.20
0. 67
3.67
0. 35
n5
2.68
0. 159

0. 80
Revenues
M1
l3
5.72
0. 718
l4
2.96
0. 031
l5
1.67
0. 026
l5
15.77
0. 018
6.60
0. 474
3.57
0. 0478
2.56
0. 0011
16.58
0. 88
5.80
0. 78
3.71
0. 36
n5
2.89
0. 223

0. 80
Commercial Bank Deposits
l3
2.70
0. 357
l8
2.12
0. 200
l5
0.05
0. 003
l5
2.85
0. 022
2.51
0. 026
1.82
0. 0121
7.10
0. 0006
10.16
1. 00
3.31
0. 34
3.88
0. 51
n8
1.44
0. 076

0. 80
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
l3
2.40
0. 097
l8
0.74
0. 047
l4
1.61
0. 096
l5
11.95
0. 017
1.50
0. 055
6.79
0. 1538
2.73
0. 0011
12.08
1. 00
5.40
0. 61
3.86
0. 40
n5
1.04
0. 058

0. 80
Public Deficit
M1
l3
3.16
1. 009
l8
1.69
0. 142
l6
1.76
0. 141
l6
2.42
0. 007
8.52
0. 621
1.58
0. 0149
1.63
0. 0005
11.23
0. 74
5.93
0. 63
3.75
0. 32
n5
1.59
0. 053

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
l3
3.43
0. 439
l8
1.97
0. 230
l6
1.81
0. 168
l5
2.38
0. 021
7.03
0. 021
0.06
0. 0007
0.30
0. 0002
10.64
1. 00
2.37
0. 25
4.25
0. 58
n8
1.42
0. 046

1. 00
Table 3.1 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t   fdx fd,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl y t1 c fdx fd,t1 pdxpd,t1 usxus,t1t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 y tn.
i and i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
x fd,tl is financial development, xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the three measures),
x to,tl is the exports and xus,tl is US interest rate. l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 4 Direct Effect on Economic Growth with Dummy Variables
x it  k  1 2   1  
Panel A: Financial Development
M1
8.19
0. 012

l6
3.66
2. 968

l6
3.00
2. 486

l1
3.30
0. 727
3.53
0. 51
3.32
0. 42
0.10
0. 0005
n5
0.76
0. 052

0. 80
Commercial Bank Deposits
1.88
0. 002

l2
2.00
0. 216

l5
3.20
0. 186

l1
0.22
0. 015
3.56
0. 29
0.74
0. 30
0.74
0. 0068
n4
0.95
0. 157

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
5.28
0. 010

l3
3.26
0. 175

l8
0.86
0. 143 
3.73
0. 56
4.00
0. 41
0.28
0. 0007
n8
4.71
0. 129

1. 00
Panel B: Trade Openness
Exports
4.41
0. 006

l2
2.38
0. 035

l7
0.27
0. 019 
3.19
0. 62
3.92
0. 47
0.94
0. 0026
n3
0.88
0. 058

0. 80
Imports
4.93
0. 004

l1
1.85
0. 057

l1
0.77
0. 056 
3.57
0. 63
4.29
0. 49
1.17
0. 0032
n3
1.46
0. 087

1. 00
Trade Openness
5.23
0. 010

l5
1.75
0. 040

l5
0.54
0. 025 
4.21
0. 63
4.10
0. 38
0.27
0. 0007
n8
5.86
0. 133

1. 00
Panel C: Public Deficit
Expenditures
4.80
0. 006

l5
2.76
0. 047

l4
1.61
0. 025

l3
1.01
0. 031
2.87
0. 62
3.20
0. 45
0.09
0. 0003
n6
0.39
0. 018

1. 00
Revenues
4.77
0. 008

l6
2.50
0. 102

l3
2.50
0. 091

l4
3.38
0. 081
3.18
0. 57
3.47
0. 44
1.36
0. 0043
n4
1.42
0. 065

1. 00
Public Deficit
6.57
0. 010

l6
3.73
0. 291

l1
1.56
0. 217 
5.03
0. 70
3.69
0. 32
0.77
0. 0025
n6
1.16
0. 054

0. 90
Panel D: International Financial Development
US Interest Rate
2.42
2. 80
1.20
0. 0011  
2.77
0. 53
2.94
0. 52
1.03
0. 0029
n3
1.13
0. 077

1. 00
Table 4 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c k logh tx i,tl 1D i1,tlx i,tl 2D i2,tlx i,tl t ,
h t

2  1D1t h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 y tn.
D i1,tl is a slope dummy defined as D i1,tl  1 in the period: 1889-2003 (for M1); 1914 - 2003 (for commercial
bank deposits); 1911-2003 (for deposits at Bank do Brasil); 1901 - 2003 (for exports); 1899 - 2003
(for imports and trade openness); 1890 - 2003 (for expenditures and revenues) and 1965 - 2003 (for public
deficit). D i2,tl  1 in the period: 1930 - 2003 (for M1); 1962 - 2003 (for commercial bank deposits);
1980 - 2003 (for expenditures and revenues), and D i1,tl  0, D i2,tl  0 otherwise.
D1t is an intercept dummy defined as D1t  1 in the period 1918-2003 and D1t  0 otherwise.
x i,tl can be either financial development or trade openness or public deficit or US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 5 Indirect Effect on Economic Growth with Dummy Variables
x it  k    1 2 1  
Panel A: Financial Development
M1
4.60
0. 010
2.96
0. 59
3.11
0. 43
l6
1.62
0. 287
l7
0.43
0. 119
l5
0.02
0. 006
0.39
0. 0010
n6
0.53
0. 017

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
4.55
0. 007
3.24
0. 53
2.84
0. 40
l4
1.04
0. 038
l1
0.06
0. 003 
0.52
0. 0027
n5
1.39
0. 059

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
6.99
0. 004
2.93
0. 62
3.78
0. 44
l3
4.16
0. 215
l3
1.28
0. 203 
1.08
0. 0036
n5
1.56
0. 054

1. 00
Panel B: Trade Openness
Exports
4.26
0. 005
3.41
0. 51
4.16
0. 50
l6
1.65
0. 068
l3
0.13
0. 010 
1.69
0. 0047
n2
1.32
0. 121

1. 00
Imports
7.88
0. 010
5.14
0. 81
3.43
0. 29
l4
1.70
0. 034  
0.84
0. 0019
n8
7.51
0. 148

1. 00
Trade Openness
4.61
0. 013
3.13
0. 50
2.11
0. 32
l8
2.68
0. 106
l3
5.66
0. 074 
0.19
0. 0005
n8
4.66
0. 124

1. 00
Panel C: Public Deficit
Expenditures
5.57
0. 010
2.68
0. 54
2.93
0. 43
l5
2.37
0. 036
l7
0.05
0. 001
l5
0.11
0. 002
0.14
0. 0003
n6
0.63
0. 022

1. 00
Revenues
8.20
0. 008
3.02
0. 59
3.33
0. 44
l8
7.95
0. 071
l5
0.49
0. 006
l4
3.98
0. 052
0.52
0. 0013
n8
4.12
0. 134

1. 00
Public Deficit
7.23
0. 010
4.32
0. 64
3.28
0. 33
l1
3.77
0. 130
l4
1.99
0. 125 
0.70
0. 0015
n8
2.63
0. 100

1. 00
Panel D: International Financial Development
US Interest Rate
2.16
0. 020
2.57
0. 40
3.01
0. 34
l5
2.52
0. 006  
0.39
0. 0011
n8
3.08
0. 093

1. 00
Table 5 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  1D1t h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 x i,tl 1D i1,tlx i,tl 1D i2,tlx i,tl y tn .
D i1,tl is a slope dummy defined as D i1,tl  1 in the period 1889-2003 (for M1); 1914-2003 (for commercial
bank deposits); 1911-2003 (for deposits at Bank do Brasil); 1901-2003 (for exports); 1899-2003
(for imports and trade openness); 1890-2003 (for expenditures and revenues) and 1965-2003 (for public
deficits). D i2,tl  1 in the period 1930-2003 (for M1); 1962-2003 (for commercial bank deposits);
1980-2003 (for expenditures and revenues), and D i1,tl  0, D i2,tl  0 otherwise.
D1t is an intercept dummy defined as D1t  1 in the period 1918-2003 and D1t  0 otherwise..
x i,tl can be either financial development or trade openness or public deficit or US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 6 The Short- and Long-run Growth Effects with Dummy Variables 
 
Table 6. The Short- and Long-run Growth Effects with Dummy Variables
x it   1 2     1  
Panel A: Financial Development
M1
l3
3.88
1. 112
l2
1.89
0. 370
l6
2.43
0. 600
6.76
0. 391
7.27
0. 62
5.98
0. 86
3.08
0. 26
1.42
0. 0048
n7
1.06
0. 067

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
l4
1.60
0. 116
l1
4.55
0. 107
l4
2.19
0. 089
1.77
0. 018
11.21
0. 78
3.32
0. 54
4.19
0. 53
1.44
0. 0031
n8
1.22
0. 047

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
l4
2.33
0. 251
l5
0.64
0. 116 
1.30
0. 135
8.18
0. 62
3.14
0. 52
3.67
0. 50
0.15
0. 0006
n8
0.24
0. 018

1. 00
Panel C: Public Deficits
Expenditures
l6
3.95
0. 067
l3
2.45
0. 323
l3
3.34
0. 459
5.77
0. 142
11.32
0. 67
6.55
0. 91
3.16
0. 21
0.76
0. 0039
n5
1.73
0. 138

1. 00
Revenues
l4
2.41
0. 088
l6
1.38
0. 047
l3
3.03
0. 079
10.69
0. 143
8.88
0. 71
4.38
0. 71
3.85
0. 48
0.41
0. 0010
n1
0.23
0. 014

1. 00
Public Deficits
l8
2.96
0. 243
l2
0.41
0. 050 
0.70
0. 028
7.26
0. 52
5.74
0. 75
3.16
0. 23
0.64
0. 0021
n5
2.84
0. 118

1. 00
Panel D: International Financial Development
US Interest Rate
l4
4.38
0. 015  
3.57
0. 002
10.80
0. 69
3.33
0. 53
4.26
0. 51
1.11
0. 0031
n8
1.77
0. 077

1. 00
Table 6. reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t   x i,tl 1D i1,tlx i,tl 2D i2,tlx i,tl y t1 c x i,t1t ,
h t

2  1D1t |u t1 |
 h t1

2 y tn.
 and capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
D i1,tl is a slope dummy defined as D i1,tl  1 in the period: 1889-2003 (for M1);
1914 - 2003 (for commercial bank deposits); 1911-2003 (for deposits at Bank do Brasil);
1890 - 2003 (for expenditures and revenues) and 1965 - 2003 (for public deficits).
D i2,tl  1 in the period 1930 - 2003 (for M1); 1962 - 2003 (for commercial bank deposits);
1980 - 2003 (for expenditures and revenues), and D i1,tl  0, D i2,tl  0 otherwise.
D1t is an intercept dummy defined as D1t  1 in the period 1918-2003 and D1t  0 otherwise.
x i,tl can be either financial development or trade openness or public deficit or US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 8.a Direct Effect of Informal Political Instability on GDP Growth 
 
Table 8.a Direct Effect of Informal Political Instability on GDP Growth
Informal Political Instability
x it  k pi    
Anti-government Demonstrations
4.10
0. 008
l3
2.65
0. 038
3.02
0. 69
3.55
0. 46
n4
1.65
0. 287

1. 00
Assassinations
6.19
0. 011
l8
5.29
0. 120
5.83
0. 78
4.31
0. 31
n3
2.05
0. 281

0. 80
General Strikes
5.29
0. 013
l2
3.14
0. 209
3.64
0. 70
4.27
0. 42
n4
1.96
0. 198

1. 00
Guerrilla Warfare
4.81
0. 017
l8
0.67
0. 011
3.07
0. 57
3.80
0. 48
n3
1.38
0. 236

1. 00
Number of Coups d’etat
4.12
0. 009
l2
2.04
0. 089
3.53
0. 71
2.72
0. 19
n6
4.28
0. 173

0. 80
Revolutions
11.68
0. 007
l7
1.83
0. 416
3.72
0. 62
4.25
0. 52
n8
1.68
0. 105

0. 80
Riots
21.32
0. 009
l5
0.93
0. 052
2.40
0. 61
3.05
0. 47
n4
0.63
0. 150

1. 00
Table 8.a reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt  c k loghtpixpi,tl t, ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 ytn .
x pi,tl is an informal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 8.b Direct Effect of Formal Political Instability on GDP Growth 
 
Table 8.b Direct Effect of Formal Political Instability on GDP Growth
Formal Political Instability
x it  k pi    
Changes in Effective Executive
13.84
0. 015
l6
3.75
0. 209
3.54
0. 77
3.22
0. 36
n3
0.71
0. 099

1. 00
Government Crisis
3.65
0. 008
l2
1.10
0. 074
3.19
0. 65
3.82
0. 47
n4
1.66
0. 338

0. 90
Legislative Effectiveness
78.26
0. 007
l6
2.12
1. 476
4.91
0. 84
3.46
0. 33
n4
2.28
0. 206

0. 90
Legislative Selection
5.42
0. 016
l1
2.80
1. 547
3.41
0. 51
6.86
0. 58
n5
1.49
0. 111

0. 80
Major Constitutional Changes
1.90
0. 007
l2
4.14
0. 090
4.77
0. 55
6.42
0. 56
n8
0.39
0. 036

0. 80
Number of Cabinet Changes
5.32
0. 012
l3
3.03
0. 159
4.29
0. 76
3.36
0. 31
n3
1.46
0. 231

0. 90
Purges
3.60
0. 012
l6
0.19
0. 002
3.42
0. 55
3.41
0. 42
n4
1.82
0. 385

0. 90
Size of the Cabinet
4.48
0. 013
l4
2.99
0. 028
4.50
0. 59
3.00
0. 27
n6
2.59
0. 217

1. 00
Table 8.b reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt  c k loghtpixpi,tl t, ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 ytn .
x pi,tl is a formal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 9.a Indirect Effect of Informal Political Instability on GDP Growth 
 
Table 9.a Indirect Effect of Informal Political Instability on GDP Growth
Informal Political Instability
x it  k   pi  
Anti-government Demonstrations
3.33
0. 0088
3.19
0. 59
4.49
0. 52
l1
3.51
0. 028
n4
0.92
0. 177

1. 00
Assassinations
4.08
0. 0101
2.95
0. 63
3.61
0. 47
l8
2.88
0. 056
n4
1.77
0. 307

1. 00
General Strikes
3.05
0. 0205
4.80
0. 45
2.51
0. 23
l2
3.34
0. 127
n7
2.47
0. 295

0. 80
Guerrilla Warfare
5.06
0. 0136
3.67
0. 47
3.36
0. 37
l8
2.73
0. 043
n6
2.06
0. 259

0. 90
Number of Coups d’etat
2.11
0. 0002
2.80
0. 23
14.21
0. 79
l1
2.00
0. 162
n5
0.133
0. 006

1. 00
Revolutions
4.64
0. 0081
4.15
0. 73
3.62
0. 34
l5
1.16
0. 268
n4
1.50
0. 088

1. 00
Riots
3.44
0. 0050
5.17
0. 72
8.14
0. 51
l1
3.37
0. 063
n4
1.56
0. 300

1. 00
Table 9.a reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt  c k loghtt, ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 pix pi,tl ytn .
x pi,tl is an informal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 9.b Indirect Effect of Formal Political Instability on GDP Growth 
 
Table 9.b Indirect Effect of Formal Political Instability on GDP Growth
Formal Political Instability
x it  k   pi  
Changes in Effective Executive
5.80
0. 0045
3.25
0. 57
3.01
0. 36
l1
5.07
0. 164
n7
2.37
0. 090

1. 00
Government Crisis
18.35
0. 0147
3.79
0. 57
3.13
0. 39
l8
1.94
0. 082
n4
1.35
0. 347

0. 90
Legislative Effectiveness
3.81
0. 0003
2.71
0. 33
9.47
0. 75
l1
2.20
0. 894
n7
1.67
0. 069

1. 00
Legislative Selection
6.83
0. 0105
3.75
0. 46
10.36
0. 67
l1
2.03
0. 755
n4
1.81
0. 083

1. 00
Major Constitutional Changes
3.60
0. 0070
5.24
0. 69
4.83
0. 37
l5
1.50
0. 098
n3
0.16
0. 010

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
5.49
0. 0065
4.54
0. 64
0.36
0. 36
l1
5.83
0. 254
n2
1.46
0. 133

1. 00
Purges
3.15
0. 0122
3.43
0. 71
3.44
0. 43
l7
2.17
0. 034
n3
1.13
0. 269

1. 00
Size of the Cabinet
3.02
0. 0106
5.28
0. 72
4.16
0. 36
l2
4.38
0. 033
n3
0.61
0. 127

1. 00
Table 9.b reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt  c k loghtt, ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 pix pi,tl ytn .
x pi,tl is a formal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
 93 
 
 
Table 10.a Direct and Indirect Effects of Informal Political Instability on GDP Growth 
 
Table 10.a Direct and Indirect Effects of Informal Political Instability on GDP Growth
Informal Political Instability
x it  k pi   pi  
Anti-government Demonstrations
2.38
0. 004
l3
3.69
0. 0883
4.31
0. 56
1.61
0. 28
l2
2.55
0. 087
n6
1.20
0. 134

0. 90
Assassinations
8.52
0. 008
l8
2.33
0. 1858
3.63
0. 83
6.02
0. 44
l3
3.69
0. 158
n2
1.43
0. 126

1. 00
General Strikes
7.40
0. 012
l2
2.69
0. 1711
6.79
0. 88
4.90
0. 38
l2
2.16
0. 086
n4
2.46
0. 182

1. 00
Guerrilla Warfare
3.71
0. 009
l8
0.12
0. 0004
3.12
0. 64
3.94
0. 47
l1
2.40
0. 008
n6
1.34
0. 227

1. 00
Number of Coups d’etat
15.64
0. 015
l2
8.26
0. 0744
7.89
0. 86
1.74
0. 10
l7
7.89
0. 094
n6
2.75
0. 057

1. 00
Revolutions
3.32
0. 017
l5
4.93
0. 1853
4.93
0. 68
2.27
0. 24
l1
0.03
0. 002
n3
2.15
0. 207

1. 00
Riots
3.17
0. 012
l1
1.16
0. 0436
4.30
0. 77
2.77
0. 36
l1
2.32
0. 048
n5
3.98
0. 139

1. 00
Table 10.a reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt  c k loghtpix pi,tl t, ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 pixpi,tl ytn .
x pi,tl is an informal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 10.b Direct and Indirect Effects of Formal Political Instability on GDP Growth 
 
Table 10.b Direct and Indirect Effects of Formal Political Instability on GDP Growth
Formal Political Instability
x it  k pi   pi  
Changes in Effective Executive
2.65
0. 017
l6
2.00
0. 138
4.73
0. 32
14.44
0. 73
l6
1.86
0. 091
n6
0.65
0. 071

0. 80
Government Crisis
4.66
0. 010
l2
0.05
0. 002
6.30
0. 89
5.63
0. 41
l1
1.63
0. 072
n2
4.26
0. 290

0. 90
Legislative Effectiveness
4.13
0. 004
l6
1.97
1. 100
6.22
0. 65
8.56
0. 52
l2
1.72
0. 897
n6
1.83
0. 072

1. 00
Legislative Selection
5.98
0. 013
l1
1.09
1. 048
3.77
0. 33
8.41
0. 64
l7
1.99
1. 368
n8
1.49
0. 071

0. 80
Major Constitutional Changes
2.48
0. 011
l2
11.27
0. 791
3.75
0. 52
4.57
0. 57
l8
0.54
0. 084
n5
0.91
0. 072

0. 90
Number of Cabinet Changes
4.67
0. 003
l4
3.61
0. 120
3.99
0. 53
6.09
0. 37
l1
5.67
0. 271
n8
0.32
0. 010

1. 00
Purges
8.40
0. 011
l4
1.57
0. 007
2.90
1. 08
2.00
0. 15
l6
3.09
0. 002
n8
0.12
0. 007

1. 00
Size of the Cabinet
3.94
0. 011
l5
0.94
0. 013
5.34
0. 69
5.09
0. 45
l3
3.51
0. 048
n3
4.32
0. 223

1. 00
Table 10.b reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt  c k loghtpix pi,tl t, ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 pixpi,tl ytn .
x pi,tl is a formal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 11.a The Short- and Long-run Effects of Informal Political Instability on GDP Growth
Informal Political Instability
x it  pi pi     
Anti-government Demonstrations
l1
1.90
0. 040
0.27
0. 009
1.73
0. 36
3.13
0. 52
6.51
0. 64
n3
0.32
0. 036

1. 00
Assassinations
l6
2.48
0. 144
2.21
0. 147
3.26
0. 32
4.37
0. 62
4.83
0. 62
n5
0.58
0. 027

1. 00
General Strikes
l2
5.18
0. 201
0.26
0. 073
4.24
0. 32
4.40
0. 62
5.70
0. 59
n3
0.79
0. 037

1. 00
Guerrilla Warfare
l5
0.08
0. 005
0.36
0. 064
3.47
0. 40
6.91
0. 69
7.16
0. 46
n4
4.83
0. 271

1. 00
Number of Coups d’etat
l2
1.86
0. 061
2.62
0. 031
3.61
0. 44
2.73
0. 69
2.95
0. 47
n4
1.53
0. 186

1. 00
Revolutions
l3
1.63
0. 214
2.14
0. 109
6.50
0. 55
2.79
0. 61
6.14
0. 61
n2
0.73
0. 053

1. 00
Riots
l4
2.06
0. 022
0.23
0. 006
3.48
0. 34
4.47
0. 60
6.00
0. 63
n5
0.05
0. 002

1. 00
Table 11.a reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt  pixpi,tlyt1c pixpi,t1 t,
ht

2  |ut1 |
 ht1

2 ytn .
pi and pi capture the short- and long-run effects respectively. indicates the speed of
adjustment to the long-run relationship. x pi,tl is an informal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 11.b The Short- and Long-run Effects of Formal Political Instability on GDP Growth
Formal Political Instability
x it  pi pi     
Changes in Effective Executive
l3
1.77
0. 117
0.53
0. 023
5.76
0. 42
4.63
0. 92
5.85
0. 38
n6
1.62
0. 242

1. 00
Government Crisis
l3
1.86
0. 140
1.29
0. 120
4.15
0. 50
2.58
0. 94
2.28
0. 45
n6
0.58
0. 081

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
l5
2.36
3. 669
1.68
1. 866
3.51
0. 54
3.58
0. 65
5.24
0. 57
n4
0.04
0. 003

1. 00
Legislative Selection
l8
1.60
0. 883
1.43
3. 441
5.93
0. 53
3.62
0. 73
2.13
0. 17
n5
1.51
0. 057

1. 00
Major Constitutional Changes
l2
3.12
0. 049
1.26
0. 018
2.06
0. 30
3.15
1. 02
3.28
0. 45
n4
1.15
0. 083

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
l5
1.82
0. 067
2.27
0. 145
6.82
0. 65
1.80
0. 24
3.66
0. 62
n8
1.02
0. 120

0. 80
Purges
l6
1.66
0. 013
0.11
0. 003
2.57
0. 34
3.08
0. 57
4.45
0. 53
n6
0.80
0. 121

1. 00
Size of the Cabinet
l2
3.01
0. 035
0.98
0. 005
3.05
0. 28
3.09
1. 14
5.55
0. 41
n1
0.59
0. 087

1. 00
Table 11.b reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt  pixpi,tlytlc pixpi,tl t,
ht

2  |ut1 |
 ht1

2 ytn .
pi and pi capture the short- and long-run effects respectively. indicates the speed of
adjustment to the long-run relationship. x pi,tl is a formal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 12.a Direct Effect of Informal Political Instability on Economic Growth with Dummies
Informal Political Instability
x it  k  d   1 2  
Anti-government Demonstrations
4.60
0. 010
l1
3.12
0. 320
l1
2.56
0. 270
5.50
0. 72
1.96
0. 25
4.01
0. 041
4.92
0. 034
n4
0.62
0. 099

0. 80
Assassinations
3.57
0. 012
l1
7.95
0. 677
l1
4.34
0. 560
4.81
0. 63
2.65
0. 37
2.94
0. 035
3.47
0. 034
n5
0.68
0. 063

0. 90
General Strikes
5.19
0. 013
l2
6.82
0. 316 
5.94
0. 72
2.33
0. 18
6.17
0. 030
3.15
0. 027
n8
0.93
0. 043

0. 90
Guerrilla Warfare
5.17
0. 015
l6
0.45
0. 021 
6.36
0. 72
1.99
0. 25
5.33
0. 021
5.80
0. 020
n5
0.34
0. 018

1. 00
Number of Coups d’etat
5.33
0. 008
l8
1.69
0. 060 
4.67
0. 84
2.39
0. 30
1.71
0. 012 
n3
0.82
0. 054

0. 90
Revolutions
3.09
0. 009
l7
5.23
0. 343 
4.97
0. 54
5.75
0. 56
1.29
0. 014
1.88
0. 016
n5
0.87
0. 088

0. 90
Riots
4.97
0. 009
l1
0.60
0. 022 
6.10
0. 85
2.17
0. 25
4.24
0. 026
4.61
0. 022
n4
0.30
0. 029

1. 00
Table 12.a reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c k logh tx i,tl dD i,tlx i,tl t ,
h t

2  1D1t 2D2t h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 y tn.
D it is a slope dummy defined as D it  1 in the period: 1964-2003 (for anti-government demonstrations);
1978-2003 (for assassinations), and D it  0 otherwise.
D1t and D2t are intercept dummies defined as D1t  1 and D2t  1 in the period 1938 - 2003
and 1979 - 2003 respectively; D1t  0 and D2t  0 otherwise.
x i,tl is an informal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 12.b Direct Effect of Formal Political Instability on Economic Growth with Dummies
Formal Political Instability
x it  k  d   1 2  
Changes in Effective Executive
3.93
0. 014
l3
1.43
0. 079 
5.43
0. 71
3.33
0. 34
5.50
0. 022
3.97
0. 020
n7
0.91
0. 063

0. 90
Government Crisis
4.77
0. 014
l1
0.86
0. 040 
5.56
0. 77
1.89
0. 18
7.62
0. 019
4.94
0. 018
n8
0.98
0. 046

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
5.83
0. 010
l2
1.68
0. 622 
6.03
0. 69
7.36
0. 29
3.52
0. 030
3.59
0. 029
n1
1.24
0. 163

0. 80
Legislative Selection
3.26
0. 010
l2
4.78
2. 758
l2
4.19
1. 782
4.33
0. 34
17.36
0. 77
0.28
0. 002
1.33
0. 006
n4
0.52
0. 027

0. 90
Major Constitutional Changes
4.20
0. 011
l5
8.71
0. 083 
5.59
0. 74
2.34
0. 15
3.32
0. 031
2.55
0. 028
n6
3.24
0. 229

0. 80
Number of Cabinet Changes
4.01
0. 009
l8
2.78
0. 075
l8
1.39
0. 074
5.60
0. 76
2.43
0. 29
3.00
0. 017
3.28
0. 015
n4
0.05
0. 005

1. 00
Purges
5.39
0. 008
l1
0.80
0. 023 
6.22
0. 87
2.79
0. 26
4.94
0. 024
3.49
0. 019
n3
0.35
0. 031

1. 00
Size of the Cabinet
4.22
0. 013
l7
3.03
0. 016 
6.05
0. 77
2.11
0. 24
4.92
0. 032
4.68
0. 027
n4
0.33
0. 033

0. 90
Table 12.b reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c k logh tx i,tl dD i,tlx i,tl t ,
h t

2  1D1t 2D2t h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 y tn.
D it is a slope dummy defined as D it  1 in the period: 1939-2003 (for legislative selection);
1889-2003 (for number of cabinet changes), and D it  0 otherwise.
D1t and D2t are intercept dummies defined as D1t  1 and D2t  1 in the period 1938 - 2003 and
1979 - 2003 respectively; D1t  0 and D2t  0 otherwise.
x i,tl is a formal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 13.a Indirect Effect of Informal Political Instability on Economic Growth with Dummies
Informal Political Instability
x it  k    d 1 2  
Anti-government Demonstrations
4.24
0. 014
6.02
0. 72
1.68
0. 19
l5
2.88
0. 263
l5
2.17
0. 219
7.81
0. 019
1.62
0. 011
n7
0.07
0. 003

1. 00
Assassinations
3.72
0. 012
5.00
0. 67
1.65
0. 22
l8
3.09
0. 235
l8
1.88
0. 156
4.59
0. 025
3.00
0. 021
n4
0.44
0. 032

0. 90
General Strikes
4.81
0. 011
5.60
0. 76
2.24
0. 27
l5
1.78
0. 151 
5.33
0. 048
6.09
0. 040
n4
0.78
0. 108

0. 80
Guerrilla Warfare
5.14
0. 008
6.38
0. 89
2.57
0. 27
l1
0.43
0. 024 
6.91
0. 030
4.76
0. 024
n3
0.45
0. 036

1. 00
Number of Coups d’etat
4.68
0. 006
5.57
0. 79
3.57
0. 33
l1
10.20
0. 375 
4.57
0. 017
3.42
0. 013
n3
0.70
0. 056

1. 00
Revolutions
4.67
0. 011
7.33
0. 70
2.81
0. 31
l5
1.35
0. 120 
1.76
0. 014
1.79
0. 013
n7
0.96
0. 062

0. 90
Riots
3.91
0. 006
4.40
0. 57
3.66
0. 46
l1
4.38
0. 106
l1
0.63
0. 034
3.56
0. 025
3.31
0. 020
n4
0.49
0. 052

0. 90
Table 13.a reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  1D1t 2D2t h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 x i,tl dD i,tlx i,tl y tn.
D it is a slope dummy defined as D it  1 in the period 1964-2003 (for anti-government demonstrations);
1978-2003 (for assassinations); 1929-2003 and 1964-2003 (for riots), and D it  0 otherwise.
D1t and D2t are intercept dummies defined as D1t and D2t  1 in the period 1938 - 2003,
1979 - 2003 respectively; D1t and D2t  0 otherwise.
x i,tl is an informal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
The coefficient for the second dummy for riots equals to -0.109 which is insignificant.
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Table 13.b Indirect Effect of Formal Political Instability on Economic Growth with Dummies
Formal Political Instability
x it  k    d 1 2  
Changes in Effective Executive
4.84
0. 0130
6.24
0. 83
2.07
0. 24
l6
2.14
0. 048 
6.79
0. 024
5.22
0. 023
n6
0.24
0. 009

1. 00
Government Crisis
5.56
0. 0103
6.08
0. 66
2.73
0. 27
l2
2.36
0. 167 
6.44
0. 036
5.82
0. 033
n6
0.26
0. 021

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
5.53
0. 0081
4.23
0. 59
3.08
0. 39
l1
6.04
2. 125 
3.08
0. 022
2.94
0. 014
n3
1.03
0. 155

0. 80
Legislative Selection
3.15
0. 0179
2.53
0. 27
2.63
0. 37
l2
5.97
2. 873
l5
0.71
0. 308 
1.70
0. 017
n4
0.45
0. 036

0. 90
Major Constitutional Changes
4.81
0. 0091
7.53
0. 74
3.11
0. 32
l7
1.38
0. 246 
6.23
0. 032
5.79
0. 031
n5
0.32
0. 027

0. 90
Number of Cabinet Changes
3.78
0. 0031
3.06
0. 54
3.20
0. 38
l1
4.22
0. 189
l1
2.08
0. 110
1.68
0. 011
2.15
0. 015
n6
0.23
0. 023

1. 00
Purges
4.47
0. 0122
5.90
0. 79
2.83
0. 30
l6
2.05
0. 024 
6.61
0. 016
4.20
0. 015
n7
1.00
0. 053

1. 00
Size of the Cabinet
3.48
0. 0162
5.40
0. 51
1.71
0. 22
l3
3.16
0. 078 
5.72
0. 026
2.56
0. 025
n5
0.09
0. 006

1. 00
Table 13.b reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  1D1t 2D2t h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 x i,tl dD i,tlx i,tl y tn.
D it is a slope dummy defined as D it  1 in the period: 1939-2003 (for legislative selection);
1889-2003 (for number of cabinet changes), and D it  0 otherwise.
D1t and D2t are intercept dummies defined as D1t  1 and D2t  1 in the period 1938 - 2003,
1979 - 2003 respectively; D1t  0 and D2t  0 otherwise.
x i,tl is a formal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 14.a The Short- and Long-run Effects of Informal Political Instability on Economic
Growth with Dummy Variables
Informal Political Instability
x it   d      
Anti-government Demonstrations
l4
7.43
0. 079
l2
2.46
0. 052
0.27
0. 009
4.58
0. 42
2.52
0. 94
3.38
0. 28
n5
1.53
0. 189

1. 00
Assassinations
l8
5.56
0. 205
l8
3.97
0. 151
2.21
0. 147
4.35
0. 32
4.65
0. 77
3.11
0. 24
n8
0.23
0. 023

0. 80
General Strikes
l4
1.78
0. 226 
1.27
0. 066
6.35
0. 51
3.30
0. 73
5.25
0. 50
n8
0.37
0. 026

1. 00
Guerrilla Warfare
l4
1.14
0. 273 
0.36
0. 023
10.24
0. 83
1.85
0. 49
2.50
0. 61
n1
1.56
0. 217

0. 80
Number of Coups d’etat
l5
2.56
0. 384 
2.62
0. 031
8.16
0. 51
3.06
0. 59
3.84
0. 39
n6
0.78
0. 181

0. 90
Revolutions
l3
1.63
0. 214 
2.14
0. 109
6.50
0. 55
2.79
0. 61
6.14
0. 61
n2
0.73
0. 053

1. 00
Riots
l5
2.83
0. 054
l7
0.46
0. 005
0.23
0. 006
8.30
0. 40
2.44
0. 95
3.68
0. 26
n5
2.17
0. 160

1. 00
Table 14.a reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t   x i,tl dD itx i,tl y t1 c x i,t1u t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 y tn.
 and capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
D it is a slope dummy defined as D it  1 in the period 1964-2003 (for anti-government demonstrations);
1978-2003 (for assassinations); 1929-2003 and 1964-2003 (for riots), and D it  0 otherwise.
x i,tl is an informal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
The coefficient of the second dummy for riots is -0.045 which is significant at 10% level.
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Table 14.b The Short- and Long-run Effects of Formal Political Instabilities on Economic
Growth with Dummy Variables
x it   d      
Formal Political Variables
Changes in Effective Executive
l3
1.92
0. 116 
0.53
0. 0236
7.36
0. 41
4.58
0. 79
4.00
0. 31
n6
1.07
0. 271

0. 80
Government Crisis
l3
2.22
0. 156 
1.29
0. 1200
5.75
0. 62
3.68
0. 85
5.34
0. 53
n1
1.43
0. 223

0. 90
Legislative Effectiveness
l5
3.14
2. 313 
1.68
1. 8664
3.00
0. 26
4.44
0. 98
4.85
0. 43
n5
1.04
0. 064

1. 00
Legislative Selection
l6
2.43
4. 869
l1
0.29
0. 338
1.44
0. 3970
10.61
0. 74
1.91
0. 71
2.61
0. 54
n7
0.32
0. 023

1. 00
Major Constitutional Changes
l2
3.05
0. 504 
1.26
0. 0181
2.39
0. 32
2.96
0. 89
3.52
0. 51
n5
0.14
0. 010

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
l8
3.46
0. 112
l2
2.42
0. 073
2.27
0. 1448
6.59
0. 37
4.64
0. 92
2.77
0. 22
n6
1.60
0. 247

0. 80
Purges
l
1.66
0. 013 
0.11
0. 0032
2.57
0. 34
3.08
0. 57
4.45
0. 53
n6
0.80
0. 121

1. 00
Size of the Cabinet
l2
4.64
0. 051 
0.98
0. 0047
3.17
0. 32
5.46
0. 64
4.63
0. 55
n7
0.28
0. 011

0. 90
Table 14.b. reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t   x i,tl dD i,tlx i,tl y t1 c x i,t1u t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 y tn.
 and capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
D it is a slope dummy defined as D it  1 in the period: 1939-2003 (for legislative selection); .
1889-2003 (for number of cabinet changes), and D it  0 otherwise.
x i,tl is a formal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 16 Direct Effect of Financial Development and Political Instabilities
on Economic Growth
k fd pi    
M1
Assassination
5.07
0. 006
l6
2.56
1. 56
l8
3.31
0. 001
3.69
0. 86
5.07
0. 41
n5
1.43
0. 086

1. 00
Number of the Coups
4.57
0. 011
l6
3.84
1. 09
l7
2.08
0. 093
6.15
0. 71
2.97
0. 32
n4
2.60
0. 254

0. 90
Number of Cabinet Changes
6.43
0. 013
l6
3.75
0. 85
l8
3.22
0. 414
3.47
0. 73
2.74
0. 30
n4
2.92
0. 244

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
18.78
0. 008
l6
2.67
0. 96
l6
9.99
1. 551
4.77
0. 89
2.80
0. 21
n4
2.19
0. 180

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
Assassination
4.70
0. 012
l3
4.68
3. 00
l8
2.44
0. 012
3.05
0. 57
3.43
0. 39
n6
3.10
0. 226

1. 00
Number of the Coups
2.72
0. 003
l3
1.73
0. 93
l7
0.85
0. 116
2.29
0. 62
4.41
0. 65
n5
0.94
0. 051

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
3.60
0. 016
l3
3.18
0. 22
l8
0.79
0. 055
2.04
0. 33
3.07
0. 47
n6
1.51
0. 217

0. 90
Legislative Effectiveness
6.42
0. 005
l3
4.92
0. 16
l6
2.88
2. 354
4.21
0. 75
3.39
0. 39
n4
1.76
0. 150

0. 90
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
Assassination
5.53
0. 004
l2
2.88
0. 26
l8
1.68
0. 015
2.50
0. 93
1.92
0. 28
n3
0.99
0. 100

1. 00
Number of the Coups
8.73
0. 003
l2
5.75
0. 30
l1
1.93
0. 055
3.36
0. 90
3.88
0. 36
n5
0.81
0. 021

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
1.85
0. 003
l2
3.04
0. 24
l8
2.01
0. 087
2.17
0. 99
1.62
0. 26
n6
0.84
0. 088

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
5.23
0. 005
l2
2.39
0. 12
l6
3.90
1. 356
4.43
0. 99
2.22
0. 20
n6
2.53
0. 092

1. 00
Table 16 reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k loghtfdx fd,tl pix pi,tl t,
ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 ytn ,
parameter estimates x fd,tl indicates a financial development variable,
x pi,tl is a political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 16.1 Direct Effect of Assassination, Commercial Bank Deposits,
Trade Openness, Public Deficits and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k fd pi to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
2.97
0. 001
l3
1.70
0. 211
l8
1.86
0. 016
l3
0.40
0. 023
l4
0.19
0. 001
l5
5.95
0. 0018
3.06
0. 55
3.29
0. 31
n6
1.51
0. 148

1. 00
Revenues
4.06
0. 003
l4
1.61
0. 136
l8
2.43
0. 013
l3
1.53
0. 050
l3
1.01
0. 002
l5
7.91
0. 0020
4.18
1. 00
4.93
0. 40
n3
1.00
0. 120

1. 00
Public Deficits
16.00
0. 006
l7
2.38
0. 140
l8
2.75
0. 014
l3
1.27
0. 044
l8
0.22
0. 025
l5
7.35
0. 0018
2.61
0. 91
3.03
0. 32
n5
0.83
0. 037

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
7.87
0. 008
l7
5.17
0. 169
l8
4.51
0. 013
l3
0.28
0. 009
l4
1.96
0. 058
l5
7.59
0. 0017
3.15
0. 86
3.38
0. 30
n3
1.40
0. 134

1. 00
Revenues
6.04
0. 010
l7
3.31
0. 176
l8
5.63
0. 013
l3
0.28
0. 010
l3
3.81
0. 005
l5
8.75
0. 0018
3.25
0. 96
3.17
0. 24
n3
1.79
0. 132

1. 00
Public Deficits
15.24
0. 009
l7
3.89
0. 199
l8
3.84
0. 015
l3
0.93
0. 054
l5
0.44
0. 044
l5
6.78
0. 0019
3.14
0. 74
4.12
0. 35
n4
0.75
0. 078

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
6.69
0. 008
l7
2.46
0. 148
l8
2.37
0. 018
l2
1.49
0. 019
l4
1.50
0. 006
l5
8.29
0. 0020
3.00
0. 85
3.65
0. 29
n8
0.07
0. 003

1. 00
Revenues
9.63
0. 006
l7
3.95
0. 194
l8
8.44
0. 017
l2
0.48
0. 003
l3
5.25
0. 004
l5
8.71
0. 0019
4.60
0. 97
4.39
0. 31
n5
1.58
0. 082

1. 00
Public Deficits
15.65
0. 007
l7
2.80
0. 175
l8
3.08
0. 013
l2
0.56
0. 010
l8
0.310
0. 029
l5
6.53
0. 0018
2.93
0. 88
4.07
0. 33
n5
1.92
0. 081

1. 00
Table 16.1 reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k loghtfdx fd,tl pix pi,tl tox to,tl pdx pd,tl usx us,tl t,
ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 ytn ,
where x fd,tl is commercial bank deposits, x pi,tl indicates the assassination,
x to,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), x pd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures), and x us,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 16.2 Direct Effect of Legislative Effectiveness, Commercial Bank Deposits,
Trade Openness, Public Deficits and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k fd pi to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
4.56
0. 004
l4
3.58
0. 165
l6
3.39
1. 531
l3
2.27
0. 060
l6
3.85
0. 006
l5
3.81
0. 0013
4.58
0. 96
3.70
0. 34
n6
1.85
0. 092

1. 00
Revenues
5.02
0. 005
l4
2.65
0. 204
l6
1.85
1. 112
l3
2.11
0. 071
l6
3.59
0. 005
l5
6.25
0. 0013
3.51
0. 87
2.81
0. 31
n6
2.01
0. 109

1. 00
Public Deficits
7.45
0. 004
l4
2.49
0. 225
l6
2.61
1. 667
l3
0.96
0. 044
l8
2.18
0. 118
l5
3.61
0. 0012
4.10
0. 80
4.55
0. 38
n4
3.15
0. 151

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
4.39
0. 007
l4
2.65
0. 239
l6
2.26
1. 451
l3
0.33
0. 014
l4
1.08
0. 002
l5
2.47
0. 0009
4.15
0. 85
2.98
0. 31
n6
1.91
0. 101

1. 00
Revenues
5.02
0. 005
l4
2.65
0. 204
l6
1.85
1. 112
l3
2.11
0. 071
l6
3.59
0. 005
l5
6.25
0. 0013
3.51
0. 87
2.81
0. 31
n6
2.01
0. 109

1. 00
Public Deficits
2.43
0. 007
l4
1.76
0. 189
l6
3.89
1. 414
l3
0.33
0. 031
l8
2.58
0. 216
l5
2.45
0. 0012
3.75
0. 70
4.38
0. 40
n4
1.77
0. 110

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
16.11
0. 007
l4
2.22
0. 204
l6
2.04
1. 318
l3
1.20
0. 029
l6
2.62
0. 005
l5
2.48
0. 0015
2.97
0. 78
2.58
0. 36
n6
1.27
0. 078

1. 00
Revenues
4.50
0. 005
l4
3.13
0. 145
l6
3.54
1. 600
l3
3.27
0. 032
l6
5.73
0. 005
l5
4.16
0. 0010
4.74
0. 97
3.57
0. 32
n6
2.56
0. 127

1. 00
Public Deficits
5.30
0. 007
l2
3.00
0. 097
l6
2.30
1. 278
l3
1.48
0. 013
l8
3.76
0. 189
l5
3.50
0. 0013
3.20
1. 00
2.09
0. 28
n3
1.61
0. 107

1. 00
Table 16.2 reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k loghtfdx fd,tl pix pi,tl tox to,tl pdx pd,tl usx us,tl t,
ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 ytn .
where x fd,tl is commercial bank deposits, x pi,tl is the legislative effectiveness,
x to,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), x pd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures), and x us,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 17 Indirect Effect of Financial Development and Political Instabilities
on Economic Growth
k   fd pi  
M1
Assassination
11.37
0. 009
5.04
0. 77
4.42
0. 37
l6
4.75
1. 381
l7
4.32
0. 019
n6
2.63
0. 203

1. 00
Number of the Coups
4.12
0. 009
3.78
0. 55
4.84
0. 48
l6
0.02
0. 006
l8
1.60
0. 169
n6
0.33
0. 012

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
6.44
0. 006
4.40
0. 39
3.42
0. 31
l6
1.99
1. 046
l1
6.32
0. 385
n8
0.49
0. 028

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
5.81
0. 012
2.94
0. 55
2.57
0. 32
l6
2.83
0. 930
l8
1.89
0. 843
n7
2.36
0. 185

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
Assassination
3.94
0. 013
2.76
0. 43
3.26
0. 43
l1
2.96
0. 069
l7
2.82
0. 008
n4
1.30
0. 259

1. 00
Number of the Coups
4.54
0. 005
4.30
0. 46
7.77
0. 60
l1
9.34
0. 069
l3
0.29
0. 054
n1
1.41
0. 143

0. 80
Number of Cabinet Changes
4.95
0. 006
2.02
0. 33
3.00
0. 50
l1
1.68
0. 067
l1
6.75
0. 271
n8
0.18
0. 100

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
6.09
0. 007
4.16
0. 59
3.85
0. 47
l1
6.00
0. 039
l3
2.32
1. 101
n1
1.00
0. 094

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
Assassination
4.55
0. 006
2.67
0. 56
1.65
0. 26
l4
6.22
0. 888
l7
4.32
0. 012
n4
1.00
0. 132

1. 00
Number of the Coups
4.83
0. 004
1.81
0. 49
1.83
0. 42
l4
2.89
0. 768
l8
0.24
0. 004
n3
0.48
0. 066

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
9.25
0. 006
4.65
0. 68
3.67
0. 16
l4
6.07
0. 890
l1
8.73
0. 202
n6
0.29
0. 005

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
5.90
0. 002
6.49
0. 55
7.10
0. 34
l4
5.05
0. 671
l3
2.67
1. 400
n5
2.44
0. 137

1. 00
Table 17. reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model:
yt  c k loghtt,
ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 fdx fd,tl pix pi,tl ytn ,
where x fd,tl indicates a financial development variable, x pi,tl is a political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 17.1 Indirect Effect of Assassination, Deposits at Banco do Brasil,
Trade Openness, Public Deficits and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k   fd pi to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
4.48
0. 005
2.33
0. 32
5.12
0. 61
l4
2.11
0. 537
l5
2.93
0. 005
l2
2.35
0. 154
l3
2.45
0. 004
l8
3.08
0. 0015
n6
1.47
0. 047

1. 00
Revenues
3.62
0. 005
2.29
0. 26
6.25
0. 59
l4
2.18
0. 558
l5
1.75
0. 003
l2
3.85
0. 185
l3
4.25
0. 007
l8
3.11
0. 0016
n4
1.13
0. 076

1. 00
Public Deficits
4.07
0. 004
2.76
0. 21
2.79
0. 17
l4
5.45
0. 613
l5
4.17
0. 008
l2
6.58
0. 433
l3
3.59
0. 457
l8
2.53
0. 0017
n3
0.43
0. 021

0. 90
Imports
Expenditures
6.11
0. 007
1.98
0. 20
3.54
0. 45
l4
5.39
0. 734
l5
1.22
0. 003
l8
1.35
0. 257
l7
1.12
0. 003
l8
1.57
0. 0009
n7
0.99
0. 029

1. 00
Revenues
3.46
0. 003
1.61
0. 14
5.38
0. 62
l4
2.87
0. 491
l5
1.61
0. 004
l8
1.91
0. 378
l3
2.25
0. 006
l8
2.34
0. 0013
n3
1.34
0. 037

1. 00
Public Deficits
3.06
0. 002
3.09
0. 37
4.81
0. 44
l4
2.50
0. 679
l5
4.02
0. 006
l8
3.03
0. 431
l8
1.10
0. 118
l8
2.57
0. 0008
n4
1.23
0. 101

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
5.63
0. 009
1.73
0. 28
3.87
0. 53
l4
5.15
0. 700
l5
1.69
0. 002
l6
0.12
0. 010
l3
6.00
0. 010
l8
3.68
0. 0018
n6
1.44
0. 049

1. 00
Revenues
5.66
0. 007
2.32
0. 42
2.98
0. 38
l4
3.87
0. 730
l5
2.99
0. 004
l6
0.43
0. 045
l4
3.97
0. 004
l8
1.55
0. 0012
n8
0.01
0. 001

1. 00
Public Deficits
3.51
0. 002
1.93
0. 16
3.68
0. 61
l4
2.45
0. 531
l5
4.76
0. 005
l8
2.21
0. 243
l3
2.41
0. 168
l8
2.02
0. 0013
n3
0.06
0. 002

1. 00
Table 17.1 reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: yt  c k loghtt,
ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 fdx fd,tl pix pi,tl tox to,tl pdx pd,tl
usx us,tl ytn , where x fd,tl indicates deposits at banco do brasil, x pi,tl is the assassination,
x to,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficits and x us,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 17.2 Indirect Effect of Legislative Effectiveness, Deposits at Banco do Brasil,
Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k   fd pi to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
4.65
0. 004
2.20
0. 22
6.94
0. 64
l4
3.65
0. 488
l4
1.61
0. 635
l2
5.13
0. 143
l3
6.46
0. 005
l8
7.95
0. 0016
n3
0.38
0. 021

1. 00
Revenues
2.49
0. 002
4.99
0. 40
9.16
0. 51
l4
3.11
0. 543
l4
0.40
0. 330
l2
3.82
0. 135
l3
3.30
0. 006
l8
2.93
0. 0009
n6
0.42
0. 037

1. 00
Public Deficits
3.95
0. 002
2.13
0. 20
8.78
0. 45
l4
3.66
0. 408
l4
3.74
1. 543
l2
3.02
0. 147
l2
9.67
0. 431
l8
3.10
0. 0009
n6
2.91
0. 127

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
3.10
0. 006
1.62
0. 16
5.66
0. 52
l4
4.04
0. 707
l4
2.01
0. 946
l8
1.60
0. 268
l3
4.21
0. 008
l8
3.45
0. 0017
n8
0.90
0. 032

1. 00
Revenues
3.22
0. 002
1.65
0. 16
6.17
0. 61
l4
3.06
0. 714
l4
1.87
1. 081
l8
2.31
0. 313
l7
2.76
0. 006
l8
2.77
0. 0009
n4
1.33
0. 112

0. 90
Public Deficits
6.03
0. 004
2.90
0. 26
9.19
0. 49
l4
5.80
0. 740
l4
2.01
0. 785
l8
1.81
0. 211
l2
2.69
0. 064
l8
2.46
0. 0007
n5
1.27
0. 064

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
6.10
0. 005
3.42
0. 33
7.01
0. 57
l4
5.26
0. 473
l4
2.50
0. 977
l8
3.68
0. 187
l3
4.56
0. 005
l8
5.60
0. 0018
n8
1.70
0. 063

0. 90
Revenues
3.37
0. 003
1.63
0. 19
8.27
0. 62
l4
3.45
0. 616
l4
3.60
0. 834
l8
2.50
0. 126
l3
4.53
0. 006
l8
3.00
0. 0014
n6
1.04
0. 044

0. 90
Public Deficits
6.33
0. 007
2.25
0. 16
4.72
0. 47
l4
9.86
0. 844
l4
1.88
0. 782
l8
2.24
0. 179
l8
2.47
0. 173
l8
4.10
0. 0015
n7
0.16
0. 004

1. 00
Table 17.2 reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: yt  c k loghtt,
ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 fdx fd,tl pix pi,tl tox to,tl pdx pd,tl
usx us,tl ytn , where x fd,tl indicates deposits at banco do brasil, x pi,tl is legislative effectiveness,
x to,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), x pd,tl is public deficits and x us,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 18 The Short- and Long-run Effects of Financial Development and Political Instability 
on Growth 
 
Table 18 The Short- and Long-run Effects of Financial Development and Political
Instabilities on Growth
x it  fd pi fd pi     
M1
Assassination
l1
2.57
0. 945
l5
7.79
0. 011
9.47
0. 881
1.75
0. 001
21.74
1. 09
5.95
1. 25
2.89
0. 20
n4
2.83
0. 146

1. 00
Number of Coups
l1
2.39
0. 984
l5
4.76
0. 021
9.72
0. 854
0.07
0. 001
12.80
1. 12
3.66
1. 23
1.82
0. 21
n5
4.02
0. 190

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
l3
4.70
0. 809
l4
1.98
0. 030
31.02
0. 691
2.31
0. 009
14.69
0. 66
6.46
1. 28
2.91
0. 13
n5
3.22
0. 181

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
l3
4.30
1. 210
l8
1.70
1. 037
6.72
0. 790
2.48
0. 792
8.76
0. 80
3.20
0. 81
2.09
0. 24
n4
0.97
0. 035

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
Assassination
l6
2.64
0. 236
l8
3.05
0. 015
1.72
0. 014
1.37
0. 022
6.19
0. 44
3.39
0. 87
1.61
0. 11
n8
0.77
0. 040

1. 00
Number of Coups
l7
2.03
0. 135
l5
15.33
0. 053
1.80
0. 013
1.41
0. 007
9.03
0. 41
2.80
1. 36
4.78
0. 17
n5
4.65
0. 339

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
l3
4.70
0. 809
l4
1.98
0. 030
31.02
0. 691
2.32
0. 009
14.69
0. 66
6.46
1. 28
2.91
0. 13
n5
3.22
0. 181

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
l3
3.59
0. 453
l8
1.86
1. 384
6.72
0. 790
2.48
0. 792
10.45
0. 87
3.03
0. 64
1.67
0. 18
n4
0.33
0. 015

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
Assassination
l1
2.57
0. 945
l5
7.79
0. 011
0.08
0. 031
0.16
0. 001
21.74
1. 09
5.95
1. 25
2.89
0. 20
n4
2.83
0. 146

1. 00
Number of Coups
l3
2.07
0. 682
l5
7.62
0. 040
0.71
0. 126
3.67
0. 042
10.93
0. 64
2.48
0. 84
1.88
0. 11
n5
3.36
0. 141

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
l3
1.61
0. 208
l2
0.26
0. 005
1.05
0. 175
2.07
0. 102
3.13
0. 30
4.50
0. 58
10.03
0. 64
n3
0.21
0. 012

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
l3
3.32
0. 879
l8
2.91
2. 493
0.32
0. 065
0.20
0. 141
5.06
0. 44
4.25
0. 93
2.49
0. 17
n4
0.84
0. 055

1. 00
Table 18 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt   fdx fd,tl pix pi,tl yt1  c fdx fd,t1 pix pi,t1t,
ht

2  |ut1 |
 ht1

2 ytn ,
iand i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
 indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
x fd,tl indicates a financial development variable (any of the three measures),
and x pi,tl is a political instability variable (or one of its elements).
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 18.1 The Short- and Long-run Effects of Commercial Bank Deposits, Political Instability, Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on 
Growth 
Table 18.1 The Short- and Long-run Effects of Commercial Bank Deposits, Political Instability,
Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Growth
x it  fd pi to pd us fd pi pd us 
Expenditures
Assassinations
l4
2.51
0. 090
l8
10.96
0. 012
l5
1.67
0. 041
l7
0.64
0. 001
l5
4.75
0. 0009
2.53
0. 035
1.02
0. 003
6.63
0. 011
9.18
4. 1  104
9.96
0. 61
Legislative Effectiveness
l4
3.17
0. 171
l5
4.48
1. 832
l5
4.29
0. 093
l6
1.61
0. 003
l7
1.77
0. 0006
1.88
0. 030
2.55
1. 013
6.99
0. 009
6.54
3. 8  104
10.18
0. 52
Revenues
Assassinations
l6
5.00
0. 162
l8
10.10
0. 014
l5
3.00
0. 096
l4
3.14
0. 013
l5
5.32
0. 0010
3.70
0. 064
1.09
0. 005
3.80
0. 013
3.51
3. 0  104
10.75
0. 61
Legislative Effectiveness
l4
3.26
0. 202
l5
2.48
3. 311
l5
2.19
0. 083
l1
0.70
0. 002
l5
2.03
0. 0006
2.06
0. 076
1.37
1. 016
2.41
0. 004
2.75
9. 2  105
5.39
0. 44
Table 18.1 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t   fdx fd,tl pixpi,tl pdxpd,tl tox to,tl usxus,tl 
y t1 c fdx fd,t1 pixpi,t1 pdxpd,t1 usxus,t1t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 y tn,
where i and i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
x fd,tl is commercial bank deposits, xpi,tl is either assassinations or legislative effectiveness, xpd,tl is public deficit (one of
its elements), x to,tl is trade openness and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively. ,, n and  are not reported.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 19 Direct Effect of Financial Development and Political Instability on Economic 
Growth with Dummy Variables 
 
Table 19 Direct Effect of Financial Development and Political Instability
on Economic Growth with Dummy Variables
k c1 fd pi pid    
M1
Assassinations
2.39
0. 004
5.02
0. 028
l6
2.61
0. 66
l8
4.06
0. 019
l8
2.54
0. 0079
3.45
0. 79
2.82
0. 35
n1
1.32
0. 223

0. 80
Number of Coups
5.75
0. 007
7.84
0. 021
l6
1.87
0. 53
l8
3.30
0. 037 
5.10
1. 13
2.46
0. 14
n8
1.21
0. 052

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
29.36
0. 005
12.07
0. 024
l6
3.00
0. 47
l2
6.28
0. 011
l8
0.11
0. 0003
7.34
1. 17
3.05
0. 14
n8
0.33
0. 032

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
4.50
0. 005
3.60
0. 012
l6
3.83
1. 09
l4
3.16
1. 426 
6.01
1. 00
2.60
0. 25
n4
2.85
0. 135

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
Assassinations
4.14
0. 007
6.69
0. 024
l3
4.64
0. 23
l8
9.30
0. 023
l8
3.07
0. 0068
3.89
0. 76
2.10
0. 17
n6
1.73
0. 123

0. 80
Number of Coups
9.34
0. 008
4.57
0. 017
l3
3.31
0. 16
l1
2.41
0. 431 
4.14
0. 97
2.70
0. 17
n6
2.47
0. 092

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
3.87
0. 002
3.89
0. 020
l3
5.32
0. 33
l3
2.98
0. 009
l3
1.05
0. 0053
4.09
0. 85
2.97
0. 27
n5
0.93
0. 050

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
3.15
0. 005
4.01
0. 017
l3
3.13
0. 26
l2
1.78
0. 936 
3.22
0. 77
2.54
0. 34
n5
2.07
0. 070

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
Assassinations
5.68
0. 011
4.32
0. 021
l4
3.67
0. 31
l8
3.48
0. 022
l8
1.56
0. 0052
8.75
0. 78
1.91
0. 21
n3
1.33
0. 090

0. 80
Number of Coups
3.12
0. 003
5.44
0. 021
l4
1.78
0. 16
l1
2.04
0. 035 
3.29
1. 02
2.90
0. 36
n4
0.31
0. 024

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
3.25
0. 002
3.28
0. 018
l4
10.00
0. 21
l2
3.00
0. 007
l2
0.91
0. 0051
3.06
0. 91
2.89
0. 35
n7
0.54
0. 017

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
5.12
0. 005
7.18
0. 019
l4
2.74
0. 14
l7
2.01
0. 358 
5.66
1. 13
3.87
0. 23
n6
0.92
0. 027

1. 00
Table 19 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c c1D1t kh t fdx fd,tl pixpi,tl pidD i,tlxpi,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 y tn ,
x fd,tl indicates a financial development variable, and xpi,tl is a political instabilty variable.
D1t is an intercept dummy defined as D1t  1 in the period 1938 - 2003, and D1t  0 otherwise.
D i,t are intercept dummies defined as D i,t  1 in the period 1978 -2003 and 1889-2003 for assassinations
and number of cabinet changes respectively, D i,t  0 otherwise.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 19.1 Direct Effect of Commercial Bank Deposits, Assassinations, Trade Openness, 
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth with a Dummy Variable 
 
Table 19.1 Direct Effect of Commercial Bank Deposits, Assassinations, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth with a Dummy Variable
k c1 fd pi to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
8.42
0. 007
4.77
0. 019
l3
2.59
0. 142
l2
1.94
0. 005
l3
0.01
0. 0003
l4
2.90
0. 004
l5
3.33
0. 0010
3.70
0. 99
2.15
0. 16
n6
1.64
0. 058

1. 00
Revenues
6.12
0. 005
3.93
0. 020
l3
2.36
0. 131
l8
5.44
0. 018
l3
0.57
0. 0157
l3
3.07
0. 007
l5
5.86
0. 0015
3.00
0. 84
2.30
0. 25
n5
1.78
0. 082

0. 90
Public Deficit
6.00
0. 005
11.01
0. 020
l3
6.82
0. 120
l8
8.64
0. 016
l3
0.14
0. 0032
l1
0.85
0. 033
l5
5.66
0. 0016
4.89
0. 96
2.92
0. 19
n6
1.95
0. 127

0. 80
Imports
Expenditures
5.34
0. 006
5.56
0. 014
l3
2.35
0. 099
l8
6.67
0. 016
l3
1.48
0. 0549
l4
1.74
0. 004
l5
5.65
0. 0015
2.22
0. 89
1.77
0. 26
n6
0.80
0. 044

1. 00
Revenues
9.42
0. 006
5.89
0. 017
l7
1.65
0. 113
l8
5.92
0. 013
l3
0.45
0. 0181
l3
3.12
0. 004
l5
7.76
0. 0013
3.30
1. 03
1.74
0. 20
n6
0.79
0. 032

1. 00
Public Deficit
8.20
0. 006
5.20
0. 016
l7
2.17
0. 133
l8
7.44
0. 010
l3
1.01
0. 0362
l5
6.46
0. 027
l5
7.00
0. 0012
4.49
0. 87
3.36
0. 27
n4
2.78
0. 184

0. 90
Trade Openness
Expenditures
7.87
0. 006
3.60
0. 012
l7
3.63
0. 144
l8
11.45
0. 013
l2
0.96
0. 0080
l4
2.59
0. 003
l5
4.18
0. 0014
3.38
1. 09
2.51
0. 28
n3
0.91
0. 064

1. 00
Revenues
5.91
0. 005
3.66
0. 015
l7
2.61
0. 108
l8
7.53
0. 014
l3
0.64
0. 0109
l3
5.28
0. 004
l5
4.88
0. 0014
2.39
0. 85
2.70
0. 33
n6
1.43
0. 074

1. 00
Public Deficit
3.77
0. 006
2.02
0. 012
l7
1.69
0. 095
l8
3.74
0. 012
l3
0.91
0. 0137
l5
0.33
0. 023
l5
7.60
0. 0014
2.15
0. 88
2.57
0. 33
n2
0.07
0. 005

1. 00
Table 19.1 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c c1D1t kh t fdx fd,tl pixpi,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 y tn ,
x fd,tl is commercial bank deposits, xpi,tl is the assassinations, x to,tl is trade openness (or one of its
elements), xpd,tl is the public deficit (any of the three measures) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
D1t is an intercept dummy defined as D1t  1 in the period 1938 - 2003 and D1t  0 otherwise.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 19.2 Direct Effect of Commercial Bank Deposits, Legislative Effectiveness, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth with a Dummy Variable
k c1 fd pi to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
10.24
0. 002
4.90
0. 014
l4
2.39
0. 158
l6
2.75
0. 959
l3
1.73
0. 053
l6
3.01
0. 002
l5
5.35
0. 0009
3.99
0. 86
3.86
0. 37
n3
0.83
0. 060

0. 80
Revenues
2.33
0. 003
4.84
0. 014
l4
2.06
0. 128
l6
1.77
0. 798
l3
2.73
0. 056
l6
1.64
0. 003
l5
5.08
0. 0009
3.79
0. 96
3.82
0. 39
n1
0.51
0. 075

0. 90
Public Deficit
2.32
0. 003
4.26
0. 016
l4
2.10
0. 200
l6
2.42
0. 953
l3
1.77
0. 038
l5
1.11
0. 038
l5
2.63
0. 0008
4.11
0. 81
3.56
0. 32
n6
0.50
0. 025

0. 80
Imports
Expenditures
2.46
0. 001
8.82
0. 035
l4
2.28
0. 130
l6
5.62
2. 008
l3
1.37
0. 053
l6
1.76
0. 030
l5
2.48
0. 0013
4.32
0. 72
4.41
0. 47
n6
0.23
0. 025

0. 80
Revenues
3.27
0. 003
5.18
0. 015
l4
2.01
0. 150
l6
3.76
0. 806
l3
1.27
0. 031
l6
3.52
0. 003
l5
4.49
0. 0008
3.84
0. 87
4.19
0. 40
n3
0.68
0. 057

0. 80
Public Deficit
3.61
0. 005
5.81
0. 015
l4
3.61
0. 310
l6
2.52
1. 178
l3
1.08
0. 058
l8
2.28
0. 249
l5
3.26
0. 0009
5.45
0. 76
2.83
0. 25
n5
2.92
0. 177

0. 80
Trade Openness
Expenditures
15.46
0. 003
4.58
0. 012
l4
2.11
0. 131
l6
1.99
0. 969
l3
1.63
0. 032
l6
3.05
0. 004
l5
4.38
0. 0011
4.08
0. 97
4.16
0. 35
n6
1.18
0. 053

1. 00
Revenues
11.43
0. 002
5.29
0. 016
l4
2.13
0. 146
l6
2.35
0. 763
l3
1.35
0. 026
l6
3.33
0. 003
l5
4.27
0. 0010
4.27
0. 85
4.46
0. 41
n7
0.36
0. 023

0. 80
Public Deficit
3.96
0. 006
6.52
0. 015
l4
3.01
0. 198
l6
3.53
1. 102
l3
0.15
0. 003
l6
5.97
0. 267
l5
3.00
0. 0007
4.84
0. 82
2.76
0. 25
n6
1.44
0. 093

0. 80
Table 19.2 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c c1D1t kh t fdx fd,tl pixpi,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 y tn ,
x fd,tl is commercial bank deposits, xpi,tl is the legislative effectiveness, x to,tl is trade openness (or one
of its elements), xpd,tl is the public deficit (any of the three measures) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
D1t is an intercept dummy defined as D1t  1 in the period 1938 - 2003, and D1t  0 otherwise.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 20 Indirect Effect of Financial Development and Political Instability
on Economic Growth with Dummy Variables
k c1   fd pi pid  
M1
Assassinations
25.55
0. 006
14.75
0. 029
7.44
1. 09
2.59
0. 12
l6
2.89
0. 721
l8
6.04
0. 023
l8
6.38
0. 018
n4
3.02
0. 140

1. 00
Number of Coups
9.72
0. 006
5.68
0. 021
3.62
0. 85
3.02
0. 32
l6
0.78
0. 252
l8
0.16
0. 003 
n6
1.51
0. 083

0. 80
Number of Cabinet Changes
9.26
0. 010
4.62
0. 024
3.53
0. 59
1.92
0. 22
l6
2.21
0. 957
l1
3.75
0. 025
l3
0.69
0. 005
n8
1.14
0. 047

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
3.83
0. 007
5.34
0. 022
3.94
0. 90
2.37
0. 28
l6
0.29
0. 082
l7
1.22
0. 369 
n8
1.52
0. 041

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
Assassinations
6.42
0. 003
4.89
0. 034
1.77
0. 44
1.87
0. 41
l1
5.36
0. 212
l5
2.17
0. 013
l5
1.45
0. 010
n1
1.54
0. 303

0. 80
Number of Coups
4.00
0. 006
3.76
0. 022
3.14
0. 93
2.62
0. 29
l1
4.39
0. 124
l8
0.22
0. 002 
n6
0.93
0. 062

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
3.91
0. 007
2.11
0. 023
3.00
0. 20
3.57
0. 64
l1
2.48
0. 131
l2
1.72
0. 014
l1
1.24
0. 011
n8
0.97
0. 138

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
5.02
0. 009
5.27
0. 022
3.49
0. 84
1.87
0. 17
l1
2.49
0. 045
l7
2.72
0. 347 
n8
1.25
0. 024

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
Assassinations
7.37
0. 006
3.19
0. 010
3.25
0. 67
2.25
0. 24
l4
4.36
0. 836
l8
3.09
0. 013
l8
4.04
0. 012
n6
0.21
0. 006

1. 00
Number of Coups
3.07
0. 001
6.06
0. 027
3.19
0. 81
3.08
0. 39
l4
4.01
0. 771
l7
2.18
0. 039 
n4
0.67
0. 052

0. 90
Number of Cabinet Changes
18.31
0. 003
2.78
0. 019
2.94
0. 84
3.66
0. 35
l4
2.81
0. 348
l1
1.71
0. 004
l3
0.24
0. 002
n3
0.35
0. 025

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
6.33
0. 006
2.37
0. 014
2.90
0. 33
5.86
0. 44
l4
9.95
0. 981
l6
2.44
1. 075 
n8
0.24
0. 008

0. 90
Table 20 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c c1D1t kh t t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 fdx fd,tl pixpi,tl pidD i,tlxpi,tl y tn,
where x fd,tl indicates a financial development variable, xpi,tl is a political instability variable,
D1t is an intercept dummy defined as D1t  1 in the period 1938 - 2003 and D1t  0 otherwise.
D i,t are intercept dummies defined as D i,t  1 in the period 1978 -2003 and 1889-2003 for assassinations
and number of cabinet changes respectively, D i,t  0 otherwise.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 20.1 Indirect Effect of Deposits at Banco do Brasil, Assassinations, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth with a Dummy Variable
k c1   fd pi to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
5.71
0. 005
2.74
0. 011
2.86
0. 17
5.22
0. 32
l4
14.04
1. 600
l5
4.53
0. 011
l2
4.98
0. 400
l4
3.57
0. 008
l8
1.87
0. 0011
n4
5.77
0. 312

0. 80
Revenues
3.69
0. 003
3.58
0. 019
1.61
0. 10
4.62
0. 49
l4
2.52
0. 794
l5
4.07
0. 019
l2
3.27
0. 548
l3
0.49
0. 002
l8
2.47
0. 0021
n5
0.76
0. 059

0. 80
Public Deficit
4.81
0. 004
4.69
0. 021
1.71
0. 10
2.86
0. 44
l4
2.61
0. 527
l5
3.67
0. 010
l2
6.08
0. 599
l3
6.04
0. 844
l8
3.12
0. 0021
n6
1.02
0. 073

0. 80
Imports
Expenditures
5.72
0. 004
4.50
0. 021
3.60
0. 46
2.75
0. 37
l4
2.65
0. 723
l5
3.15
0. 011
l8
1.81
0. 398
l4
1.38
0. 006
l8
2.50
0. 0019
n8
0.11
0. 011

0. 80
Revenues
6.27
0. 006
2.98
0. 019
2.91
0. 36
2.75
0. 39
l4
1.91
0. 477
l5
1.75
0. 007
l8
2.01
0. 464
l8
2.62
0. 008
l8
2.42
0. 0023
n8
0.48
0. 045

0. 80
Public Deficit
10.81
0. 005
4.99
0. 019
4.19
0. 58
2.24
0. 29
l4
2.96
0. 855
l5
3.88
0. 010
l8
1.54
0. 300
l6
3.34
0. 212
l8
2.53
0. 0019
n8
0.30
0. 023

0. 80
Trade Openness
Expenditures
6.07
0. 006
3.89
0. 018
2.26
0. 22
1.74
0. 30
l4
4.95
0. 782
l5
6.12
0. 009
l8
.69
0. 143
l4
1.57
0. 003
l8
2.45
0. 0014
n4
1.53
0. 051

1. 00
Revenues
5.78
0. 006
4.78
0. 020
4.88
0. 66
2.14
0. 26
l4
4.38
0. 795
l5
3.35
0. 009
l5
0.80
0. 075
l6
2.42
0. 005
l8
1.76
0. 0014
n8
0.06
0. 004

0. 80
Public Deficit
5.89
0. 007
3.41
0. 020
3.55
0. 22
8.25
0. 54
l1
2.23
0. 125
l5
5.01
0. 011
l8
1.73
0. 254
l8
3.11
0. 629
l8
5.04
0. 0019
n8
0.73
0. 027

0. 80
Table 20.1 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c c1D1t kh t t , h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 
fdx fd,tl pixpi,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl y tn,
where x fd,tl indicates deposits at banco do brasil, xpi,tl is the assassinations, x to,tl is trade openness
(or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the three measures) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
D1t is an intercept dummy defined as D1t  1 in the period 1938 - 2003, and D1t  0 otherwise.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 20.2 Indirect Effect of Deposits at Banco do Brasil, Legislative Effectiveness, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth with a Dummy Variable
k c1   fd pi to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
8.94
0. 007
2.56
0. 010
4.80
0. 42
4.87
0. 34
l4
9.83
1. 193
l4
3.12
1. 218
l2
1.97
0. 127
l3
5.05
0. 010
l8
3.11
0. 0016
n4
0.45
0. 027

0. 80
Revenues
3.82
0. 003
4.70
0. 022
2.12
0. 14
4.55
0. 47
l4
3.20
0. 777
l4
2.49
1. 766
l2
1.58
0. 195
l3
7.01
0. 012
l8
2.32
0. 0018
n6
1.51
0. 108

0. 80
Public Deficit
1.91
0. 001
3.43
0. 022
4.21
0. 27
3.88
0. 35
l5
12.59
1. 013
l4
11.69
1. 911
l2
9.63
0. 523
l3
13.05
0. 716
l8
3.78
0. 0013
n5
1.18
0. 089

0. 80
Imports
Expenditures
4.72
0. 004
4.65
0. 017
4.43
0. 33
6.81
0. 49
l4
4.20
0. 888
l4
2.11
1. 038
l8
1.70
0. 223
l3
6.90
0. 014
l8
1.87
0. 0014
n8
0.28
0. 118

0. 80
Revenues
2.22
0. 001
10.86
0. 022
3.78
0. 27
4.23
0. 27
l4
5.80
1. 207
l4
10.57
2. 072
l8
4.04
0. 384
l2
5.86
0. 009
l8
2.13
0. 0013
n5
4.33
0. 238

0. 80
Public Deficit
2.19
0. 001
4.38
0. 022
3.53
0. 34
7.50
0. 59
l4
4.20
0. 965
l4
2.18
1. 074
l8
2.19
0. 221
l5
2.78
0. 172
l8
2.44
0. 0017
n8
0.02
0. 0010

0. 80
Trade Openness
Expenditures
6.57
0. 005
4.31
0. 017
5.56
0. 55
5.06
0. 38
l4
3.70
0. 392
l4
2.00
0. 693
l8
2.06
0. 063
l3
2.06
0. 006
l8
1.95
0. 0011
n8
0.68
0. 014

1. 00
Revenues
7.68
0. 006
2.07
0. 008
3.68
0. 28
2.45
0. 26
l4
9.24
0. 743
l4
2.66
0. 993
l8
2.24
0. 079
l3
10.41
0. 009
l8
7.02
0. 0020
n8
0.05
0. 001

1. 00
Public Deficit
2.46
0. 002
3.79
0. 013
4.29
0. 31
8.43
0. 54
l4
5.92
0. 291
l2
2.44
0. 912
l8
4.81
0. 156
l8
3.37
0. 035
l8
2.19
0. 0007
n5
3.82
0. 150

1. 00
Table 20.2 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t  c c1D1t kh t t , h t

2  h t1

2  e t1  h t1

2 
fdx fd,tl pixpi,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl y tn,
where x fd,tl indicates deposits at banco do brasil, xpi,tl is the assassinations, x to,tl is trade openness
(or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the three measures) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
D1t is an intercept dummy defined as D1t  1 in the period 1938 - 2003, and D1t  0 otherwise.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 21 The Short- and Long-run Effects of Financial Development and Political
Instability on Growth with Dummy Variables
x it  1 fd pi pid fd pi     
M1
Assassinations
4.23
0. 015
l6
2.84
0. 54
l2
3.33
0. 005
l1
0.54
0. 0008
9.47
0. 881
1.74
0. 001
20.50
1. 18
5.35
0. 99
1.93
0. 18
n5
2.44
0. 098

1. 00
Number of Coups
6.10
0. 015
l6
4.79
0. 93
l5
16.26
0. 040 
9.72
0. 854
0.07
0. 001
15.79
0. 91
3.91
0. 88
2.77
0. 25
n5
4.80
0. 188

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
2.13
0. 012
l6
5.30
1. 03
l3
2.18
0. 048
l5
1.29
0. 0048
31.02
0. 691
2.32
0. 009
11.73
1. 15
3.47
0. 84
2.60
0. 30
n6
0.32
0. 014

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
1.90
0. 011
l6
3.29
0. 71
l8
3.86
1. 742 
6.72
0. 790
2.48
0. 792
5.57
0. 74
4.02
0. 76
2.30
0. 30
n5
1.20
0. 061

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
Assassinations
4.14
0. 016
l6
1.75
0. 12
l2
5.50
0. 013
l1
4.50
0. 0066
1.72
0. 014
1.37
0. 022
11.82
1. 00
3.59
0. 85
3.71
0. 42
n8
0.53
0. 027

1. 00
Number of Coups
1.68
0. 015
l3
5.60
0. 36
l5
3.92
0. 033 
1.80
0. 013
1.41
0. 006
6.77
0. 65
2.72
0. 84
2.29
0. 23
n5
2.78
0. 252

0. 80
Number of Cabinet Changes
2.00
0. 013
l6
3.38
0. 14
l3
2.46
0. 029
l8
0.09
0. 0003
2.19
0. 222
2.06
0. 145
5.65
0. 72
4.14
0. 98
3.72
0. 28
n5
3.07
0. 166

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
6.59
0. 025
l3
3.12
0. 22
l6
1.74
0. 631 
3.37
0. 180
2.39
1. 73
20.14
1. 02
5.34
0. 69
3.15
0. 27
n5
3.38
0. 244

0. 80
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
Assassinations
2.57
0. 013
l4
2.05
0. 38
l2
2.94
0. 007
l1
2.04
0. 0003
0.08
0. 031
0.16
0. 001
12.02
1. 12
4.27
0. 83
3.61
0. 34
n5
2.13
0. 098

1. 00
Number of Coups
6.47
0. 032
l3
2.42
0. 24
l5
2.70
0. 033 
0.71
0. 126
3.67
0. 042
12.50
0. 85
3.57
1. 02
2.61
0. 23
n5
2.69
0. 125

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
7.45
0. 021
l3
1.94
0. 04
l3
1.87
0. 016
l2
2.34
0. 0068
1.05
0. 175
2.07
0. 102
18.85
1. 15
7.20
1. 27
3.35
0. 20
n8
1.59
0. 072

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
3.22
0. 020
l3
2.01
0. 15
l8
2.43
1. 799 
0.32
0. 065
0.20
0. 141
7.12
0. 72
3.83
0. 84
4.59
0. 34
n5
2.01
0. 160

0. 90
Table 21 reports parameter estimates for the following model: y t   1D1t fdx fd,tl pixpi,tl
pidD i.tlxpi,tl y t1 c fdx fd,t1 pixpi,t1t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 y tn.
i and i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively. indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
x fd,tl is a financial development variable (any of the three measures), and xpi,tl is a political instability variable.
D1t is an intercept dummy defined as D1t  1 in the period 1938 - 2003 and D1t  0 otherwise.
D i,t are slope dummies defined as D i,t  1 in the period 1978 -2003 and 1889-2003 for the assassinations and number
of cabinet changes respectively, D i,t  0 otherwise.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively. The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 21.1 The Short- and Long-run Effects of Commercial Bank Deposits, Political Instabilities, Trade Openness
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Growth with a Dummy Variable
x it  1 fd pi to pd us fd pi pd us     
Expenditures
Assassinations
13.21
0. 025
l4
11.04
0. 246
l2
4.50
0. 007
l5
1.64
0. 038
l6
2.35
0. 004
l5
5.01
0. 0007
2.53
0. 035
1.02
0. 003
6.63
0. 011
9.18
4. 1  104
26.83
0. 86
5.16
0. 84
4.70
0. 36
n8
1.48
0. 114

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
3.81
0. 013
l4
6.63
0. 116
l8
2.24
1. 057
l3
2.16
0. 022
l6
2.44
0. 005
l7
3.87
0. 0005
1.88
0. 030
2.55
1. 013
6.99
0. 009
6.54
3. 8  104
11.69
0. 74
4.91
0. 80
4.90
0. 37
n8
1.61
0. 092

0. 80
Revenues
Assassinations
11.82
0. 029
l2
1.69
0. 171
l2
2.00
0. 004
l5
1.58
0. 046
l4
2.50
0. 012
l5
2.75
0. 0007
3.70
0. 064
1.09
0. 005
3.80
0. 013
3.51
3. 0  104
23.51
1. 05
5.25
0. 86
1.95
0. 18
n7
0.81
0. 041

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
7.24
0. 020
l4
4.56
0. 259
l8
2.14
2. 580
l5
2.11
0. 109
l3
1.74
0. 002
l4
2.56
0. 0007
2.06
0. 076
1.37
1. 016
2.41
0. 004
2.75
9. 2  105
10.12
0. 68
4.55
0. 66
4.77
0. 50
n3
1.38
0. 125

0. 80
Table 21.1 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
y t   1D1t fdx fd,tl pixpi,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl 
y t1 c fdx fd,t1 pixpi,t1 pdxpd,t1 usxus,t1t , h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 y tn.
i and i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
x fd,tl is commercial bank deposits, xpi,tl is either assassinations or legislative effectiveness, x to,tl is trade openness,
xpd,tl is public deficit (one of its elements) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
D1t is an intercept dummy defined as D1t  1 in the period 1938 - 2003, and D1t  0 otherwise.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Appendix A: Selected Results From Trivariate 
Estimations – Financial Development, Trade 
Openness and Public Deficit 
 
 
Table 1.1.a Direct Effect of M1, Trade Openness, Public Deficit on Economic Growth 
Table 1.1.a Direct Effect of M1, Trade Openness, Public Deficit
on Economic Growth
k fd to pd    
Expenditures
Exports
6.79
0. 008
l6
1.63
0. 341
l3
3.03
0. 057
l5
2.63
0. 025
4.15
0. 69
3.22
0. 34
n8
3.49
0. 119

1. 00
Imports
12.70
0. 006
l6
2.38
0. 541
l2
2.50
0. 078
l3
1.70
0. 013
4.31
0. 56
4.15
0. 47
n5
0.62
0. 034

0. 80
Trade Openness
4.32
0. 005
l6
2.04
0. 476
l2
2.74
0. 021
l5
1.83
0. 027
4.39
0. 63
6.62
0. 52
n1
0.99
0. 094

1. 00
Revenues
Exports
6.44
0. 007
l6
3.34
0. 603
l3
2.64
0. 053
l5
1.69
0. 022
3.74
0. 55
3.10
0. 43
n5
0.61
0. 034

0. 80
Imports
10.50
0. 007
l6
2.19
0. 529
l2
2.66
0. 078
l1
2.14
0. 031
4.08
0. 57
4.72
0. 49
n2
0.20
0. 017

0. 90
Trade Openness
5.46
0. 008
l6
2.04
0. 439
l2
4.00
0. 039
l1
2.79
0. 037
3.49
0. 57
3.32
0. 43
n8
3.00
0. 143

0. 80
Public Deficit
Exports
4.69
0. 008
l6
1.83
0. 460
l3
1.97
0. 059
l8
1.22
0. 101
3.70
0. 55
3.44
0. 43
n5
0.31
0. 016

0. 80
Imports
5.87
0. 009
l6
2.28
0. 535
l2
2.68
0. 129
l8
1.90
0. 092
5.05
0. 56
5.94
0. 45
n8
3.91
0. 119

0. 90
Trade Openness
7.33
0. 008
l6
3.05
0. 510
l2
2.95
0. 068
l8
3.32
0. 164
4.70
0. 56
5.77
0. 47
n8
2.92
0. 132

0. 80
Table 1.1.a reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k logh tfdxfd,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn,
parameter estimates xfd,tl is M1,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures).
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 1.2.a Direct Effect of Commercial Bank Deposits, Trade Openness, Public Deficit on 
Economic Growth 
 
 
Table 1.2.a Direct Effect of Commercial Bank Deposits, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit on Economic Growth
k fd to pd    
Expenditures
Exports
4.50
0. 010
l2
1.15
0. 053
l8
1.66
0. 124
l5
1.90
0. 026
3.48
0. 63
2.22
0. 33
n8
3.92
0. 115

1. 00
Imports
5.27
0. 005
l2
0.46
0. 026
l2
2.76
0. 085
l5
1.89
0. 028
.3.17
0. 61
3.98
0. 51
n5
1.07
0. 035

1. 00
Trade Openness
14.62
0. 010
l2
0.99
0. 051
l2
3.87
0. 047
l3
1.77
0. 033
3.90
0. 60
2.96
0. 37
n8
5.43
0. 123

1. 00
Revenues
Exports
6.18
0. 013
l2
0.18
0. 011
l8
2.67
0. 175
l1
2.00
0. 044
2.16
0. 41
1.89
0. 44
n8
3.30
0. 150

0. 80
Imports
4.39
0. 009
l2
0.69
0. 036
l2
1.95
0. 079
l6
2.54
0. 031
3.04
0. 45
4.19
0. 51
n1
0.81
0. 098

0. 80
Trade Openness
4.45
0. 007
l2
0.77
0. 040
l2
2.40
0. 036
l6
2.70
0. 029
3.28
0. 49
3.95
0. 52
n3
0.70
0. 060

0. 80
Public Deficit
Exports
2.20
0. 018
l2
0.96
0. 132
l8
1.94
0. 428
l6
2.32
0. 285
2.50
0. 20
2.16
0. 61
n3
0.11
0. 011

0. 80
Imports
4.17
0. 006
l2
0.78
0. 042
l2
2.17
0. 121
l8
1.73
0. 071
3.50
0. 55
4.26
0. 51
n5
0.10
0. 003

1. 00
Trade Openness
6.12
0. 005
l2
1.07
0. 047
l2
2.87
0. 066
l8
3.50
0. 154
4.72
0. 51
6.80
0. 55
n1
1.56
0. 155

0. 80
Table 1.2.a reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k logh tfdxfd,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn,
parameter estimates xfd,tl is commercial bank deposits,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures).
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Public Deficit on Economic Growth
k fd to pd    
Expenditures
Exports
4.50
0. 005
l3
1.96
0. 096
l2
2.22
0. 048
l5
1.91
0. 030
3.75
0. 64
5.26
0. 54
n2
0.85
0. 062

1. 00
Imports
7.22
0. 008
l3
2.86
0. 075
l2
3.18
0. 098
l5
3.03
0. 028
4.96
0. 66
4.09
0. 38
n8
3.54
0. 156

0. 90
Trade Openness
5.74
0. 009
l3
2.90
0. 144
l2
2.51
0. 048
l5
2.93
0. 029
4.47
0. 63
3.37
0. 35
n8
3.64
0. 117

1. 00
Revenues
Exports
4.24
0. 009
l3
2.10
0. 112
l2
1.68
0. 041
l6
2.53
0. 029
2.77
0. 43
3.43
0. 51
n2
0.59
0. 076

0. 80
Imports
6.00
0. 008
l6
2.65
0. 163
l2
2.58
0. 082
l5
2.14
0. 023
4.31
0. 61
4.20
0. 42
n8
3.83
0. 149

0. 90
Trade Openness
5.20
0. 009
l3
2.10
0. 153
l2
2.00
0. 053
l5
2.64
0. 028
3.64
0. 56
3.39
0. 39
n8
3.53
0. 110

1. 00
Public Deficit
Exports
8.24
0. 009
l2
2.46
0. 173
l8
2.58
0. 181
l8
2.50
0. 144
3.06
0. 65
2.57
0. 36
n8
7.67
0. 196

0. 90
Imports
6.89
0. 010
l6
1.65
0. 135
l2
2.78
0. 102
l6
2.79
0. 136
5.89
0. 63
5.20
0. 37
n8
6.37
0. 123

1. 00
Trade Openness
6.08
0. 010
l6
2.53
0. 232
l2
3.54
0. 052
l6
7.26
0. 310
5.84
0. 64
4.03
0. 35
n8
3.79
0. 122

0. 90
Table 1.3.a reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k logh tfdxfd,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn,
parameter estimates xfd,tl is deposits at Banco do Brasil,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures).
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 2.1.a Indirect Effect of M1, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit on Economic Growth
k   fd to pd  
Expenditures
Exports
4.65
0. 010
3.88
0. 48
2.74
0. 38
l6
1.71
0. 263
l8
4.72
0. 150
l8
1.81
0. 024
n8
4.62
0. 121

1. 00
Imports
5.30
0. 010
3.67
0. 56
2.95
0. 38
l6
1.90
0. 295
l8
1.82
0. 130
l2
1.84
0. 028
n8
3.82
0. 123

1. 00
Trade Openness
5.54
0. 008
3.93
0. 52
2.55
0. 32
l6
1.90
0. 305
l8
2.32
0. 126
l5
5.15
0. 045
n8
3.57
0. 107

1. 00
Revenues
Exports
3.41
0. 012
2.93
0. 36
3.08
0. 44
l6
2.55
0. 350
l8
3.01
0. 162
l8
6.09
0. 044
n8
4.21
0. 108

1. 00
Imports
5.19
0. 008
3.31
0. 47
2.94
0. 43
l6
2.20
0. 553
l8
1.85
0. 305
l8
2.02
0. 040
n8
2.92
0. 174

0. 80
Trade Openness
4.50
0. 014
3.67
0. 40
2.67
0. 41
l6
2.00
0. 507
l8
2.86
0. 162
l6
0.75
0. 015
n6
0.97
0. 042

0. 80
Public Deficit
Exports
5.21
0. 006
4.08
0. 39
4.22
0. 50
l6
1.74
0. 330
l8
5.19
0. 201
l3
3.55
0. 267
n8
3.42
0. 131

1. 00
Imports
6.83
0. 011
4.66
0. 52
3.20
0. 34
l6
1.96
0. 336
l8
1.87
0. 164
l1
5.48
0. 252
n8
4.95
0. 181

0. 90
Trade Openness
6.61
0. 009
6.09
0. 65
2.36
0. 19
l6
2.42
0. 375
l8
4.28
0. 114
l8
2.42
0. 137
n8
5.47
0. 153

1. 00
Table 2.1.a reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: yt  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 fdxfd,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl ytn,
where xfd,tl indicates M1, xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements),
xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the three measures).
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 2.2.a Indirect Effect of Commercial Bank Deposits, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit on Economic Growth
k   fd to pd  
Expenditures
Exports
5.33
0. 011
4.08
0. 50
2.52
0. 33
l8
0.64
0. 009
l8
4.18
0. 148
l5
3.97
0. 028
n8
3.07
0. 099

1. 00
Imports
5.66
0. 009
5.54
0. 54
5.23
0. 44
l6
0.49
0. 008
l6
2.55
0. 144
l3
7.18
0. 074
n8
2.46
0. 093

1. 00
Trade Openness
7.19
0. 007
4.15
0. 63
2.08
0. 27
l8
0.51
0. 008
l8
3.04
0. 142
l5
3.55
0. 033
n8
3.36
0. 127

1. 00
Revenues
Exports
2.10
0. 017
2.10
0. 24
2.82
0. 50
l8
0.69
0. 012
l8
2.12
0. 173
l8
3.08
0. 026
l8
3.72
0. 095

1. 00
Imports
6.83
0. 009
5.42
0. 64
3.79
0. 35
l8
0.20
0. 004
l6
1.95
0. 133
l8
0.86
0. 011
n8
2.84
0. 127

1. 00
Trade Openness
5.47
0. 010
4.25
0. 58
1.85
0. 26
l8
0.48
0. 007
l8
3.81
0. 133
l3
2.69
0. 021
n8
3.75
0. 124

1. 00
Public Deficit
Exports
7.62
0. 008
3.75
0. 41
3.02
0. 43
l8
0.34
0. 005
l8
3.56
0. 187
l3
3.78
0. 186
n8
3.99
0. 124

1. 00
Imports
6.13
0. 009
5.96
0. 62
4.90
0. 36
l8
0.14
0. 002
l6
2.06
0. 144
l3
2.06
0. 058
n8
5.97
0. 143

1. 00
Trade Openness
4.09
0. 006
3.79
0. 35
2.49
0. 28
l8
1.12
0. 018
l8
2.99
0. 185
l3
5.19
0. 272
n8
5.42
0. 195

1. 00
Table 2.2a reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: yt  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 fdxfd,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl ytn,
where xfd,tl indicates commercial bank deposits, xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements),
xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the three measures).
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 2.3.a Indirect Effect of Deposits at Banco do Brasil, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit on Economic Growth
k   fd to pd  
Expenditures
Exports
6.61
0. 002
2.65
0. 40
7.54
0. 66
l8
6.72
0. 351
l5
4.47
0. 067
l2
5.80
0. 086
n5
0.18
0. 006

1. 00
Imports
6.84
0. 007
4.62
0. 60
3.90
0. 36
l8
5.26
0. 304
l8
3.45
0. 087
l2
5.60
0. 049
n8
6.80
0. 153

1. 00
Trade Openness
6.21
0. 008
3.82
0. 55
2.14
0. 28
l8
2.99
0. 468
l8
1.62
0. 141
l5
5.79
0. 069
n8
3.77
0. 026

0. 80
Revenues
Exports
7.35
0. 010
3.23
0. 36
3.41
0. 44
l8
3.45
0. 245
l8
1.84
0. 104
l2
4.05
0. 042
n8
4.16
0. 113

1. 00
Imports
5.81
0. 005
3.05
0. 52
4.97
0. 43
l8
3.04
0. 238
l6
1.66
0. 245
l6
4.92
0. 056
n7
1.32
0. 076

1. 00
Trade Openness
9.16
0. 003
1.69
0. 17
8.47
0. 69
l5
13.90
0. 802
l8
6.62
0. 141
l2
10.49
0. 138
n8
3.66
0. 131

1. 00
Public Deficit
Exports
6.31
0. 007
3.52
0. 51
3.26
0. 41
l8
4.78
0. 242
l8
1.66
0. 093
l3
4.22
0. 151
n8
3.08
0. 112

1. 00
Imports
9.76
0. 007
6.18
0. 59
6.24
0. 37
l8
6.47
0. 243
l8
1.04
0. 034
l3
4.40
0. 109
n8
7.66
0. 157

1. 00
Trade Openness
9.44
0. 007
6.55
0. 54
6.16
0. 38
l5
8.21
0. 404
l8
7.50
0. 066
l3
2.56
0. 044
n8
9.48
0. 154

1. 00
Table 2.3.a reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: yt  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 fdxfd,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl ytn,
where xfd,tl indicates deposits at Banco do Brasil, xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements),
xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the three measures).
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
 135 
 
 
Table 3.1.a The Short- and Long-run Effects of Financial development, Public Deficit and US 
Interest Rate on Growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1.a The Short- and Long-run Effects of Financial Development, Public Deficit and
US Interest Rate on Growth
xit  fd pd us fd pd us     
Expenditures
M1
l3
2.14
0. 870
l5
2.25
0. 062
l6
2.35
0. 008
7.15
0. 591
0.71
0. 009
1.63
0. 0006
9.35
0. 74
4.69
0. 57
3.21
0. 40
n8
1.11
0. 051

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
l4
4.22
0. 110
l2
1.01
0. 014
l6
2.71
0. 010
1.80
0. 045
5.93
0. 097
4.70
0. 0029
10.55
0. 66
6.03
0. 68
5.01
0. 40
n5
3.55
0. 193

0. 80
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
l4
1.65
0. 046
l5
1.47
0. 035
l6
1.23
0. 005
1.50
0. 128
4.21
0. 103
2.06
0. 0018
7.75
0. 69
4.68
0. 68
3.80
0. 42
n4
0.68
0. 056

0. 80
Revenues
M1
l3
2.25
0. 699
l6
2.74
0. 062
l5
8.09
0. 015
6.60
0. 474
3.57
0. 048
2.56
0. 0011
11.53
0. 82
4.86
0. 62
3.93
0. 42
n5
3.07
0. 173

0. 80
Commercial Bank Deposits
l4
1.86
0. 102
l6
2.96
0. 052
l5
5.30
0. 020
2.51
0. 026
1.82
0. 012
7.10
0. 0006
10.99
0. 75
5.20
0. 60
4.46
0. 39
n5
2.19
0. 212

0. 80
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
l4
2.95
0. 081
l5
0.80
0. 045
l5
5.78
0. 010
1.50
0. 055
6.79
0. 154
2.73
0. 0011
10.21
0. 63
4.80
0. 67
3.90
0. 40
n8
1.27
0. 103

0. 80
Public Deficit
M1
l3
2.80
0. 874
l6
2.58
0. 218
l5
2.95
0. 009
8.52
0. 621
1.58
0. 015
1.63
0. 0005
11.95
0. 80
5.53
0. 67
3.14
0. 33
n8
0.99
0. 041

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
l3
2.27
0. 244
l6
2.86
0. 235
l5
7.78
0. 018
7.03
0. 021
0.06
0. 001
0.30
0. 0002
10.27
0. 98
4.04
0. 44
2.27
0. 37
n5
2.19
0. 113

0. 80
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
l3
2.10
0. 073
l5
0.95
0. 020
l5
4.01
0. 011
5.41
0. 242
0.78
0. 007
5.46
0. 0053
9.24
0. 62
6.65
0. 81
5.78
0. 40
n3
1.36
0. 076

1. 00
Table 3.1.a reports parameter estimates for the following model: yt   fdxfd,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl
yt1 c fdxfd,t1 pdxpd,t1 usxus,t1t , h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 ytn.
i and i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.  indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
xfd,tl is financial development (any of the three measures), xpd,tl is public deficit (or one of its elements)
and xus,tl is US interest rate.l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 16.a Direct Effect of Financial Development, Political Instability and US Interest Rate 
on Economic Growth 
Table 16.a Direct Effect of Financial Development, Political Instability
and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k fd pi us    
M1
Assassinations
9.12
0. 008
l6
3.10
1. 65
l8
2.14
0. 018
l4
6.99
0. 002
4.03
0. 84
5.14
0. 36
n5
0.72
0. 030

1. 00
Number of Coups
6.74
0. 015
l6
3.76
0. 70
l8
3.24
0. 057
l5
15.80
0. 002
4.51
0. 84
4.01
0. 24
n8
2.71
0. 073

0. 90
Number of Cabinet Changes
6.42
0. 013
l6
3.37
0. 80
l8
2.73
0. 496
l5
16.08
0. 002
5.23
0. 81
2.01
0. 23
n5
0.31
0. 016

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
7.50
0. 006
l6
3.15
1. 66
l6
4.36
0. 914
l5
8.00
0. 002
4.02
1. 00
2.92
0. 22
n4
1.65
0. 159

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
Assassinations
11.22
0. 002
l3
4.07
2. 43
l1
1.60
0. 026
l4
2.29
0. 002
2.62
0. 63
5.52
0. 57
n4
0.44
0. 156

0. 90
Number of Coups
3.20
0. 018
l3
1.75
1. 58
l3
1.03
0. 079
l4
0.81
0. 0001
1.95
0. 21
4.00
0. 54
n6
1.76
0. 145

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
14.14
0. 008
l3
4.95
0. 28
l8
1.08
0. 049
l7
2.26
0. 0018
4.11
0. 67
2.90
0. 28
n6
5.71
0. 253

0. 90
Legislative Effectiveness
1.84
0. 002
l3
2.08
0. 12
l7
1.58
2. 628
l7
0.24
0. 0002
3.83
0. 65
6.67
0. 60
n2
1.28
0. 141

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
Assassinations
2.96
0. 005
l2
4.42
0. 24
l8
2.26
0. 017
l4
2.90
0. 0008
3.11
0. 96
2.47
0. 28
n3
0.94
0. 102

1. 00
Number of Coups
2.90
0. 003
l2
4.80
0. 18
l1
2.16
0. 043
l3
2.64
0. 0009
4.12
0. 63
3.50
0. 34
n4
1.36
0. 177

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
14.90
0. 007
l2
2.28
0. 13
l8
2.43
0. 060
l6
1.60
0. 0007
3.46
0. 84
1.87
0. 26
n4
1.28
0. 268

0. 90
Legislative Effectiveness
6.05
0. 005
l2
1.76
0. 10
l7
3.16
1. 044
l6
0.93
0. 0006
3.36
0. 91
2.37
0. 27
n6
0.65
0. 023

0. 90
Table 16.a reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c kh t fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn,
parameter estimates xfd,tl is a financial development variable.
xpi,tl is a political instability variable, xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 17.a Indirect Effect of Financial Development, Political Instability
and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k   fd pi us  
M1
Assassinations
11.64
0. 012
2.26
0. 52
1.66
0. 29
l6
1.92
1. 295
l7
1.94
0. 004
l6
3.49
0. 0014
n6
0.98
0. 129

1. 00
Number of Coups
4.70
0. 010
3.90
0. 58
4.28
0. 41
l6
2.28
0. 511
l8
1.55
0. 161
l8
2.05
0. 0007
n7
1.22
0. 049

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
6.79
0. 005
2.38
0. 29
4.84
0. 45
l6
2.97
1. 280
l1
3.62
0. 394
l8
1.66
0. 0025
n2
0.44
0. 068

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
7.71
0. 013
3.99
0. 60
2.11
0. 18
l6
3.88
1. 115
l8
1.96
1. 238
l6
4.64
0. 0012
n8
7.10
0. 212

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
Assassinations
4.26
0. 015
2.94
0. 39
2.84
0. 36
l1
4.37
0. 134
l7
3.67
0. 010
l8
0.58
0. 0003
n4
1.35
0. 261

0. 90
Number of Coups
7.12
0. 014
3.94
0. 44
3.18
0. 42
l1
3.84
0. 074
l8
1.40
0. 144
l8
1.64
0. 0007
n7
0.69
0. 035

0. 90
Number of Cabinet Changes
5.95
0. 004
3.14
0. 42
5.03
0. 42
l1
2.43
0. 032
l1
5.49
0. 273
l8
1.85
0. 0011
n4
0.94
0. 054

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
5.76
0. 012
4.36
0. 57
1.98
0. 22
l1
3.25
0. 078
l8
7.58
1. 677
l8
2.78
0. 0012
n8
4.98
0. 253

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
Assassinations
9.07
0. 014
2.24
0. 42
1.66
0. 32
l4
4.36
0. 966
l7
3.96
0. 010
l8
3.22
0. 0017
n2
0.192
0. 021

0. 90
Number of Coups
5.12
0. 005
4.02
0. 52
7.26
0. 51
l4
5.76
0. 463
l8
1.38
0. 146
l8
2.70
0. 0009
n5
0.56
0. 024

0. 90
Number of Cabinet Changes
5.24
0. 005
4.24
0. 56
3.81
0. 29
l4
5.54
0. 560
l1
3.80
0. 178
l8
2.60
0. 0012
n6
0.62
0. 026

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
7.15
0. 010
3.13
0. 38
1.60
0. 14
l4
6.57
0. 927
l6
1.79
1. 330
l6
6.13
0. 0019
n6
1.26
0. 040

1. 00
Table 17.a reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: yt  c kh t t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl usxus,tl ytn,
where xfd,tl indicates a financial development variable, xpi,tl is a political instability variable
and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 18.a The Short- and Long-run Effects of Financial Development, Political instability
and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
xit  fd pi us fd pi us     
M1
Assassinations
l3
4.19
1. 082
l2
1.65
0. 0036
l5
6.29
0. 0016
9.89
0. 663
0.12
0. 0003
4.35
0. 00008
10.88
0. 93
2.73
1. 04
2.02
0. 26
n7
1.63
0. 026

1. 00
Number of Coups
l1
2.63
0. 848
l5
8.84
0. 0350
l1
3.57
0. 0008
9.18
0. 854
0.02
0. 0002
2.76
0. 00005
9.96
0. 88
4.92
1. 36
1.76
0. 12
n5
5.90
0. 270

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
l3
3.89
0. 921
l5
1.40
0. 0156
l5
6.02
0. 0015
37.27
0. 665
2.50
0. 0094
13.35
0. 00007
9.48
0. 95
2.11
0. 88
2.22
0. 40
n3
0.35
0. 027

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
l3
4.57
1. 080
l8
2.24
1. 0551
l5
17.47
0. 0017
6.74
0. 730
2.37
0. 7078
5.65
0. 00012
17.67
0. 69
5.40
1. 14
1.81
0. 06
n5
5.30
0. 210

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
Assassinations
l5
3.18
0. 246
l2
1.71
0. 0038
l5
6.46
0. 0023
1.98
0. 134
1.52
0. 0164
8.50
0. 00050
8.30
0. 58
3.20
1. 02
2.71
0. 28
n4
1.22
0. 078

1. 00
Number of Coups
l4
1.95
0. 167
l5
2.73
0. 0189
l5
7.80
0. 0020
2.48
0. 140
1.76
0. 0831
4.11
0. 00058
8.57
0. 64
3.17
0. 87
2.59
0. 19
n8
1.29
0. 034

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
l4
4.75
0. 261
l4
3.77
0. 0607
l2
5.39
0. 0007
2.72
0. 122
1.98
0. 0631
6.05
0. 00061
15.96
0. 55
4.15
1. 13
2.51
0. 10
n5
3.20
0. 130

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
l3
4.00
0. 406
l8
1.96
1. 0460
l2
3.54
0. 0016
2.53
0. 061
10.52
1. 6560
3.36
0. 00045
11.46
0. 85
4.06
0. 82
1.62
0. 14
n4
1.28
0. 054

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
Assassinations
l3
2.38
0. 202
l8
2.13
0. 1282
l5
5.74
0. 0010
0.65
0. 069
0.18
0. 0014
0.91
0. 00014
8.66
0. 54
4.37
1. 09
2.33
0. 11
n5
3.12
0. 150

1. 00
Number of Coups
l3
1.69
0. 257
l5
3.80
0. 0207
l5
8.21
0. 0020
0.96
0. 117
1.65
0. 0498
3.74
0. 00068
13.39
0. 57
3.37
1. 14
3.55
0. 18
n3
0.62
0. 029

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
l3
1.81
0. 055
l4
2.89
0. 0157
l1
4.34
0. 0010
1.42
0. 249
0.15
0. 0136
1.75
0. 00032
7.96
0. 54
3.84
1. 10
2.25
0. 28
n4
1.64
0. 476

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
l3
2.23
0. 654
l8
2.72
1. 6196
l2
2.99
0. 0013
0.90
0. 086
0.05
0. 0417
1.00
0. 00017
6.58
0. 52
2.95
0. 92
1.70
0. 14
n6
0.69
0. 045

1. 00
Table 18.a reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt   fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl usxus,tl yt1 c fdxfd,t1 pixpi,t1 usxus,t1t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 ytn.
i and i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
xfd,tl is financial development (any of the three measures), xpi,tl is a political instability variable (or one of its elements)
and xus,tl is US interest rate. l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 16.3 Direct Effect of Commercial Bank Deposits, Number of the Coups, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k fd pi to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
5.06
0. 010
l7
4.67
0. 211
l2
1.19
0. 050
l3
2.58
0. 067
l6
4.89
0. 005
l5
7.29
0. 0019
3.90
0. 78
2.80
0. 34
n6
1.21
0. 052

1. 00
Revenues
4.24
0. 005
l2
2.61
0. 163
l2
1.44
0. 057
l3
1.88
0. 072
l6
4.70
0. 006
l5
8.25
0. 0022
4.60
0. 91
3.53
0. 32
n1
0.29
0. 029

1. 00
Public Deficit
6.33
0. 008
l7
2.54
0. 164
l2
1.41
0. 052
l3
2.82
0. 086
l5
0.84
0. 066
l5
10.46
0. 0022
7.02
0. 93
3.76
0. 25
n6
0.88
0. 040

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
5.56
0. 005
l7
2.53
0. 082
l2
1.18
0. 050
l3
1.17
0. 137
l6
4.10
0. 005
l5
7.74
0. 0018
3.94
0. 83
3.14
0. 33
n5
2.12
0. 087

1. 00
Revenues
5.56
0. 009
l7
1.71
0. 116
l2
1.06
0. 046
l3
1.03
0. 113
l6
5.91
0. 006
l5
5.59
0. 0020
3.65
0. 82
2.30
0. 25
n6
0.99
0. 045

1. 00
Public Deficit
24.16
0. 011
l4
2.52
0. 234
l2
1.48
0. 058
l3
0.35
0. 057
l8
2.91
0. 282
l5
6.51
0. 0016
3.70
0. 68
3.21
0. 40
n5
0.22
0. 010

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
6.44
0. 011
l7
4.19
0. 155
l2
1.49
0. 049
l2
0.83
0. 020
l4
3.15
0. 006
l5
12.11
0. 0018
4.14
0. 94
3.37
0. 29
n6
0.18
0. 004

1. 00
Revenues
7.01
0. 008
l7
560
0. 101
l2
1.74
0. 098
l2
1.79
0. 107
l6
3.09
0. 004
l5
11.75
0. 0022
4.93
1. 04
1.88
0. 20
n3
2.40
0. 133

1. 00
Public Deficit
7.13
0. 010
l2
1.65
0. 058
l2
1.36
0. 088
l2
2.48
0. 062
l8
4.37
0. 255
l5
9.10
0. 0017
4.44
0. 93
2.48
0. 19
n3
2.40
0. 095

1. 00
Table 16.3 reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k logh tfdxfd,tl pixpi,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn.
parameter estimates xfd,tl is commercial bank deposits, xpi,tl is the number of the coups,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
 140 
 
 
Table 16.4 Direct Effect of Commercial Bank Deposits, Number of Cabinet Changes, Trade 
Openness, Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth 
 
Table 16.4 Direct Effect of Commercial Bank Deposits, Number of Cabinet Changes, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k fd pi to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
5.40
0. 006
l7
2.39
0. 120
l8
0.55
0. 023
l3
2.24
0. 042
l6
2.27
0. 006
l5
4.91
0. 0023
2.94
0. 89
2.33
0. 28
n4
1.12
0. 190

1. 00
Revenues
4.27
0. 007
l4
2.12
0. 233
l8
1.11
0. 024
l3
3.07
0. 102
l6
2.95
0. 006
l5
6.13
0. 0022
4.54
0. 94
3.11
0. 36
n4
1.33
0. 199

1. 00
Public Deficit
3.76
0. 012
l4
1.94
0. 313
l8
1.04
0. 055
l3
0.27
0. 020
l8
2.29
0. 383
l5
4.48
0. 0017
3.51
0. 28
11.61
0. 81
n7
1.43
0. 067

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
3.16
0. 004
l7
4.64
0. 183
l8
1.25
0. 062
l3
0.14
0. 009
l4
2.17
0. 006
l5
9.36
0. 0021
4.27
0. 95
3.57
0. 25
n4
1.50
0. 228

1. 00
Revenues
4.17
0. 009
l8
0.37
0. 033
l8
1.16
0. 071
l3
0.50
0. 003
l6
4.68
0. 006
l5
5.39
0. 0016
2.84
0. 68
3.11
0. 32
n6
0.85
0. 134

1. 00
Public Deficit
7.53
0. 010
l7
1.94
0. 108
l8
4.03
0. 118
l4
0.74
0. 065
l8
3.07
0. 307
l8
0.99
0. 0004
6.45
0. 90
3.14
0. 34
n4
1.34
0. 241

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
6.28
0. 004
l7
1.75
0. 074
l8
0.82
0. 028
l3
1.56
0. 028
l6
1.99
0. 006
l5
11.05
0. 0024
3.67
1. 01
2.65
0. 31
n4
1.23
0. 204

1. 00
Revenues
4.14
0. 008
l7
1.88
0. 098
l8
0.32
0. 021
l2
1.05
0. 017
l6
2.16
0. 005
l5
5.29
0. 0020
2.26
0. 82
5.13
0. 39
n2
0.27
0. 024

1. 00
Public Deficit
6.75
0. 007
l7
2.04
0. 150
l8
0.25
0. 015
l3
0.56
0. 025
l8
0.50
0. 061
l5
9.51
0. 0018
2.74
0. 87
4.46
0. 34
n3
1.26
0. 172

1. 00
Table 16.4 reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k logh tfdxfd,tl pixpi,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn.
parameter estimates xfd,tl is commercial bank deposits, xpi,tl is number of cabinet changes,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 17.3 Indirect Effect of Deposits at Banco do Brasil, Number of the Coups,
Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k   fd pi to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
5.78
0. 005
2.23
0. 61
2.14
0. 34
l4
2.06
0. 622
l8
2.15
0. 023
l2
1.90
0. 057
l3
6.09
0. 007
l8
6.34
0. 0014
n8
1.13
0. 044

1. 00
Revenues
4.26
0. 005
2.63
0. 26
5.11
0. 45
l4
2.91
0. 526
l8
2.91
0. 012
l2
5.64
0. 278
l3
10.56
0. 011
l8
5.34
0. 0018
n6
1.41
0. 042

1. 00
Public Deficit
4.64
0. 002
2.85
0. 26
8.65
0. 60
l4
3.86
0. 095
l2
1.18
0. 077
l2
6.91
0. 216
l3
6.99
0. 320
l8
1.96
0. 0006
n5
1.05
0. 028

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
7.31
0. 006
2.64
0. 27
1.98
0. 33
l4
4.00
0. 782
l8
1.51
0. 021
l8
2.27
0. 295
l3
5.98
0. 008
l8
5.69
0. 0020
n5
0.13
0. 006

1. 00
Revenues
2.84
0. 004
1.79
0. 16
3.31
0. 50
l4
2.48
0. 537
l8
0.54
0. 009
l8
2.23
0. 374
l3
4.13
0. 008
l8
2.66
0. 0016
n6
0.92
0. 027

1. 00
Public Deficit
3.27
0. 002
1.64
0. 18
3.19
0. 49
l4
2.05
0. 677
l8
0.11
0. 003
l8
1.96
0. 479
l3
1.53
0. 156
l8
2.16
0. 0016
n8
0.05
0. 004

0. 90
Trade Openness
Expenditures
6.13
0. 004
3.12
0. 27
10.63
0. 67
l4
10.60
0. 206
l2
0.61
0. 042
l8
4.12
0. 137
l3
3.92
0. 004
l8
6.76
0. 0010
n4
1.19
0. 041

1. 00
Revenues
3.79
0. 003
2.64
0. 27
6.07
0. 54
l4
3.24
0. 470
l8
0.85
0. 044
l8
4.19
0. 195
l3
6.34
0. 007
l8
6.16
0. 0017
n7
0.18
0. 008

1. 00
Public Deficit
5.46
0. 003
2.25
0. 22
6.93
0. 69
l4
11.60
0. 225
l2
0.79
0. 040
l8
10.90
0. 232
l8
3.40
0. 024
l8
7.28
0. 0012
n4
0.76
0. 031

1. 00
Table 17.3 reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: yt  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl ytn,
where xfd,tl indicates deposits at Banco do Brasil, xpi,tl is the number of the coups,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the three measures)
and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 17.4 Indirect Effect of Deposits at Banco do Brasil, Number of Cabinet Changes,
Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k   fd pi to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
3.39
0. 004
4.60
0. 47
7.46
0. 45
l4
5.63
0. 590
l1
2.31
0. 120
l2
2.35
0. 073
l3
3.18
0. 003
l8
1.75
0. 0013
n5
0.24
0. 007

1. 00
Revenues
3.92
0. 003
3.01
0. 32
6.94
0. 48
l4
4.90
0. 943
l1
3.15
0. 191
l2
3.05
0. 201
l3
6.95
0. 009
l8
2.78
0. 0027
n8
0.86
0. 064

0. 80
Public Deficit
6.32
0. 006
3.24
0. 46
5.27
0. 34
l4
4.54
0. 712
l1
14.97
0. 277
l2
0.25
0. 009
l8
2.44
0. 065
l8
3.41
0. 0015
n5
0.86
0. 029

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
4.51
0. 003
2.33
0. 30
5.21
0. 49
l4
5.67
0. 305
l1
4.06
0. 198
l8
4.54
0. 246
l3
5.54
0. 010
l8
3.31
0. 0018
n8
0.37
0. 015

1. 00
Revenues
5.13
0. 002
1.74
0. 27
6.10
0. 55
l4
10.20
0. 223
l1
2.69
0. 216
l8
1.84
0. 157
l3
9.83
0. 006
l8
2.75
0. 0016
n4
0.53
0. 024

1. 00
Public Deficit
4.50
0. 003
2.24
0. 29
3.65
0. 48
l4
4.91
0. 305
l1
3.53
0. 216
l8
3.08
0. 327
l8
2.83
0. 189
l8
3.53
0. 0010
n4
1.56
0. 071

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
7.62
0. 007
3.64
0. 51
2.66
0. 23
l4
1.19
0. 262
l1
14.32
0. 204
l8
1.49
0. 085
l5
3.67
0. 009
l8
0.28
0. 0002
n8
1.57
0. 056

1. 00
Revenues
3.29
0. 003
3.25
0. 35
8.39
0. 53
l4
4.23
0. 360
l1
2.08
0. 123
l8
2.81
0. 075
l3
9.42
0. 005
l8
2.21
0. 0016
n2
0.72
0. 043

1. 00
Public Deficit
6.84
0. 008
5.03
0. 38
4.84
0. 29
l4
5.52
0. 245
l1
4.38
0. 164
l8
2.24
0. 175
l8
6.68
0. 366
l8
2.98
0. 0014
n8
2.04
0. 080

1. 00
Table 17.4 reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: yt  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl ytn,
where xfd,tl indicates deposits at Banco do Brasil, xpi,tl is number of cabinet changes,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Growth
xit  fd pi pd to us fd pi pd us     
Exports
Expenditures
l6
5.13
0. 112
l5
4.01
0. 034
l4
2.85
0. 005
l5
2.74
0. 074
l2
1.76
0. 0003
3.25
0. 054
3.30
0. 025
10.40
0. 014
16.77
2. 8  104
14.08
0. 90
3.05
1. 00
1.79
0. 28
n7
1.71
0. 136

0. 80
Revenues
l5
2.00
0. 136
l5
3.67
0. 032
l4
1.42
0. 008
l5
1.67
0. 035
l2
0.94
0. 0002
2.79
0. 067
2.91
0. 018
6.52
0. 016
10.76
2. 5  104
12.05
0. 83
2.42
1. 11
1.84
0. 31
n6
0.54
0. 025

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
l6
1.96
0. 099
l5
2.71
0. 018
l6
2.07
0. 005
l4
0.44
0. 029
l5
7.48
0. 0014
3.25
0. 054
3.30
0. 025
10.40
0. 014
16.77
2. 8  104
13.64
0. 62
2.62
0. 89
4.16
0. 31
n8
0.06
0. 005

0. 80
Revenues
l5
2.40
0. 133
l5
4.93
0. 036
l4
1.89
0. 011
l5
3.07
0. 133
l2
1.40
0. 0003
2.79
0. 067
2.91
0. 018
6.52
0. 016
10.76
2. 5  104
11.47
0. 84
2.87
1. 09
1.83
0. 26
n6
0.91
0. 045

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
l6
2.13
0. 115
l5
3.54
0. 024
l6
2.19
0. 050
l5
2.67
0. 062
l5
6.41
0. 0014
3.25
0. 054
3.30
0. 025
10.40
0. 014
16.77
2. 8  104
20.15
0. 64
3.52
0. 90
1.77
0. 18
n7
1.27
0. 133

0. 80
Revenues
l5
2.38
0. 135
l5
3.58
0. 033
l4
2.60
0. 013
l5
1.84
0. 049
l5
2.90
0. 0007
2.79
0. 067
2.91
0. 018
6.52
0. 016
10.76
2. 5  104
13.86
0. 85
2.59
1. 10
2.27
0. 33
n8
0.23
0. 006

1. 00
Table 18.3 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt   fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl pdxpd,tl toxto,tl usxus,tl 
yt1 c fdxfd,t1 pixpi,t1 pdxpd,t1 usxus,t1t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 ytn.
i and i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
xfd,tl is commecial bank deposits, xpi,tl is the number of the coups, xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the three measures),
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
 144 
 
 
Table 18.4 The Short- and Long-run Effects of Commercial Bank Deposits, Number of Cabinet Changes, Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US Interest 
Rate on Economic Growth
Table 18.4 The Short- and Long-run Effects of Commercial Bank Deposits, Number of Cabinet Changes,
Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Growth
xit  fd pi pd to us fd pi pd us     
Exports
Expenditures
l5
1.83
0. 126
l4
1.62
0. 0003
l4
3.24
0. 006
l5
0.89
0. 036
l5
2.09
0. 0006
2.11
0. 034
0.71
0. 005
6.55
0. 012
15.74
4. 0  104
17.70
1. 06
3.33
1. 03
1.89
0. 29
n3
1.50
0. 083

0. 90
Revenues
l4
5.18
0. 024
l4
1.79
0. 0003
l1
3.70
0. 007
l5
1.12
0. 040
l2
1.97
0. 0003
1.78
0. 057
2.99
0. 110
1.58
0. 003
1.58
5. 4  104
14.94
0. 60
4.51
1. 02
2.73
0. 16
n7
1.76
0. 205

0. 80
Imports
Expenditures
l6
2.02
0. 164
l6
2.36
0. 0006
l4
5.10
0. 009
l5
1.62
0. 113
l5
4.11
0. 0013
2.11
0. 034
0.71
0. 005
6.55
0. 012
15.74
4. 0  104
14.51
0. 62
4.12
0. 77
5.69
0. 40
n6
1.40
0. 144

0. 80
Revenues
l4
5.37
0. 291
l4
2.15
0. 0005
l1
2.05
0. 005
l5
7.12
0. 130
l2
3.26
0. 0011
1.78
0. 057
2.99
0. 110
1.58
0. 003
1.58
5. 4  104
13.56
0. 62
3.83
1. 01
2.16
0. 21
n7
1.25
0. 146

0. 80
Trade Openness
Expenditures
l6
2.83
0. 189
l6
2.44
0. 0006
l4
2.40
0. 011
l5
0.79
0. 047
l5
3.21
0. 0012
2.11
0. 034
0.71
0. 005
6.55
0. 012
15.74
4. 0  104
9.14
0. 61
4.15
0. 58
8.33
0. 60
n7
0.32
0. 018

0. 90
Revenues
l4
4.86
0. 256
l4
2.43
0. 0005
l1
3.09
0. 007
l5
1.61
0. 050
l2
3.21
0. 0011
1.78
0. 057
2.99
0. 110
1.58
0. 003
1.58
5. 4  104
25.05
0. 62
3.79
0. 99
2.39
0. 21
n7
1.93
0. 174

0. 80
Table 18.4 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt   fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl pdxpd,tl toxto,tl usxus,tl 
yt1 c fdxfd,t1 pixpi,t1 pdxpd,t1 usxus,t1t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 ytn. i (
i and i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
 indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
xfd,tl is commercial bank deposits, xpi,tl is number of cabinet changes, xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the three measures),
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 16.5.a Direct Effect of M1, Assassinations, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k fd pi to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
2.75
0. 012
l6
2.22
1. 97
l8
2.25
0. 017
l3
3.01
0. 134
l4
1.64
0. 009
l5
3.01
0. 0013
2.51
0. 36
5.92
0. 68
n8
0.74
0. 069

0. 90
Revenues
5.15
0. 006
l6
3.41
1. 70
l8
3.05
0. 013
l3
2.86
0. 063
l4
2.76
0. 006
l2
2.37
0. 0009
2.96
0. 96
2.99
0. 30
n8
1.65
0. 082

1. 00
Public Deficit
4.43
0. 006
l6
2.48
1. 23
l8
2.31
0. 017
l3
1.80
0. 041
l1
3.35
0. 186
l4
7.94
0. 0022
3.43
0. 99
2.92
0. 29
n3
0.70
0. 066

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
5.38
0. 007
l6
2.42
1. 71
l8
2.37
0. 015
l1
2.10
0. 038
l4
3.58
0. 012
l3
3.15
0. 0152
3.33
0. 62
4.51
0. 45
n2
.33
0. 034

0. 90
Revenues
30.16
0. 008
l6
2.71
1. 63
l8
2.34
0. 015
l1
1.84
0. 042
l4
2.19
0. 009
l2
1.76
0. 0087
3.51
0. 67
4.39
0. 46
n3
1.14
0. 121

0. 9
Public Deficit
8.81
0. 006
l6
2.53
1. 66
l8
2.31
0. 014
l1
2.07
0. 070
l1
2.53
0. 158
l4
7.03
0. 0171
3.07
0. 83
3.88
0. 35
n3
0.46
0. 042

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
5.97
0. 008
l6
2.19
1. 16
l8
2.12
0. 009
l2
1.57
0. 024
l4
2.31
0. 005
l3
5.26
0. 0223
3.16
0. 70
4.02
0. 36
n6
1.53
0. 176

0. 90
Revenues
5.31
0. 005
l6
2.56
1. 73
l8
2.26
0. 014
l2
2.24
0. 024
l4
0.42
0. 001
l4
4.15
0. 0157
3.55
0. 87
5.64
0. 44
n7
0.26
0. 008

1. 00
Public Deficit
9.50
0. 006
l6
3.18
1. 54
l6
2.78
0. 014
l3
1.13
0. 025
l1
4.05
0. 180
l4
6.92
0. 0173
2.66
1. 06
2.85
0. 22
n8
1.16
0. 078

1. 00
Table 16.5.a reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k logh tfdxfd,tl pixpi,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn,
parameter estimates xfd,tl is M1, xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements),
xpi,tl is the assassinations, xpd,tl is the public deficit (any of the three measures)
and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 16.5.b Direct Effect of M1, Number of the Coups, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k fd pi to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
11.22
0. 005
l6
2.51
1. 52
l1
1.89
0. 105
l3
1.65
0. 105
l4
1.42
0. 004
l5
7.08
0. 0017
3.49
0. 56
6.21
0. 52
n8
0.52
0. 036

0. 90
Revenues
14.71
0. 006
l6
2.57
1. 21
l1
1.83
0. 049
l3
1.93
0. 113
l4
2.73
0. 006
l2
2.97
0. 0011
3.63
0. 81
5.73
0. 40
n8
0.67
0. 033

1. 00
Public Deficit
8.19
0. 008
l6
4.65
1. 27
l8
0.91
0. 046
l3
1.63
0. 048
l1
1.87
0. 104
l4
6.60
0. 0022
3.39
0. 90
2.01
0. 20
n6
0.83
0. 071

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
7.85
0. 011
l6
3.96
0. 95
l8
1.83
0. 037
l1
2.74
0. 061
l4
11.77
0. 014
l3
6.86
0. 0228
6.44
0. 98
2.30
0. 16
n6
3.96
0. 082

1. 00
Revenues
13.81
0. 010
l6
2.96
1. 36
l8
1.04
0. 060
l1
2.36
0. 028
l4
2.35
0. 005
l2
2.03
0. 0007
3.35
0. 67
3.36
0. 40
n3
0.68
0. 043

0. 90
Public Deficit
5.33
0. 006
l6
3.86
1. 29
l8
1.04
0. 071
l2
2.75
0. 088
l8
0.49
0. 013
l4
5.65
0. 0021
4.75
0. 86
3.96
0. 35
n4
1.15
0. 057

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
3.75
0. 004
l6
2.70
1. 04
l8
0.86
0. 062
l2
1.71
0. 016
l4
2.63
0. 004
l3
2.73
0. 0096
4.03
0. 73
8.40
0. 54
n1
1.21
0. 131

1. 00
Revenues
9.27
0. 008
l6
4.56
1. 46
l8
1.28
0. 060
l2
1.72
0. 013
l5
8.25
0. 011
l4
8.97
0. 0228
5.23
1. 04
3.57
0. 20
n8
2.29
0. 091

1. 00
Public Deficit
4.36
0. 006
l6
3.28
1. 26
l8
1.06
0. 077
l2
3.28
0. 035
l8
2.05
0. 008
l4
7.12
0. 0021
5.87
0. 86
5.74
0. 38
n8
0.10
0. 005

1. 00
Table 16.5.b reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k logh tfdxfd,tl pixpi,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn,
parameter estimates xfd,tl is M1, xpi,tl is the number of the coups
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is the public deficit (any of the
three measures) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 16.5.c Direct Effect of M1, Number of Cabinet Changes, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k fd pi to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
9.02
0. 004
l6
2.85
1. 81
l8
2.18
0. 141
l4
3.41
0. 255
l4
1.94
0. 008
l4
1.54
0. 0006
3.24
0. 67
3.51
0. 41
n4
0.93
0. 129

0. 90
Revenues
3.74
0. 005
l6
3.40
1. 00
l8
5.74
0. 180
l3
2.53
0. 046
l4
3.04
0. 006
l2
2.24
0. 0011
2.95
1. 14
1.58
0. 21
n2
0.59
0. 049

1. 00
Public Deficit
3.59
0. 005
l6
1.75
2. 01
l8
1.86
0. 126
l3
2.33
0. 209
l1
0.26
0. 009
l4
1.54
0. 0010
2.85
0. 50
6.02
0. 57
n3
0.036
0. 004

0. 80
Imports
Expenditures
9.21
0. 006
l6
3.15
1. 33
l8
2.71
0. 117
l1
2.66
0. 042
l4
3.49
0. 008
l3
3.20
0. 0016
2.54
0. 90
2.04
0. 31
n5
2.19
0. 078

0. 90
Revenues
8.99
0. 004
l6
2.59
1. 81
l8
2.15
0. 119
l1
1.21
0. 028
l4
2.62
0. 005
l2
1.66
0. 0007
3.82
0. 88
5.00
0. 42
n2
0.32
0. 033

1. 00
Public Deficit
3.24
0. 013
l6
4.21
1. 01
l8
0.52
0. 034
l8
4.17
0. 398
l7
0.25
0. 015
l4
0.28
0. 0002
3.94
0. 55
4.74
0. 36
n4
2.47
0. 308

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
23.17
0. 009
l6
3.68
1. 23
l8
2.15
0. 104
l2
0.29
0. 006
l4
1.89
0. 005
l3
3.34
0. 0015
2.78
0. 80
2.03
0. 20
n6
1.59
0. 173

0. 90
Revenues
4.03
0. 010
l6
2.50
1. 68
l8
2.24
0. 146
l2
0.24
0. 007
l4
1.31
0. 004
l4
1.91
0. 0009
2.98
0. 63
3.53
0. 37
n8
0.96
0. 084

0. 90
Public Deficit
12.62
0. 008
l6
0.38
0. 25
l8
2.94
0. 088
l2
0.93
0. 037
l7
0.56
0. 044
l6
2.23
0. 0007
5.92
0. 71
5.92
0. 40
n4
1.11
0. 208

1. 00
Table 16.5.c reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k logh tfdxfd,tl pixpi,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn,
parameter estimates xfd,tl is M1, xpi,tl is the number of cabinet changes,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is the public deficit (any of the
three measures) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 16.5.d Direct Effect of M1, Number of Legislative Effectiveness, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k fd pi to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
9.70
0. 006
l6
2.28
0. 41
l6
11.96
1. 273
l3
3.72
0. 064
l4
1.27
0. 002
l5
5.49
0. 0012
3.13
0. 79
2.56
0. 24
n6
1.25
0. 155

0. 80
Revenues
10.99
0. 007
l6
2.75
0. 61
l6
5.20
2. 00
l3
4.51
0. 074
l4
3.35
0. 004
l2
1.44
0. 0004
5.43
1. 16
1.87
0. 10
n8
2.65
0. 160

1. 00
Public Deficit
4.84
0. 008
l6
1.80
0. 49
l6
2.57
1. 801
l3
0.80
0. 020
l1
1.68
0. 104
l7
1.65
0. 0006
3.30
0. 77
2.16
0. 26
n5
2.50
0. 122

1. 00
Imports
Exports
7.59
0. 004
l6
4.28
1. 50
l6
4.83
0. 518
l3
1.61
0. 069
l4
0.41
0. 001
l5
11.63
0. 0016
3.24
1. 29
2.09
0. 22
n2
0.56
0. 049

1. 00
Imports
5.90
0. 006
l6
2.54
0. 86
l6
23.47
2. 33
l3
0.62
0. 026
l4
2.13
0. 005
l4
2.71
0. 0007
4.45
0. 83
3.09
0. 30
n4
2.17
0. 140

1. 00
Trade Openness
5.65
0. 008
l6
1.80
0. 48
l6
12.65
1. 505
l3
0.15
0. 009
l8
1.25
0. 130
l5
4.32
0. 0013
1.68
0. 88
1.58
0. 20
n8
2.21
0. 110

1. 00
Trade Openness
Exports
4.88
0. 003
l6
3.38
1. 65
l6
3.57
0. 64
l3
1.67
0. 027
l4
2.64
0. 004
l7
2.53
0. 0011
2.88
1. 08
1.78
0. 29
n3
1.04
0. 098

1. 00
Imports
19.93
0. 002
l6
1.80
0. 39
l6
4.66
2. 55
l3
2.00
0. 024
l4
0.89
0. 001
l2
3.76
0. 0011
3.69
0. 97
3.08
0. 35
n5
2.87
0. 193

1. 00
Trade Openness
4.37
0. 005
l6
1.68
0. 45
l6
3.23
2. 190
l3
1.63
0. 022
l8
1.07
0. 078
l2
1.32
0. 0004
3.31
0. 85
2.34
0. 29
n5
3.36
0. 145

1. 00
Table 16.5.d reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k logh tfdxfd,tl pixpi,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn,
parameter estimates xfd,tl is M1, xpi,tl is the legislative effectiveness,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is the public deficit (any of the
three measures) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 17.5.a Indirect Effect of M1, Assassinations, Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US 
Interest Rate on Economic Growth 
 
 
Table 17.5.a Indirect Effect of M1, Assassinations, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k   fd pi to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
6.20
0. 009
3.77
0. 49
3.14
0. 28
l6
3.48
1. 151
l7
5.25
0. 009
l2
3.32
0. 148
l7
4.91
0. 008
l8
3.88
0. 0027
n6
1.24
0. 090

1. 00
Revenues
4.82
0. 005
3.10
0. 19
4.14
0. 46
l6
3.74
0. 970
l7
4.73
0. 021
l2
2.24
0. 266
l2
4.91
0. 025
l3
0.68
0. 0005
n6
1.63
0. 142

1. 00
Public Deficit
5.48
0. 008
2.60
0. 23
2.85
0. 38
l6
1.97
0. 701
l7
2.57
0. 008
l2
2.70
0. 274
l8
2.11
0. 328
l8
1.86
0. 0007
n8
0.45
0. 026

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
6.05
0. 011
3.99
0. 45
1.68
0. 16
l6
3.05
1. 401
l7
5.63
0. 010
l6
4.18
0. 367
l7
4.28
0. 007
l8
3.13
0. 0030
n5
1.18
0. 040

1. 00
Revenues
11.50
0. 009
4.11
0. 69
3.61
0. 27
l6
2.35
0. 934
l7
4.47
0. 008
l4
0.82
0. 123
l2
3.29
0. 011
l4
0.57
0. 0003
n6
1.80
0. 176

1. 00
Public Deficit
5.82
0. 005
2.71
0. 41
1.84
0. 31
l6
2.34
1. 071
l7
5.06
0. 014
l6
0.94
0. 155
l8
4.29
0. 479
l8
2.25
0. 0007
n4
0.77
0. 054

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
6.12
0. 008
3.18
0. 46
1.74
0. 24
l6
1.94
0. 728
l7
3.85
0. 009
l8
2.65
0. 171
l7
5.10
0. 010
l8
4.34
0. 0031
n7
1.93
0. 124

1. 00
Revenues
6.06
0. 005
2.09
0. 23
1.69
0. 47
l5
0.24
0. 126
l7
1.57
0. 007
l8
0.85
0. 208
l2
5.86
0. 012
l8
1.62
0. 0011
n3
1.30
0. 048

1. 00
Public Deficit
6.02
0. 008
3.58
0. 31
5.57
0. 44
l6
1.27
0. 222
l7
5.34
0. 006
l8
2.37
0. 195
l8
2.94
0. 349
l8
1.77
0. 0004
n6
2.21
0. 103

1. 00
Table 17.5.a reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: yt  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl ytn,
where xfd,tl indicates M1, xpi,tl is the assassinations,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is the public deficit and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 17.5.b Indirect Effect of M1, Number of the Coups, Trade Openness, Public Deficit and 
US Interest Rate on Economic Growth 
 
 
 
Table 17.5.b Indirect Effect of M1, Number of the Coups, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k   fd pi to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
5.08
0. 006
1.89
0. 15
5.34
0. 40
l6
2.49
0. 841
l7
0.59
0. 006
l2
6.36
0. 349
l7
1.42
0. 002
l8
4.75
0. 0034
n8
1.58
0. 061

1. 00
Revenues
7.85
0. 011
3.83
0. 54
2.98
0. 31
l6
6.55
1. 383
l7
0.41
0. 005
l2
2.63
0. 103
l3
5.47
0. 018
l8
3.62
0. 0015
n6
1.25
0. 078

1. 00
Public Deficit
4.89
0. 004
3.36
0. 35
3.60
0. 36
l6
3.06
1. 359
l8
3.62
0. 030
l1
6.84
0. 133
l3
6.49
0. 662
l8
2.05
0. 0010
n7
2.13
0. 131

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
6.34
0. 011
4.23
0. 46
3.84
0. 35
l6
3.09
0. 936
l8
0.67
0. 065
l4
1.22
0. 055
l5
4.89
0. 010
l8
2.96
0. 0015
n7
0.60
0. 016

1. 00
Revenues
5.63
0. 008
2.32
0. 34
3.81
0. 47
l6
3.72
0. 984
l8
1.34
0. 134
l4
0.01
0. 001
l3
8.60
0. 014
l8
3.58
0. 0014
n7
0.73
0. 026

1. 00
Public Deficit
11.45
0. 006
3.71
0. 59
4.11
0. 42
l6
1.86
0. 438
l8
0.99
0. 123
l4
2.90
0. 133
l3
4.85
0. 243
l8
1.88
0. 0006
n7
1.28
0. 041

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
6.79
0. 008
2.84
0. 33
3.04
0. 28
l6
1.22
0. 345
l7
0.62
0. 010
l8
1.79
0. 209
l5
6.56
0. 011
l8
5.46
0. 0028
n4
0.10
0. 008

1. 00
Revenues
5.18
0. 006
3.88
0. 47
4.69
0. 41
l6
2.67
0. 721
l8
1.57
0. 134
l8
2.21
0. 088
l3
4.46
0. 005
l8
7.63
0. 0024
n4
0.67
0. 025

1. 00
Public Deficit
1.89
0. 011
2.45
0. 26
4.67
0. 58
l6
0.84
0. 237
l8
1.28
0. 097
l8
1.42
0. 162
l3
165
0. 125
l8
1.98
0. 0006
n5
0.42
0. 017

1. 00
Table 17.5.b reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: yt  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl ytn,
where xfd,tl indicates M1, xpi,tl is the number of the coups,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is the public deficit and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 17.5.c Indirect Effect of M1, Number of Cabinet Changes, Trade Openness, Public 
Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth 
 
 
 
Table 17.5.c Indirect Effect of M1, Number of Cabinet Changes, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k   fd pi to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
6.40
0. 007
3.23
0. 28
5.41
0. 33
l6
3.55
0. 885
l1
7.03
0. 180
l2
2.77
0. 126
l5
9.17
0. 022
l8
2.40
0. 0020
n7
0.27
0. 008

1. 00
Revenues
11.73
0. 005
3.38
0. 35
6.10
0. 39
l6
1.85
0. 538
l1
7.24
0. 245
l2
2.83
0. 036
l3
3.47
0. 012
l8
2.58
0. 0019
n6
0.104
0. 005

1. 00
Public Deficit
6.12
0. 004
2.85
0. 24
4.77
0. 34
l6
2.17
0. 791
l1
9.52
0. 208
l2
3.78
0. 165
l3
5.28
0. 464
l8
2.14
0. 0011
n7
1.33
0. 051

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
12.92
0. 007
3.67
0. 44
5.14
0. 30
l6
2.40
0. 774
l1
6.03
0. 226
l6
2.97
0. 113
l5
6.55
0. 012
l8
2.99
0. 0016
n5
1.93
0. 112

1. 00
Revenues
8.30
0. 003
3.19
0. 35
6.82
0. 45
l6
3.68
0. 768
l1
3.64
0. 241
l2
2.57
0. 023
l3
3.56
0. 010
l8
3.33
0. 0020
n2
0.02
0. 003

1. 00
Public Deficit
7.94
0. 004
3.97
0. 46
5.79
0. 43
l6
1.97
0. 802
l1
7.52
0. 227
l6
3.03
0. 107
l8
3.92
0. 196
l8
2.06
0. 0012
n8
0.216
0. 007

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
7.73
0. 006
2.73
0. 32
2.39
0. 32
l6
1.90
0. 752
l1
3.96
0. 190
l8
0.94
0. 111
l5
5.09
0. 013
l8
2.60
0. 0015
n4
0.28
0. 021

1. 00
Revenues
12.43
0. 008
3.38
0. 41
4.83
0. 38
l6
1.80
0. 517
l1
4.70
0. 197
l6
1.14
0. 023
l3
5.74
0. 007
l8
2.80
0. 0016
n4
0.56
0. 040

1. 00
Public Deficit
5.41
0. 004
2.34
0. 18
6.77
0. 46
l6
4.25
0. 784
l1
4.91
0. 312
l8
5.41
0. 124
l3
8.41
0. 357
l8
5.96
0. 0017
n3
1.38
0. 065

1. 00
Table 17.5.c reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: yt  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl ytn,
where xfd,tl indicates M1, xpi,tl is the number of cabinet changes,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is the public deficit and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 17.5.d Indirect Effect of M1, Legislative Effectiveness, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth
k   fd pi to pd us  
Exports
Expenditures
6.13
0. 009
4.22
0. 51
2.79
0. 21
l6
6.27
1. 362
l5
2.01
1. 151
l2
0.97
0. 016
l5
10.36
0. 009
l8
4.11
0. 0025
n5
5.94
0. 294

1. 00
Revenues
6.57
0. 011
2.56
0. 37
3.30
0. 41
l6
3.18
0. 702
l6
1.85
1. 097
l2
5..03
0. 069
l3
6.97
0. 017
l8
3.53
0. 0015
n7
2.22
0. 155

1. 00
Public Deficit
3.94
0. 003
1.94
0. 18
9.20
0. 29
l6
2.44
0. 870
l6
1.59
0. 827
l2
7.35
0. 188
l3
7.28
0. 665
l8
1.96
0. 0010
n7
2.11
0. 109

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
6.67
0. 008
2.96
0. 28
2.82
0. 22
l6
3.76
1. 027
l6
2.23
0. 932
l2
11.24
0. 335
l5
8.60
0. 009
l8
7.69
0. 0032
n7
2.69
0. 086

1. 00
Revenues
6.34
0. 008
2.49
0. 25
6.03
0. 53
l6
1.89
0. 788
l6
0.56
0. 560
l6
2.81
0. 269
l8
6.84
0. 014
l8
2.10
0. 0015
n8
1.73
0. 060

1. 00
Public Deficit
6.26
0. 006
2.49
0. 16
3.01
0. 22
l6
2.21
0. 970
l6
1.36
0. 785
l6
4.57
0. 283
l3
7.13
0. 552
l8
1.69
0. 0012
n3
1.53
0. 082

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
5.60
0. 013
3.96
0. 19
7.39
0. 41
l6
5.95
1. 889
l6
2.96
1. 002
l6
3.32
0. 122
l5
7.85
0. 018
l8
3.84
0. 0024
n8
3.85
0. 125

1. 00
Revenues
2.38
0. 004
3.20
0. 27
9.09
0. 57
l6
2.78
0. 692
l5
1.61
0. 955
l6
2.46
0. 100
l3
6.50
0. 010
l8
2.49
0. 0014
n7
1.63
0. 098

1. 00
Public Deficit
4.91
0. 007
1.99
0. 16
1.62
0. 22
l6
2.89
1. 139
l6
1.85
1. 375
l6
3.54
0. 110
l3
9.70
0. 461
l8
1.72
0. 0011
n8
3.72
0. 149

1. 00
Table 17.5.d reports parameter estimates of indirect effects for the following model: yt  c k logh tt ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl ytn,
where xfd,tl indicates M1, xpi,tl is the legislative effectiveness,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is the public deficit and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 18.5.a The Short- and Long-run Effects of M1, Assassinations, Trade Openness, Public Deficit
and US Interest Rate on Growth
xit  fd pi pd to us fd pi pd us     
Exports
Expenditures
l6
3.94
1. 97
l8
3.83
0. 010
l6
0.07
0. 0002
l4
0.73
0. 042
l5
5.51
0. 0018
8.95
0. 652
0.49
0. 001
0.33
0. 0002
4.26
8. 81  105
12.51
1. 11
2.94
0. 78
2.09
0. 29
n7
0.78
0. 045

1. 00
Revenues
l6
1.88
0. 86
l8
1.94
0. 009
l2
0.50
0. 0016
l2
1.39
0. 045
l5
1.98
0. 0006
8.31
0. 692
0.11
0. 002
0.67
0. 0006
2.84
9. 19  105
6.43
0. 75
1.98
0. 67
2.48
0. 44
n6
0.84
0. 067

1. 00
Public Deficit
l6
2.92
1. 02
l8
1.77
0. 009
l2
0.12
0. 0089
l2
0.40
0. 014
l5
6.07
0. 0016
4.54
0. 736
0.78
0. 003
2.21
0. 0490
2..31
3. 53  105
6.92
0. 66
2.33
0. 74
1.84
0. 26
n7
0.42
0. 022

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
l6
3.58
0. 90
l8
4.52
0. 014
l6
0.88
0. 0028
l4
0.23
0. 026
l5
2.25
0. 0008
8.95
0. 652
0.49
0. 001
0.33
0. 0002
4.26
8. 81  105
6.15
0. 59
3.72
0. 86
1.79
0. 18
n6
0.32
0. 013

1. 00
Revenues
l6
2.27
0. 84
l8
1.62
0. 008
l2
0.84
0. 0027
l4
0.28
0. 040
l5
6.26
0. 0017
8.31
0. 692
0.11
0. 002
0.67
0. 0006
2.84
9. 19  105
7.20
0. 66
2.37
0. 79
1.68
0. 24
n7
0.48
0. 023

1. 00
Public Deficit
l6
2.38
0. 85
l8
1.96
0. 009
l2
0.28
0. 0204
l4
0.32
0. 043
l5
5.55
0. 0017
4.54
0. 736
0.78
0. 003
2.21
0. 0490
2..31
3. 53  105
7.02
0. 68
2.64
0. 77
1.62
0. 23
n7
0.40
0. 019

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
l6
2.29
0. 85
l8
2.23
0. 010
l6
0.71
0. 0027
l3
0.37
0. 010
l5
2.79
0. 0009
8.95
0. 652
0.49
0. 001
0.33
0. 0002
4.26
8. 81  105
6.17
0. 67
2.46
0. 72
2.32
0. 31
n6
0.59
0. 031

1. 00
Revenues
l6
2.23
0. 82
l8
2.70
0. 013
l2
0.15
0. 0003
l3
1.01
0. 036
l5
1.98
0. 0007
8.31
0. 692
0.11
0. 002
0.67
0. 0006
2.84
9. 19  105
6.17
0. 71
2.56
0. 69
2.61
0. 34
n6
0.75
0. 045

1. 00
Public Deficit
l6
1.63
0. 56
l8
1.88
0. 009
l2
0.03
0. 0016
l4
0.03
0. 001
l5
7.85
0. 0018
4.54
0. 736
0.78
0. 003
2.21
0. 0490
2..31
3. 53  105
7.88
0. 68
3.09
0. 81
2.96
0. 27
n5
2.05
0. 110

1. 00
Table 18.5.a reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt   fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl pdxpd,tl toxto,tl usxus,tl yt1 c fdxfd,t1 pixpi,t1 pdxpd,t1 usxus,t1t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 ytn.
i and i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.  indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
xfd,tl is M1, xpi,tl is the assassinations, xpd,tl is the public deficit (any of the three measures), xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements)
and xus,tl is US interest rate. l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 18.5.b The Short- and Long-run Effects of M1, Number of the Coups, Trade Openness, Public Deficit
and US Interest Rate on Growth
xit  fd pi pd to us fd pi pd us     
Exports
Expenditures
l6
1.79
0. 39
l1
2.86
0. 029
l6
1.45
0. 006
l2
1.66
0. 049
l5
3.10
0. 0009
6.51
0. 866
0.18
0. 001
0.59
0. 0011
1.74
7. 81  105
10.07
0. 62
4.26
0. 96
2.37
0. 17
n8
0.69
0. 037

1. 00
Revenues
l6
2.25
0. 68
l1
3.42
0. 054
l1
0.86
0. 004
l3
3.26
0. 183
l5
2.70
0. 0011
7.02
0. 661
0.39
0. 002
0.13
0. 0001
2.87
8. 89  105
12.91
1. 08
3.87
0. 67
4.40
0. 43
n8
0.60
0. 017

1. 00
Public Deficit
l6
1.94
0. 70
l1
2.90
0. 050
l8
0.40
0. 035
l3
1.89
0. 138
l5
4.29
0. 0017
4.54
0. 747
0.09
0. 0007
2.34
0. 0467
0.84
3. 81  105
9.74
1. 08
3.17
0. 66
2.91
0. 38
n7
0.01
0. 0003

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
l6
1.68
0. 51
l1
1.97
0. 037
l6
0.56
0. 001
l1
1.10
0. 063
l5
4.17
0. 0016
6.51
0. 866
0.18
0. 001
0.59
0. 0011
1.74
7. 81  105
10.05
1. 07
3.12
0. 68
2.12
0. 32
n8
0.26
0. 011

1. 00
Revenues
l6
2.28
0. 47
l1
2.10
0. 045
l1
0.70
0. 003
l1
1.90
0. 100
l5
1.57
0. 0004
7.02
0. 661
0.39
0. 002
0.13
0. 0001
2.87
8. 89  105
11.98
0. 99
3.82
0. 68
5.18
0. 53
n6
0.04
0. 001

1. 00
Public Deficit
l6
2.31
0. 65
l1
2.19
0. 040
l8
0.56
0. 052
l1
1.34
0. 080
l5
4.27
0. 0013
4.54
0. 747
0.09
0. 0007
2.34
0. 0467
0.84
3. 81  105
10.40
1. 07
2.96
0. 66
2.28
0. 34
n6
0.43
0. 014

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
l6
1.80
0. 57
l1
3.12
0. 046
l6
0.50
0. 002
l3
2.10
0. 094
l5
4.32
0. 0020
6.51
0. 866
0.18
0. 001
0.59
0. 0011
1.74
7. 81  105
11.06
1. 09
3.69
0. 70
2.85
0. 33
n8
0.28
0. 011

1. 00
Revenues
l6
1.90
0. 55
l1
2.05
0. 040
l1
0.28
0. 001
l3
1.63
0. 067
l5
2.01
0. 0007
7.02
0. 661
0.39
0. 002
0.13
0. 0001
2.87
8. 89  105
12.37
1. 09
3.59
0. 74
3.06
0. 35
n5
2.33
0. 079

1. 00
Public Deficit
l6
1.67
0. 38
l1
3.09
0. 034
l8
2.67
0. 205
l3
2.00
0. 062
l5
11.83
0. 0019
4.54
0. 747
0.09
0. 0007
2.34
0. 0467
0.84
3. 81  105
8.87
0. 64
4.01
0. 95
1.75
0. 15
n5
1.44
0. 065

1. 00
Table 18.5.b reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt   fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl pdxpd,tl toxto,tl usxus,tl yt1 c fdxfd,t1 pixpi,t1 pdxpd,t1 usxus,t1t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 ytn.
i and i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
xfd,tl is M1, xpi,tl is the number of coups, xpd,tl is the public deficit (any of the three measures), xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements)
and xus,tl is US interest rate. l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 18.5.c The Short- and Long-run Effects of M1, Number of Cabinet Changes, Trade Openness, Public Deficit
and US Interest Rate on Growth
xit  fd pi pd to us fd pi pd us     
Exports
Expenditures
l6
3.95
1. 26
l8
2.00
0. 0008
l7
0.22
0. 002
l1
0.16
0. 003
l5
2.38
0. 0010
10.64
0. 658
3.08
0. 0100
0.17
0. 0001
2.91
7. 28  105
13.60
1. 08
2.31
0. 79
1.90
0. 29
n8
1.29
0. 054

1. 00
Revenues
l6
3.57
1. 40
l8
0.22
0. 0001
l8
1.94
0. 003
l2
1.80
0. 072
l5
6.13
0. 0017
11.26
0. 648
2.57
0. 0098
0.49
0. 0003
3.58
8. 02  105
9.96
0. 54
2.96
0. 90
2.16
0. 21
n6
0.95
0. 086

1. 00
Public Deficit
l6
4.25
1. 17
l8
1.69
0. 0006
l4
1.51
0. 094
l1
0.98
0. 019
l5
4.94
0. 0016
7.14
0. 664
2.11
0. 0152
0.19
0. 0019
3.02
7. 17  105
13.85
1. 07
2.52
0. 88
2.03
0. 27
n5
2.49
0. 080

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
l6
3.58
1. 15
l8
1.74
0. 0005
l7
0.46
0. 002
l1
0.12
0. 003
l5
3.90
0. 0009
10.64
0. 658
3.08
0. 0100
0.17
0. 0001
2.91
7. 28  105
10.53
0. 76
2.34
0. 84
3.17
0. 43
n5
1.82
0. 089

1. 00
Revenues
l6
5.07
1. 50
l8
2.67
0. 0010
l5
0.62
0. 001
l4
0.86
0. 120
l5
5.50
0. 0016
11.26
0. 648
2.57
0. 0098
0.49
0. 0003
3.58
8. 02  105
8.32
0. 51
2.56
0. 85
3.03
0. 34
n7
1.05
0. 052

1. 00
Public Deficit
l6
4.05
1. 19
l8
1.63
0. 0006
l4
1.42
0. 107
l1
0.48
0. 015
l5
4.43
0. 0016
7.14
0. 664
2.11
0. 0152
0.19
0. 0019
3.02
7. 17  105
11.68
1. 07
2.25
0. 82
1.92
0. 29
n5
2.46
0. 075

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
l6
2.86
1. 07
l8
2.43
0. 0008
l7
0.60
0. 0026
l3
2.42
0. 181
l5
6.33
0. 0020
10.64
0. 658
3.08
0. 0100
0.17
0. 0001
2.91
7. 28  105
11.16
1. 05
2.51
0. 81
2.29
0. 35
n7
0.66
0. 021

1. 00
Revenues
l6
3.33
1. 28
l8
0.74
0. 0003
l5
2.84
0. 004
l3
1.36
0. 039
l5
4.10
0. 0012
11.26
0. 648
2.57
0. 0098
0.49
0. 0003
3.58
8. 02  105
11.75
0. 57
2.45
0. 98
1.92
0. 27
n7
1.12
0. 063

1. 00
Public Deficit
l6
3.94
1. 18
l8
1.72
0. 0006
l4
1.33
0. 075
l3
0.60
0. 015
l5
4.15
0. 0015
7.14
0. 664
2.11
0. 0152
0.19
0. 0019
3.02
7. 17  105
11.84
1. 07
2.33
0. 84
1.96
0. 29
n5
2.49
0. 079

1. 00
Table 18.5.c reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt   fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl pdxpd,tl toxto,tl usxus,tl yt1 c fdxfd,t1 pixpi,t1 pdxpd,t1 usxus,t1t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 ytn.
i and i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
 indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
xfd,tl is M1, xpi,tl is the number of cabinet changes, xpd,tl is the public deficit (any of the three measures),
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 18.5.d The Short- and Long-run Effects of M1, Legislative Effectiveness, Trade Openness, Public Deficit
and US Interest Rate on Growth
xit  fd pi pd to us fd pi pd us     
Exports
Expenditures
l6
2.69
1. 85
l1
2.57
1. 73
l6
0.12
0. 0006
l8
0.21
0. 037
l5
5.00
0. 0016
1.03
0. 087
1.43
1. 053
0.55
0. 0004
2.10
1. 49  104
6.23
0. 72
2.59
0. 47
4.63
0. 72
n8
1.30
0. 102

1. 00
Revenues
l6
2.00
1. 27
l5
2.61
2. 46
l4
0.46
0. 0011
l6
0.35
0. 025
l5
1.64
0. 0006
0.06
0. 002
0.91
0. 335
0.62
0. 0009
1.56
3. 48  105
5.46
0. 56
3.43
0. 58
5.92
0. 67
n8
0.93
0. 076

1. 00
Public Deficit
l6
1.84
0. 37
l5
3.57
1. 38
l1
2.70
0. 0503
l4
2.37
0. 044
l5
0.63
0. 0001
19.52
0. 747
6.96
0. 761
1.20
0. 0264
1.99
9. 26  105
10.18
0. 82
4.06
1. 09
6.65
0. 39
n8
0.21
0. 008

1. 00
Imports
Expenditures
l6
2.12
1. 64
l1
1.82
1. 35
l6
0.03
0. 0002
l6
0.14
0. 043
l5
2.89
0. 0016
1.03
0. 087
1.43
1. 053
0.55
0. 0004
2.10
1. 49  104
4.77
0. 72
1.90
0. 24
4.78
0. 79
n8
1.25
0. 090

1. 00
Revenues
l6
2.19
1. 37
l5
2.44
2. 90
l4
0.84
0. 0029
l6
0.49
0. 033
l5
2.08
0. 0007
0.06
0. 002
0.91
0. 335
0.62
0. 0009
1.56
3. 48  105
5.83
0. 76
2.27
0. 47
4.51
0. 70
n8
0.99
0. 077

1. 00
Public Deficit
l6
1.88
0. 78
l5
1.87
1. 43
l3
0.74
0. 0535
l6
0.32
0. 044
l5
1.76
0. 0008
19.52
0. 747
6.96
0. 761
1.20
0. 0264
1.99
9. 26  105
7.47
0. 65
3.48
0. 71
6.70
0. 49
n8
0.55
0. 037

1. 00
Trade Openness
Expenditures
l6
2.33
1. 52
l5
1.69
2. 28
l6
0.17
0. 0008
l2
1.04
0. 030
l5
2.46
0. 0010
1.03
0. 087
1.43
1. 053
0.55
0. 0004
2.10
1. 49  104
5.69
0. 64
3.37
0. 43
6.24
0. 71
n8
0.93
0. 077

1. 00
Revenues
l6
2.86
1. 61
l5
2.43
2. 77
l4
0.88
0. 0034
l3
2.91
0. 122
l5
2.69
0. 0010
0.06
0. 002
0.91
0. 335
0.62
0. 0009
1.56
3. 48  105
6.62
0. 78
2.58
0. 43
5.87
0. 73
n8
1.03
0. 068

1. 00
Public Deficit
l6
1.92
0. 60
l5
1.84
1. 47
l1
0.32
0. 0220
l4
0.22
0. 006
l5
1.68
0. 0007
19.52
0. 747
6.96
0. 761
1.20
0. 0264
1.99
9. 26  105
7.99
0. 65
3.45
0. 77
7.40
0. 53
n8
0.54
0. 030

1. 00
Table 18.5.d reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt   fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl pdxpd,tl toxto,tl usxus,tl yt1 c fdxfd,t1 pixpi,t1 pdxpd,t1 usxus,t1t ,
h t

2  |u t1 |
 h t1

2 ytn.
i and i capture the short- and long-run effects respectively.
 indicates the speed of adjustment to the long-run relationship.
xfd,tl is M1, xpi,tl is legislative effectiveness, xpd,tl is the public deficit (any of the three measures),
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements) and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 23 Direct Effect of Economic Growth with Standard Deviation in Mean (Univariate) 
Table 23 Direct Effect on Economic Growth (with Standard Deviation in Mean)
x it  k     
Panel A: Financial Development
M1
4.78
0. 52
l6
2.02
0. 559
3.00
0. 57
3.11
0. 48
n6
0.57
0. 022

1. 00
Commercial Bank Deposits
4.03
0. 63

l2
1.15
0. 051
2.51
0. 48
2.17
0. 41
n8
3.68
0. 111

1. 00
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
4.58
0. 33

l3
1.66
0. 120
4.00
0. 67
4.61
0. 51
n3
0.02
0. 001

1. 00
Panel B: Trade Openness
Exports
5.55
0. 24

l3
1.94
0. 034
4.32
0. 79
4.98
0. 50
n3
0.19
0. 014

1. 00
Imports
6.58
0. 48

l2
2.03
0. 061
3.10
0. 59
3.09
0. 47
n8
2.17
0. 083

1. 00
Trade Openness
6.65
0. 35

l5
1.83
0. 045
4.00
0. 65
4.15
0. 49
n4
0.65
0. 048

0. 80
Panel C: Public Deficits
Expenditures
5.43
0. 64

l1
1.76
0. 029
3.01
0. 53
2.52
0. 40
n8
3.76
0. 151

0. 90
Revenues
4.20
0. 48

l6
1.66
0. 030
2.70
0. 59
2.56
0. 47
n5
0.77
0. 030

1. 00
Public Deficit
4.93
0. 43

l6
2.10
0. 143
2.89
0. 62
2.72
0. 46
n5
1.28
0. 052

1. 00
Panel D: International Financial Development
US Interest Rate
4.71
0. 53

l4
2.84
0. 013
3.58
0. 61
2.94
0. 39
n8
4.00
0. 114

1. 00
Table 23 reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt  c k ht x i,tl t, ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 ytn .
x i,tl can be either financial development or trade openness or public deficit or US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 23.1 Direct Effect of M1, Trade Openness, Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic 
Growth (with Standard Deviation in Mean) 
 
 
Table 23.1 Direct Effect of M1, Trade Openness, Public Deficit
and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth (with Standard Deviation in Mean)
k fd to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
6.67
0. 400
l6
3.41
0. 693
l3
1.68
0. 031
l5
4.65
0. 078
l4
4.57
0. 017
3.65
0. 65
2.48
0. 36
n8
3.91
0. 201

0. 80
Revenues
6.71
0. 400
l6
1.82
0. 331
l2
3.16
0. 029
l6
2.40
0. 039
l4
4.63
0. 014
4.18
0. 64
3.75
0. 45
n5
0.17
0. 009

0. 80
Public Deficit
5.53
0. 641
l6
2.38
0. 645
l3
1.57
0. 040
l6
1.88
0. 108
l5
7.81
0. 015
3.17
0. 52
2.08
0. 34
n8
2.78
0. 137

0. 80
Imports
Expenditures
10.28
0. 445
l6
2.11
0. 426
l2
2.72
0. 079
l5
3.42
0. 062
l4
3.46
0. 015
4.00
0. 58
3.42
0. 42
n8
5.03
0. 180

0. 80
Revenues
6.31
0. 410
l6
1.64
0. 319
l2
2.32
0. 055
l6
1.87
0. 026
l4
3.66
0. 012
4.78
0. 66
4.44
0. 46
n4
0.58
0. 028

0. 90
Public Deficit
5.46
0. 369
l6
2.07
0. 382
l2
2.41
0. 080
l6
2.02
0. 053
l4
2.21
0. 010
3.53
0. 58
4.62
0. 53
n6
0.65
0. 029

0. 90
Trad Openness
Expenditures
4.96
0. 291
l6
2.96
0. 556
l2
2.61
0. 033
l5
2.85
0. 050
l4
2.09
0. 010
4.26
0. 66
4.98
0. 51
n5
0.24
0. 010

0. 90
Revenues
6.61
0. 386
l6
1.83
0. 323
l2
3.21
0. 021
l6
2.05
0. 034
l4
4.34
0. 013
4.40
0. 65
4.04
0. 46
n5
0.12
0. 006

0. 80
Public Deficit
5.51
0. 359
l6
2.10
0. 373
l2
2.18
0. 033
l6
1.71
0. 027
l4
2.32
0. 010
4.04
0. 59
4.69
0. 51
n5
0.38
0. 017

0. 80
Table 23.1 reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k ht fdx fd,tl tox to,tl pdxpd,tl usx us,tl t,
ht

2  ht1

2  et1  ht1

2 ytn ,
x fd,tl is M1,
x to,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), x pd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures), and x us,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 23.2 Direct Effect of Commercial Bank Deposit, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth (with Standard Deviation in Mean)
k fd to pd us    
Exports
Expenditures
3.51
0. 575
l2
1.79
0. 191
l8
2.38
0. 311
l5
2.77
0. 058
l4
3.25
0. 018
4.67
0. 51
2.78
0. 36
n5
1.69
0. 092

0. 80
Revenues
1.60
0. 180
l2
1.86
0. 387
l8
1.63
0. 114
l6
4.19
0. 059
l4
4.91
0. 020
3.72
0. 50
2.09
0. 37
n3
0.28
0. 023

0. 80
Imports
Expenditures
4.23
0. 194
l2
2.26
0. 036
l2
1.61
0. 028
l1
2.79
0. 020
l1
2.89
0. 005
5.01
0. 76
6.87
0. 54
n2
1.01
0. 082

1. 00
Revenues
3.09
0. 341
l3
2.30
0. 190
l2
1.62
0. 085
l5
2.85
0. 093
l4
4.02
0. 016
3.45
0. 45
4.49
0. 52
n3
0.86
0. 066

0. 80
Trade Openness
Expenditures
4.29
0. 333
l3
1.63
0. 090
l2
3.22
0. 028
l5
2.29
0. 043
l4
3.05
0. 009
7.12
0. 62
7.39
0. 51
n5
0.35
0. 030

0. 80
Revenues
2.29
0. 629
l3
4.43
0. 530
l8
3.42
0. 207
l6
1.78
0. 077
l4
0.74
0. 009
2.40
0. 18
7.67
0. 73
n8
1.78
0. 061

1. 00
Public Deficit
4.68
0. 486
l3
3.04
0. 161
l2
1.98
0. 049
l6
1.67
0. 097
l4
4.35
0. 017
3.55
0. 43
3.30
0. 47
n7
1.50
0. 070

0. 80
Table 23.2 reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k h t fdxfd,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn,
xfd,tl is commercial bank deposits,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures), and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 23.3 Direct Effect of Deposits at Banco do Brasil, Trade Openness,
Public Deficit and US Interest Rate on Economic Growth (with Standard Deviation in Mean)
k fd to pd us    
Imports
Expenditures
5.98
0. 435
l3
2.34
0. 177
l2
1.98
0. 080
l5
3.31
0. 061
l4
3.52
0. 015
3.61
0. 54
3.80
0. 44
n8
5.10
0. 161

0. 80
Revenues
4.82
0. 391
l4
1.92
0. 144
l3
1.56
0. 064
l6
4.26
0. 068
l5
5.62
0. 018
3.21
0. 59
2.58
0. 40
n8
1.94
0. 137

0. 80
Public Deficit
4.59
0. 500
l3
2.74
0. 134
l2
0.74
0. 017
l6
2.15
0. 115
l7
2.07
0. 011
3.03
0. 54
3.11
0. 45
n7
2.52
0. 143

0. 80
Exports
Expenditures
6.05
0. 437
l3
2.39
0. 063
l2
2.33
0. 082
l5
2.81
0. 056
l4
2.11
0. 012
4.05
0. 63
4.33
0. 44
n8
6.27
0. 122

1. 00
Revenues
6.32
0. 369
l6
2.06
0. 132
l2
2.34
0. 081
l5
4.10
0. 068
l4
3.86
0. 015
4.64
0. 59
4.47
0. 43
n8
5.01
0. 181

0. 80
Public Deficit
2.32
0. 333
l6
2.17
0. 360
l5
1.70
0. 151
l6
4.24
0. 305
l4
11.17
0. 018
4.63
0. 52
2.68
0. 37
n4
0.13
0. 012

0. 80
Trade Openness
Expenditures
6.26
0. 506
l3
1.98
0. 128
l2
2.51
0. 048
l5
2.68
0. 046
l4
4.32
0. 017
4.93
0. 60
3.66
0. 33
n8
4.02
0. 165

0. 80
Revenues
5.96
0. 366
l3
1.78
0. 095
l2
2.05
0. 036
l5
3.75
0. 072
l4
5.05
0. 013
3.65
0. 61
3.85
0. 47
n7
1.74
0. 084

0. 80
Public Deficit
4.93
0. 437
l6
1.88
0. 148
l2
2.05
0. 031
l6
2.73
0. 161
l4
4.05
0. 014
4.09
0. 56
3.66
0. 41
n8
3.76
0. 170

0. 80
Table 23.3 reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k h t fdxfd,tl toxto,tl pdxpd,tl usxus,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn,
xfd,tl is deposits at Banco do Brasil,
xto,tl is trade openness (or one of its elements), xpd,tl is public deficit (any of the
three measures), and xus,tl is US interest rate.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 24.a Direct Effect of Informal Political Instability on GDP Growth (with Standard 
Deviation in Mean) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24.a Direct Effect of Informal Political Instability on GDP Growth (with
Standard Deviation in Mean)
Informal Political Instability
xit  k     
Anti-government Demonstrations
2.84
0. 645
l4
5.34
0. 071
2.24
0. 28
1.88
0. 29
n6
1.53
0. 225

0. 80
Assassinations
6.98
0. 452
l8
1.64
0. 121
3.31
0. 59
2.84
0. 44
n4
0.96
0. 258

0. 80
General Strikes
5.29
0. 580
l2
2.52
0. 286
3.05
0. 73
2.56
0. 41
n5
0.64
0. 107

1. 00
Guerrilla Warfare
5.44
0. 843
l8
0.33
0. 008
2.57
0. 40
2.66
0. 43
n3
0.78
0. 165

1. 00
Number of Coups d’etat
4.38
0. 448
l7
1.63
0. 146
4.11
0. 74
4.74
0. 49
n5
0.46
0. 019

1. 00
Revolutions
4.05
0. 464
l1
2.44
0. 253
2.56
0. 53
2.92
0. 49
n6
1.99
0. 317

0. 80
Riots
11.99
0. 558
l7
1.39
0. 086
3.08
0. 54
2.72
0. 42
n5
1.28
0. 084

0. 80
Table 24.a reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt  c k h t xi,tl t , h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn.
xi,tl is an informal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 24.b Direct Effect of Formal Political Instability on GDP Growth (with Standard Deviation 
in Mean) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 24.b Direct Effect of Formal Political Instability on GDP Growth (with
Standard Deviation in Mean)
Formal Political Instability
xit  k     
Changes in Effective Executive
6.75
0. 531
l3
1.07
0. 074
3.18
0. 62
2.56
0. 41
n4
0.144
0. 414

0. 80
Government Crisis
3.60
0. 735
l1
0.92
0. 059
2.45
0. 35
1.79
0. 31
n6
1.36
0. 207

0. 90
Legislative Effectiveness
4.69
0. 387
l6
2.77
2. 356
3.34
0. 74
2.63
0. 40
n3
0.01
0. 001

0. 90
Legislative Selection
6.89
0. 444
l1
1.93
0. 771
3.89
0. 70
4.19
0. 51
n4
1.26
0. 223

1. 00
Major Constitutional Changes
6.10
0. 363
l5
2.38
0. 090
3.26
0. 80
2.63
0. 37
n5
2.52
0. 224

0. 90
Number of Cabinet Changes
3.63
0. 451
l8
3.76
0. 106
3.10
0. 55
2.36
0. 42
n4
1.41
0. 377

0. 80
Purges
3.62
0. 539
l6
0.127
0. 002
2.38
0. 46
2.72
0. 48
n4
1.16
0. 263

1. 00
Size of the Cabinet
2.61
0. 440
l5
1.36
0. 009
3.25
0. 49
3.23
0. 43
n4
0.54
0. 182

0. 90
Table 24.b reports parameter estimates for the following model:
yt  c k h t xi,tl t , h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn.
xi,tl is a formal political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
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Table 25 Direct Effect of Financial Development and Political Instability on Economic Growth 
(with Standard Deviation in Mean) 
 
Table 25 Direct Effect of Financial Development and Political Instability
on Economic Growth (with Standard Deviation in Mean)
k fd pi    
M1
Assassination
4.67
0. 343
l6
2.23
1. 67
l8
2.32
0. 010
3.95
0. 83
3.94
0. 42
n5
1.18
0. 076

1. 00
Number of the Coups
7.82
0. 505
l6
2.21
0. 70
l7
2.46
0. 130
4.88
0. 82
3.90
0. 39
n2
1.68
0. 104

1. 00
Number of Cabinet Changes
5.76
0. 463
l6
7.02
1. 62
l8
2.92
0. 079
3.97
0. 82
1.87
0. 25
n4
2.95
0. 319

0. 90
Legislative Effectiveness
4.49
0. 326
l6
2.42
0. 81
l6
20.23
2. 836
2.49
0. 61
2.04
0. 44
n2
0.61
0. 062

0. 80
Commercial Bank Deposits
Assassination
2.40
0. 413
l4
2.56
0. 45
l8
0.14
0. 001
3.18
0. 57
2.77
0. 43
n2
0.52
0. 113

0. 90
Number of the Coups
3.25
0. 335
l4
1.89
0. 22
l7
1.33
0. 079
3.53
0. 56
4.77
0. 53
n6
1.16
0. 079

0. 80
Number of Cabinet Changes
2.83
0. 571
l3
3.60
0. 46
l7
1.12
0. 089
2.50
0. 22
4.99
0. 77
n8
0.43
0. 047

0. 80
Legislative Effectiveness
3.34
0. 169
l3
2.04
0. 09
l6
10.08
3. 019
3.27
0. 69
4.45
0. 55
n3
0.95
0. 079

0. 80
Deposits at Banco do Brasil
Assassination
5.72
0. 505
l4
2.06
0. 30
l8
2.01
0. 013
2.93
0. 51
2.69
0. 42
n6
0.91
0. 191

0. 80
Number of the Coups
4.71
0. 319
l4
2.22
0. 13
l8
1.63
0. 083
4.49
0. 73
4.62
0. 46
n4
2.34
0. 189

0. 90
Number of Cabinet Changes
4.40
0. 258
l4
2.52
0. 10
l4
1.53
0. 047
4.61
0. 84
5.78
0. 45
n4
1.35
0. 277

1. 00
Legislative Effectiveness
6.18
0. 330
l4
2.60
0. 16
l8
4.09
2. 075
4.32
0. 84
2.93
0. 37
n2
0.26
0. 016

1. 00
Table 25 reports parameter estimates of direct effect only for the following model:
yt  c k h t fdxfd,tl pixpi,tl t ,
h t

2  h t1

2  et1 
 h t1

2 ytn,
parameter estimates xfd,tl indicates a financial development variable,
xpi,tl is a political instability variable.
l and n are the order of the lags of explanatory variables and growth respectively.
The numbers in parentheses are t statistics.
